Changing Spatial Discourses of National Identity in Jordan by Yan, Laura
Wellesley College
Wellesley College Digital Scholarship and Archive
Honors Thesis Collection
2014




Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.wellesley.edu/thesiscollection
This Dissertation/Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Wellesley College Digital Scholarship and Archive. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Honors Thesis Collection by an authorized administrator of Wellesley College Digital Scholarship and Archive. For more information,
please contact ir@wellesley.edu.
Recommended Citation
Yan, Laura, "Changing Spatial Discourses of National Identity in Jordan" (2014). Honors Thesis Collection. 244.
https://repository.wellesley.edu/thesiscollection/244










Submitted in Partial Fulfillment  









© 2014 Laura W. M. Yan  
   










Chapter I: Establishing the State of Transjordan, 1850 to 1940 
 
13 
Chapter II: Discourses of Pan-Jordanianism: The Annexation of the  
West Bank, 1948-1967 
 
55 
Chapter III: Discourses of a Tribalized National identity, 1967 to 1990 
 
95 
Chapter IV: Museums, Monuments, and Downtown Amman: Spatial  








   
	   2 
Acknowledgements 
 
 The idea for this project emerged from readings of articles by Dr. Elena Corbett, 
who graciously read my initial proposal and suggested several invaluable sources. I must 
also thank the staff at the American Center for Oriental Research (ACOR) in Amman, 
Jordan for their help and their wonderful tea. Preston Quinn, one of my golden friends 
from my study abroad program in Jordan, also allowed me to use some of his striking 
photographs of the Martyrs’ Memorial. The staff at the British Library and the National 
Archives at Kew Garden were extremely helpful in guiding my first experience 
conducting archival research.  
 
 I could not have completed this project without the resources of the Wellesley 
College Library. The Wellesley College History Department has also been my home base 
for the past year and through the department’s Schwarz scholarship, I was able to travel 
to London. I would like to thank Professor Brenna Greer and the other honors students 
for their generous feedback and support. I am also immensely grateful to Professors 
Simon Grote, Louise Marlow, and Y. Tak Matsusaka for giving their time to serve on my 
honors committee. For their unconditional love and support, I must thank my family, 
friends, and loved ones. 
 
 Finally, I cannot thank my advisor Professor Lidwien Kapteijns enough. Your 
class about discourse is the foundation of this thesis. I am so grateful to you for being 
both my toughest critic and most enthusiastic cheerleader. You truly helped me fall in 
love with history and I would not be the student I am today without your guidance. 
   
	   3 
 
(Map of Jordan. Author: cacahuate, amended by Globe-trotter. Source: Wikimedia 
Commons. Accessed April 15, 2014)  
   




COR British Colonial Office Record 
 
FOR British Foreign Office Record 
 
IOR British India Office Record 
 
JNM Jordanian National Movement 
 
PAM Palestine Archeological Museum 
  
   
	   5 
Introduction 
 
The idea for a project about changing spatial discourses of national identity in 
Jordan emerged during my study abroad experience in Jordan. One of the main themes of 
a course titled ‘Jordan: A Case Study in Diplomacy and Development’ was narratives and 
counter-narratives of Jordanian history. As part of the course, I visited various spaces 
such as the Martyrs’ Memorial and some museums, participated in dialogues with 
government officials about the potential political and economic trajectories of Jordan, and 
read some secondary sources about Jordanian history. As I learned more about the 
narratives and counter-narratives of Jordanian history, I realized that another way to 
frame historical narratives was with the term ‘discourse’, which, in Foucauldian terms, is 
not just reflective but also prescriptive, articulating what reality should be according to 
one – perhaps hegemonic – point of view. From 1921 to the present, the Hashemite 
monarchy has engaged in and created discourses of Jordanian national identity that reflect 
how the Hashemite monarchy envisioned and symbolized Jordanian national identity. 
Charting discourses of Jordanian national identity showed that the Hashemite monarchy’s 
discourses privileged certain groups of Jordanians at different moments and according to 
different political contexts. At certain moments, the communities that were excluded or 
felt marginalized by official discourses of national identity articulated their own 
discourses of national identity, which were often premised on the exclusion of other 
communities. For example, as analyzed in the third chapter, certain communities that 
identified as tribes portrayed Palestinians as foreign or even erased their own Palestinian 
roots from their oral and written histories. This was done so that such tribes could engage 
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in a discourse of autochthony and think of themselves as ‘true Jordanians’.1 The 
relationship between official and community discourses was symbiotic and mutually 
constitutive. Communities’ claims of belonging to Jordan were both a reaction to 
Hashemite discourses of national identity and sources of new discourses of national 
identity that the monarchy could appropriate for its own purposes. 
 My initial interest in the project was in the relationship between discourses of 
Jordanian national identity and public spaces in Amman. Dr. Elena Corbett co-taught the 
course called ‘Jordan: A Case Study in Diplomacy and Development’ of my study abroad 
program. Her article about the construction of a Hashemite-dominated narrative of 
Jordanian history expressed in the King Hussein Park in the capital city of Amman 
sparked my interest in expressions of discourses of Jordanian national identity in public 
spaces in Amman. During my time in Jordan, I visited a number of public spaces in 
Amman, including the Martyrs’ Memorial, the King Hussein Park, the Jordan Museum, 
and downtown Amman, which are all spaces analyzed in the fourth chapter. Corbett’s 
article is an essential secondary source that illuminates concepts and contexts for the 
fourth chapter and I also used personal photographs of the spaces to illustrate my 
argument. But in order for the reader to fully understand the narratives expressed in 
public spaces and their significance, I needed to first show how the Jordanian 
government’s discourses of national identity changed over time and the specific contexts 
in which they emerged. Thus, this thesis includes three chapters devoted to the political 
history of Jordan from 1921 to the present with an emphasis on discourses of national 
identity and sources of legitimacy for the Hashemite monarchy. The fourth and final 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Autochthony is a term that is used throughout the thesis to convey the notion of being indigenous or 
native. 
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chapter about public spaces in Amman illustrates how the Hashemite monarchy drew 
upon all the previously discussed sources of legitimacy to produce narratives of Jordanian 
history and discourses of Jordanian national identity that supported and still support 
Hashemite rule. 
This thesis is located at the intersection of the fields of political and urban history 
and contributes to discussions about discourse, national identity, and modernity. Much of 
the political history of Jordan presented in this thesis is based on well-known secondary 
sources in the field of Jordanian history, including Frontiers of the State in the Late 
Ottoman Empire by Eugene Rogan, King Abdullah, Britain and the making of Jordan by 
Mary Wilson, The Making of Jordan by Yoav Alon, Jordan, an invented nation? by 
Schirin Fathi, and East Bank/West Bank by Arthur Day. These sources provide essential 
information about political contexts ranging from the late Ottoman period to the 1990s. I 
have also drawn upon British Colonial Office and Foreign Office reports at the British 
Library and the British National Archives. These primary sources provide insight into the 
relationship between the British government and King Abdullah and various political 
conflicts during the mandate period, especially during the early mandate period in the 
1920s. The records also show how the British government framed the relationship 
between Abdullah and his subjects. The secondary sources that were especially helpful in 
understanding moments of political resistance and communities’ articulation of other 
discourses of national identity were Colonial Effects by Joseph Massad and Nationalist 
Voices in Jordan by Betty Anderson. These works analyze changing relations between 
the monarchy, political opposition groups, Palestinian communities, and East Bank 
political elites, focusing on the period from the establishment of the mandate in 1921 to 
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Black September in 1970. Massad’s work is especially significant for its analysis of the 
exclusion of Palestinians in Hashemite constructions of Jordanian national identity. 
In order to show how different discourses of national identity were expressed, I 
used both primary and secondary sources. Memoirs including the volume published by 
King Abdullah and The Story of the Arab Legion by John Glubb were valuable sources 
for the discussion of colonial and Hashemite discourses of national identity during the 
early mandate period. These memoirs highlighted both Abdullah’s and Glubb’s emphasis 
on loyalty to the Hashemites as an essential component of their idea of patriotism. In his 
study titled Nationalism and Genealogical Imagination, Andrew Shryock recorded oral 
histories from various communities identified as ‘tribes’ and also examined the 
phenomenon of written tribal histories. The oral histories were essential to analyzing 
tribal discourses of Jordanian national identity in the third chapter. Linda Layne’s Home 
and Homeland was an important source for charting the Hashemite monarchy’s move 
from a discourse of a pan-Jordanian national identity, which aimed to include both 
Palestinians and Jordanians, to a discourse of a tribalized national identity, which 
privileges members of tribes as autochthonous and thus bearers of true Jordanianness.  
As for urban history, this thesis does not delve into the urban planning of Amman 
or the public spaces examined here and it does not feature an in-depth study of the history 
of Amman as a city. However, the thesis does contribute to discussions of the role of 
cities in constructing a national culture and discourses of national identity. In The 
Production of Space, Henri Lefebvre wrote that space is not just a locus of social 
interactions but shapes social relations. This idea was essential to understanding the 
potential of spaces in influencing behavior and, by extension, feelings of belonging and 
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the imagining of identities. Omar Amireh’s conceptualization of a place as a space with 
meanings and cues that encourage certain behaviors was also instrumental to writing 
about the relationship between spaces and users and I used his ideas to frame my 
discussion of places in the fourth chapter. Aside from Amireh, important writers in the 
field of Jordanian urban history include Rami Daher, Irene Maffi, Seteney Shami, and 
Elena Corbett, all of whose works helped shape the fourth chapter. Although she does not 
focus on Amman, Kimberly Katz’s Jordanian Jerusalem was an important work of 
Jordanian urban history in that she illustrates how the Hashemite monarchy used claims 
to ownership of the holy sites in Jerusalem as sources of legitimacy during Jordan’s 
annexation of the West Bank.  
In addition to Lefebvre, various works were essential to understanding concepts 
of discourses and national identity. The term discourse is used extensively throughout 
this thesis and it is premised on Michel Foucault’s concept of discourse. Discourse can 
mean statements in general but in Foucauldian terms – and for the purpose of this study – 
discourse is associated with power relations. Discourse can be described as a “system 
which describes the way we perceive reality.”2 This is possible due to the rules that 
govern which discourses circulate. 
Rather than seeing discourse as simply a set of statements which have some 
coherence, we should, rather, think of a discourse as existing because of a 
complex set of practices which try to keep them in circulation and other practices 
which try to fence them off from others and keep those other statements out of 
circulation.3 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Sara Mills, Michel Foucault (New York: Routledge, 2003), 55. 
3 Mills, 54. 
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These practices or rules that regulate discourse are sometimes associated with institutions 
in power. By establishing rules of discourses, these institutions impose and circulate their 
visions of social reality by emphasizing some voices and silencing others.4  
In his introduction to the anthology Nation and Narration, Homi Bhabha argues 
that the self/other binary that is usually used as a concept in discussions about national 
identity should be complicated. There is a process of incorporation of new members into 
a body politic and the ‘other’ actually emerges in intimate contexts controlled by the 
‘self’. Bhabha also conceptualizes narratives of national history as claims to cultural 
supremacy and as performative spaces. Constructing a discourse of national identity 
requires constant performances in order to maintain the narrative or discursive position of 
power. This thesis examines how the Hashemite monarchy has performed and expressed 
discourses of national identity over time. 
 The first chapter of the thesis focuses on the creation of the state of Jordan. The 
chapter begins in the late Ottoman period in order to demonstrate the establishment of 
institutions that were used by the British during the mandate period and to highlight the 
emergence of new political elites. This section is followed by an analysis of how the 
Hashemites gained more control of Transjordan. The Anglo-Hashemite government’s 
control of state resources meant that it could establish a patronage system by which 
different groups claimed loyalty to Abdullah in exchange for access to resources. This 
patronage system catalyzed the politicization of tribal identities, which is an important 
component of the third chapter. The discourses of national identity that emerged during 
the mandate period were largely based on Abdullah’s vision of Arab nationalism. Neither 
Abdullah nor the British government emphasized a Jordanian national identity based on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Mills, 61-65. 
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autochthony. Rather, they emphasized loyalty to the Anglo-Hashemite government and 
inclusion in the Arab nation. In order to justify this claim, Abdullah referred to the 
Hashemites’ role as leaders in the Arab Revolt and Britain’s aid towards the Arab Revolt 
as a sign of British government’s intention to help the Hashemites realize the Arab 
nation. Although mass anti-colonial nationalist movements did not develop during this 
period, political opposition groups emerged that framed their political claims in terms of 
Transjordanian autochthony, as opposed to Arab nationalism. Thus, competing discourses 
of national identity did emerge during the mandate period. 
 In the second chapter, focused on the period of Jordan’s annexation of the West 
Bank from 1948 to 1967, I analyze the political incorporation of the Palestinian 
population into the Jordanian state and the various discourses of national identity 
expressed in Jerusalem. By making visual and spatial claims over Jerusalem, King 
Hussein used his status as a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad to justify his 
‘protection’ of Jerusalem. In turn, by making claims to Jerusalem, the Hashemite 
monarchy bolstered its credentials as Arab nationalist leaders in the context of competing 
discourses of Arab nationalism, especially Gamal Abdul Nasser’s radical, anti-imperial 
socialism as opposed to King Hussein’s pro-Western version of Arab nationalism. At the 
same time, a strong political opposition movement undermined the Hashemite 
monarchy’s legitimacy by adopting Nasserism to frame their opposition. 
 The third chapter focuses on the aftermath of the 1967 War, especially the 1970 
civil war also known as Black September, and its effects on discourses of national 
identity. In the 1970s, an ‘East Bank’ first discourse emerged that privileged 
‘Transjordanians’ (supposedly indigenous Jordanians) over Palestinians. This discourse 
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was expressed in terms of tribalism, putting forward the idea that members of tribes were 
autochthonous. The government’s discourse of national identity as a tribal one was 
accompanied by the emergence of a tribal discourse of autochthony from political 
communities that identified as tribes. Individuals who claimed to represent these groups 
asserted autochthony exclusively for members of tribes by excluding Palestinians from 
their definition of national identity and making tribes bearers of national identity and 
culture. 
 The fourth chapter examines the spaces of the Jordan Museum, the Martyrs’ 
Memorial, the King Hussein Park, and downtown Amman. These spaces were designed 
by the Jordanian government and my analysis focuses on how they have mediated the 
Hashemite monarchy’s claims to legitimacy and discourses of national identity. By 
referring to glorious historical episodes from ancient civilizations such as the Nabataeans 
to the Arab Revolt in the more recent past, in these spaces, the Hashemite monarchy has 
presented itself as the rightful descendent of the past great rulers of Jordan. More 
recently, the monarchy has also adopted a vision of Jordan’s future that is based on 
aspects of neoliberal policies, which are highly contested within Jordan. By shaping 
dominant discourses of the past, present, and future of Jordan and the Hashemite 
monarchy as one and the same, the Hashemite monarchy continues to frame its 
legitimacy in terms of tradition and modernity. What the Hashemite monarchy considers 
traditional and modern have changed over time but the monarchy’s aspiration to narrate 
itself into significance by balancing both can be traced from its establishment in Jordan to 
the present. 
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Establishing the State of Transjordan, 1850 to 1940 
Introduction 
Transjordan was, to use Benedict Anderson’s words, an imagined state. However, 
Transjordan’s boundaries were not imagined by its inhabitants but rather, by Great Britain, 
which divided up the Arab provinces of the disintegrated Ottoman Empire with its ally 
France. Mary Wilson argues that the state of Transjordan was an artificial creation that 
merely served British interests.1 In some respects, this is true: Jordan was a nation-state built 
by the Anglo-Hashemite government that emerged out of World War I. The British 
authorities drew the borders, created the institutions, and even designed the flag of the Arab 
Revolt that was later adopted as the Transjordanian flag.2 According to Wilson, 
“Transjordan’s existence hinged on European interests rather than on a local or regional 
rationale.”3 Transjordan as a state was not preceded by a Transjordanian nation, in which a 
people was united by their common identity as Transjordanians and demanded a territorial 
state. Instead, the state was created by foreigners, a group that includes both the British and 
Hashemites, and they shaped a nation to legitimize the state. 
Perhaps the dominant role of the British in Transjordan’s creation explains the 
absence of the actual residents of Transjordan in many narratives of the founding of 
Transjordan. Recent scholars have criticized the overemphasis on the Hashemite monarchy 
and the British in Jordan’s history. The field of Jordanian history is saturated with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Mary Wilson, King Abdullah, Britain and the making of Jordan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1987), 213. 
2 Sir Mark Sykes designed the Arab Army’s flag, which was flown when Faisal and T.E. Lawrence entered 
Damascus, and this flag later became the basis for Jordan’s national flag (Massad, 159). The flag is composed of 
horizontal black, white, and green stripes, and a white seven-pointed star in the middle of a red chevron. The 
meaning of the flag is explained on King Hussein’s official website: “The flag symbolizes the Kingdom’s roots 
in the Great Arab Revolt of 1916, as it is adapted from the revolt banner. The black, white and green bands 
represent the Arab Abbasid, Umayyad and Fatimid dynasties respectively, while the crimson triangle joining the 
bands represents the Hashemite dynasty. The seven-pointed Islamic star set in the center of the crimson triangle 
represents the unity of Arab peoples in Jordan” (“National Anthem,” King Hussein, web, 29 Nov. 2009). 
3 Wilson, 58. 
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biographies of the Hashemite monarchs.4 However, works that focus on Jordanian citizens 
are lacking. Anderson argues that most recent scholarship about Jordan has failed to question 
Abdullah’s and his descendants’ centrality to Jordanian history and does not include 
Jordanians in their histories.5 By writing from the ‘high politics’ perspective and focusing 
almost exclusively on how the Hashemites consolidated their rule, many popular works of 
Jordanian history seem to equate the history of Hashemite rule in Jordan with the history of 
Jordan. The Hashemite monarchy has dominated histories of Jordan produced in Jordan and 
the monarchy’s control of discourses of national identity has undoubtedly influenced histories 
of Jordan written in the Western world. 
Scholars such as Anderson, Massad, Alon, Shryock, and Layne have aimed to re-
examine this version of Jordanian history. Anderson argues that one way the Hashemite 
government itself propagates Hashemite-Jordanian history through its publication of history 
textbooks. According to Anderson, the overarching theme of the textbooks is as follows: 
“The Hashemites are Jordan; Jordan is the Hashemite family…The citizens of the country 
have no faces and no names. The British creators of the state are merely a force to be fought 
by the Hashemite kings.”6 She attempts to make Jordanian citizens visible and present in their 
own history by detailing the narrative of the Jordanian Nationalist Movement (JNM), a 
coalition of political opposition groups that were active during the 1950s. Massad studied the 
role of British institutions in the production of a national culture, which is drawn from 
colonial ideas of tribalism. This culture is later adopted by Jordanian nationalists and painted 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Examples of such works that focus on the Hashemite monarchy include King Hussein: A Political Life by 
Nigel Ashton, From Abdullah to Hussein: Jordan in Transition by Robert Satloff, Lion of Jordan: The Life of 
King Hussein in War and Peace by Avi Shlaim, King Abdallah and Palestine: A Territorial Ambition by Joseph 
Nevo, Anglo-American Support for Jordan: The Career of King Hussein by Miriam Joyce, and King Hussein 
and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism: Jordan 1955-1967 by Uriel Dann. 
5 Betty S. Anderson, Nationalist Voices in Jordan: The Street and the State (Austin: University of Texas Press, 
2005), 3-5. 
6 Anderson, 1. 
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as ‘traditional’.7 He also explores how, after the annexation of the West Bank, a national 
Jordanian identity developed in opposition to the Palestinian ‘other’,8 which I will elaborate 
on in the second chapter. Alon, Shryock, and Layne focus on the political roles of tribes9 and 
the relationship between tribal identities and national identity that has become extremely 
visible in Jordan since the beginning of the 1990s, and on which I will discuss in the third and 
fourth chapters. 
If Transjordan was an artificial creation, how did a national identity, a sense of 
affinity of the notion of ‘being Jordanian’ develop emerge? To answer this question, I will 
first examine the establishment of the state itself and then how it became a polity with a 
national identity. The first chapter will focus on the institutions that solidified Transjordan’s 
borders both in physical space and in people’s imaginations, and tethered the residents of 
Transjordan to its territory. Events under study will include the establishment of 
Transjordan’s borders and nationality laws. I will examine how the different groups in 
Transjordan related to Anglo-Hashemite rule, whether by participating in state institutions, 
opposing the state, or both at different times. A particularly important group is tribes, both 
nomadic and sedentary. By participating in the state’s patronage system, tribal identities 
became politicized, meaning that tribal identities were no longer just expressions of familial 
or social relations but were also expressions of differential power relations and used to access 
benefits from the state. Although by 1946, Transjordan had been firmly established as a state, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Joseph Massad, Colonial Effects: The Making of National Identity in Jordan (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2001), 7. 
8 Massad, 222. 
9 A ‘tribe’ is a term that deserves further explanation. Alon describes a tribe as a “group of people distinguished 
from other groups by notions of shared descent, real or imagined” (8). According to Wilson, whether or not 
people’s shared descent was real, tribes formed a “complex web of integrative social alliances” (57) and Wilson 
states that nearly everyone in Transjordan identified with a family, clan, and tribal affiliation (57). Therefore, 
the connections and relationships between members of a tribe were a significant social reality. During the 
mandate period, tribes become politicized: members of tribes could use their tribal affiliations to gain benefits 
from the state and state authorities also constructed categories of ‘tribes’ by assuming unified groups and fixed 
territorial boundaries (Eickelman, 128-129). Tribal identities and the meanings associated with them certainly 
inform the present as being part of a tribal network can lead to economic and political benefits. Furthermore, 
tribal and national identities interact to create a national identity that is framed and legitimized by tribal 
identities in Jordan today. This will be explored further in the third chapter.   
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a Transjordanian identity was still in formation. I will examine colonial, Hashemite, and 
political opposition discourses of national identity in order to answer the question: How did 
these discourses reflect and shape conceptualizations of a national Jordanian identity? During 
the mandate period, competing discourses of national identity emerged and these discourses 
shifted with changing political dynamics. 
By focusing not only on the role of the British in creating the foundational institutions 
of Transjordan but also on Abdullah’s work in building relations between the government 
and different segments of the population, I hope to reconcile the multiple viewpoints of 
Jordanian history in the field. The relationship between Abdullah and his subjects was a 
patronage system by which different groups cooperated with the government when the 
benefits of doing so were apparent. The people in Transjordan were not passive recipients of 
Anglo-Hashemite rule. Before Abdullah arrived in Transjordan in 1921, the people in 
Transjordan had already experienced local rule through tribal sheikhs, as well as 
approximately seventy years of direct Ottoman rule (to different degrees depending on the 
region). The Ottomans had introduced some members of the population to benefits associated 
with state institutions.10 In fact, these Ottoman institutions even became helpful to their 
wartime enemies, as the Faisali and later the British governments retained Ottoman 
institutions until around 1930. Furthermore, new political elites emerged during the Ottoman 
period and they formed the first political opposition movement during the mandate period. 
Over time, different people’s interests changed and were expressed with various discourses. 
My aim is to see how these interests were expressed using discourses of national identity and 
how these discourses were expressed in public spaces in Amman. These public spaces are the 
sites of interaction between the state and its citizens and between citizens themselves.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Eugene Rogan, Frontiers of the State in the Late Ottoman Empire: Transjordan, 1850-1921 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), 254. 
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Ottoman Rule 
Before its defeat at Allied hands in 1918, the Ottoman Empire administered the 
territories of modern-day Jordan, Syria, and Palestine mostly from the Syrian city of 
Damascus. One of the main Ottoman interests in the area of Transjordan was the pilgrimage 
from Damascus to Mecca, which was the ‘centerpiece’ of Ottoman rule in Damascus because 
it was a valuable source of income.11 According to Norman Lewis, during the eighteenth 
century, the annual pilgrimage was also the main source of income for groups such as the 
Bani Sakhr,12 which provided camels and safe passage to the caravans in return for payment 
from the Ottoman authorities.13 Apart from ensuring the safe passage of pilgrims, the 
Ottoman government had very little presence in Transjordan before 1850 and mostly ruled 
through local sheikhs.14  
Ottoman rule in the area became more direct in 1864, when the Empire implemented 
the Vilayet Law. This law established a hierarchy of provinces, regions, and sub-provinces 
and in 1866, the Damascus governor Rashid Pasha created administrative districts in ‘Ajlun 
and Salt.15 The administration’s main aim in establishing direct rule in ‘Ajlun was to obtain 
agricultural produce and collect taxes in order to increase revenue after a series of financial 
crises. These goals undercut Bedouin raiders’ claims to taxes.16 Furthermore, the Ottoman 
security forces were able to provide services of protection that limited Bedouin groups’ 
ability to charge khuwa protection fees. After a joint raid by the Bani Sakhr and ‘Adwan to 
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Press, 1987), 124. 
14 I will use the term Transjordan to describe the geographical territory that will eventually become the nation-
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reassert their claims to khuwa,17 the Ottoman government set out to conciliate Fandi Al-Fayiz, 
whom the Ottomans acknowledged as the leader of the Bani Sakhr tribe. The Al-Fayiz family 
recognized the benefits of working with the Ottomans and Fandi Al-Fayiz’s sons continued 
fostering good relations with the Ottoman government; they were rewarded with more land in 
Balqa’ and modest administrative appointments.18 The land registration program19 led the 
Bani Sakhr to register much of their land during the 1890s but such property came to be 
concentrated in the hands of a few powerful families, such as the Al- Fayiz family, within the 
Bani Sakhr confederation. Meanwhile, poorer tribes continued to rent tribal, rather than 
individual, properties.20 These strong socioeconomic divisions did not just emerge between 
large groups of tribes but also occurred within large tribal confederacies such as the Bani 
Sakhr.  
In the northern regions of ‘Ajlun and Balqa’, direct Ottoman rule undermined tribal 
sheikhs’ authority.21 Furthermore, some Bedouins became more reliant on Ottoman 
institutions such as the Ottoman court system, rather than tribal arbitration. In Salt, the 
Ottoman institutions were acknowledged as the ultimate authority.22 Until the 1860s, the 
townspeople in Salt paid a large annual tribute to the semi-nomadic ‘Adwan tribe for 
protection. But Ottoman rule became strong in Salt, to the extent that by the 1870s, Ottoman 
officials in Salt were able to raise taxes from the ‘Adwan and surrounding pastoralists.23 By 
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the end of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire had established control in the north 
and gained the cooperation of the Bani Sakhr.  
Ottoman rule in Transjordan was further consolidated by settlement of foreign groups. 
Circassian and Chechen groups arrived in Ottoman territory after conflicts with the Russian 
government and the majority of these refugees were directed to settle in Transjordan.24 
According to Rogan, the Ottoman authorities decided to settle these refugees in the area 
between Salt and Karak in order to reinforce Ottoman the presence in this area.25 Many 
Circassian refugees became official intermediaries between the Ottoman administration and 
the local residents and assisted with tax collection in these rural, settled areas.26 The first 
permanent Circassian settlement was in the village of Amman, which would eventually grow 
to become Transjordan’s capital and will be discussed later in the chapter.  
As indigenous tribes began accumulating vast amounts of land and refugees settled on 
Transjordanian territory, the urban merchant class also emerged as powerful landholders 
during this period. Once Ottoman rule had been firmly established in the late nineteenth 
century, merchants from Syria and Palestine, attracted to the security and low prices of grain 
in Transjordan, began settling in Salt.27 By the 1890s, the new merchants in Salt exported 
more than half of Transjordan’s agricultural products, which included wheat, barley, raisins, 
and grapes, to Syria, Palestine, and even Europe.28 These merchants started accumulating 
land through foreclosures on bad loans and they became the largest landholders in Salt.29 At 
the same time, intermarriage between Syrian or Palestinian men and local women was 
increasing.30 Marriage was a way of tethering the new merchants to the territory that would 
become Transjordan and increasing their sense of belonging to the territory. The merchants’ 
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economic power translated into political power as they replaced indigenous elites (especially 
sheikhs of powerful tribes) as the intermediaries between the Ottoman government and 
society. The merchants became urban notables as they came to dominate public life in Salt. 
By the early twentieth century, they held many of the elected and appointed positions in the 
Ottoman government’s various committees in Salt.31  
Although Ottoman rule was established in the north, sheikhs’ autonomous rule 
persisted in the southern town of Karak. The Ottomans established their garrison in Karak in 
1983, which is late relative to the establishment of Ottoman rule in the rest of Transjordan,32 
and this is a factor that contributed to the Ottomans’ lack of control in Karak. However, there 
were established links between settled tribes and the Ottoman authority, which was part of 
what Droz-Vincent noted as the nascent phenomenon of politics of the notables in 
Transjordanian urban areas.33 Settled tribes controlled much of Karak and according to 
Rogan, the townspeople of Karak would “annihilate” urban merchants if they tried to control 
land or challenge established political and social groups.34 The Majali tribe, the hereditary 
rulers of the town and district and leaders of two rival alliances composed of various tribes in 
the region, governed the town of Karak and, according to Rogan, tribesmen were the 
“complete masters of the district.”35  
However, the autonomy of Karak changed after a failed rebellion in 1910. After the 
Young Turks revolution in 1908,36 the central Ottoman government wanted to homogenize 
Ottoman rule in all Ottoman provinces and sub-regions, which meant the registration, 
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taxation and conscription of all Ottoman subjects.37 When soldiers entered Karak in 1910 to 
conduct a census, which some residents, principally Qadar Majali (the main sheikh in Karak), 
suspected was a cover for conscription, Majali groups mobilized began attacking Ottoman 
detachments. The revolt grew and spread south to Ma’an but Ottoman military units were 
able to subdue the rebellion quickly.38 However, other narratives of Karak and the revolt 
indicate that one of the Majali sheikhs received subsidies from the Ottoman government as 
governor of Karak and he collected taxes on behalf of the Ottomans. The revolt was partly a 
response to the reduction of subsidies and the eviction of a Majali sheikh from the Ottoman 
administrative council in Karak. Jungen argues that portrayals of sheikhs as independent 
masters obscure Majali sheikhs’ compliance with the Ottoman Empire.39 
After this failed rebellion, Karak remained firmly under Ottoman control. In 1917, the 
people of Karak even formed a military unit to defend the Ottoman Empire against the Arab 
Army, i.e. the British-supported army led by Faisal from the Hijaz.40 In fact, the revolt may 
have strengthened Ottoman rule. Rogan describes how the townspeople of Karak had no 
enthusiasm for any more secessionist movements because local merchants and residents lost 
1.4 million piasters worth of assets in the revolt,41 and thus were likely tired of revolts. 
Although the revolt inspired Arab nationalists in Damascus to unite the tribes in the territory 
of Transjordan to overthrow the Ottoman government, the local people, such as those in 
Karak and Salt who volunteered for the army, had no such ambitions, and organized to fight 
for the Ottomans during World War One. The Transjordanian residents were not impressed 
by the retreat of the Arab Army and the British-controlled Egypt Expeditionary Force and 
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these retreats may have confirmed Transjordanian residents’ distrust of the Anglo-Hashemite 
partnership. 42  
However, the volunteers in Karak and Salt most likely did not sign up for the army 
solely due to a strong sense of loyalty to the Ottoman Empire. Rather, Ottoman rule exposed 
the local population to state institutions and benefits associated with the presence of a 
modernizing state,43 and made the territory more secure and thus more favorable for trade. 
The Ottoman authorities also paid some tribes for their allegiance during the war.44 In fact, 
Shryock notes that some sheikhs in the ‘Adwan tribe today do not describe the Ottoman 
Empire fondly. They told Shryock that the Ottomans only wanted taxes and did not care 
about tribal affairs. One ‘Adwani sheikh stated, “The Turks destroyed this country…There 
was no state, nor was there a government in Jordan. There was no law, no order, only tribes 
and shaykhdoms…the Turks oppressed us.”45 This statement presents a clear contrast 
between the legacy of Ottoman rule in tribal discourse how the sheikhs viewed Hashemite-
ruled Jordan in the 1990s.46 Despite the image of lawlessness during the Ottoman period in 
tribal discourse, the Ottoman government actually created a semblance of a modernizing state 
with institutions that lasted into the mandate period. Furthermore, the ‘nascent politics of the 
notables’ as seen mostly in Salt and partly in Karak allowed political elites to form short-
lived local governments after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the dismissal of 
Faisal,47 as discussed below. 
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The Creation of Transjordan 
Transjordan, unlike Iraq, Syria, and Palestine, was not created as a mandate as a result 
of the Treaty of Sèvres at the San Remo Conference in 1920.48 Amir Faisal, field commander 
of the Arab Army and Sherif Husayn’s third son, proclaimed himself King of Syria in 1918 
and Britain was content to allow Faisal to rule the territory east of the Jordan River, which 
fell outside Britain’s jurisdiction.49 According to Alon, the first year of Faisal’s rule in the 
area of Transjordan was relatively successful: he retained Ottoman institutions and personnel 
and paid local sheikhs to help the officials from Damascus collect taxes and provide services 
such as courts and schools.50 However, once Britain halved their financial support for Faisal’s 
government, he could no longer pay the sheikhs in Transjordan and the government started 
losing power. According to Alon, this power vacuum was filled by local elites, who were 
sheikhs from powerful, wealthy groups. The Bani Sakhr and the ‘Adwan, for example, 
reasserted their power by competing over land and restarting the khuwa tribute system.51 
After the French military defeated Faisal in Damascus in July 1920,52 Britain quickly 
began making plans to govern the territory of Transjordan, which they intended to be a buffer 
between Syria and Egypt because the British did not want the French to have access to the 
Suez Canal and from there, access to India.53 Many sheikhs realized that, after the fall of 
Faisal’s government, Britain was the most important political player in the region. They met 
with or sent messages to High Commissioner for Palestine Herbert Samuel and some 
politically weaker groups even asked for a British administration in Transjordan in the hopes 
that by allying themselves with the British, their political and economic power would be 
elevated. Encouraged by the sheikhs’ overtures, Samuel believed that a British occupation 
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would be welcomed in Transjordan and in August 1920, Samuel met with over 600 ‘local 
notables’ (meaning merchant elites and tribal sheikhs) in Salt and explained that Britain 
would help these various groups establish local governments.54 After the meeting, British 
advisors were sent to set up local governments in Salt, ‘Ajlun, Amman, and Karak.55 
According to Alec Kirkbride, who was sent as an advisor to Karak and became the British 
Resident in Transjordan in 1939, local governments were run by ‘tribal elders’. In Karak, 
these leaders established a Council of Elders, the equivalent of a cabinet, and a National 
Government. This government failed to collect taxes but it did experience boundary disputes 
with other autonomous governments, such as the one established in Amman.56 
However, Alon concludes that the British failed at local rule. Alon claims that the first 
sheikhs who approached the British were the weaker local notables hoping to improve their 
own position vis-à-vis more powerful groups. In fact, when Abdullah’s arrival threatened to 
undermine British rule, the ‘Adwan group continued to support British rule.57 Some of the 
more powerful local groups did not acknowledge the governments that were set up. In ‘Ajlun, 
some communities refused to recognize the authority of the government set up in the town of 
Irbid and some tribes demanded their own separate governments. In response, Major 
Somerset (the British advisor in ‘Ajlun) acquiesced to their demands and set up four different 
governments.58 Tribes such as the Bani Sakhr in the Balqa’ had complete autonomy and 
sheikhs in Karak refused to pay taxes.59 In light of such failures, Abdullah’s arrival signalled 
an opportunity for the British to move away from the short-lived experiment of various 
degrees of indirect rule through local governments. 
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Abdullah, the second son of Sherif Husayn in Mecca, arrived in the southern town of 
Ma’an in November 1920 in the aftermath of his brother Faisal’s expulsion from Damascus. 
Initially a contender for the throne in Iraq in 1919, Abdullah was rebuffed by Gertrude Bell 
and Percy Cox, who argued that the people in Iraq wanted direct British rule.60 According to 
Wilson, Sherif Husayn and Abdullah, who were both disappointed that their dream of a 
unified Arab state did not become a reality. Thus they changed tactics and decided to try to 
re-conquer Syria. In his memoirs, Abdullah writes that he travelled to Ma’an, a town in the 
south of Transjordan, as a response to the Arab nationalists in both Syria who wanted him to 
restore the Arab throne. Abdullah arrived at Ma’an with nearly 1,000 troops and a £90,000 
budget. According to his memoirs, people of Ma’an and the residents from surrounding areas 
welcomed his arrival.61 During the next four months, Abdullah established relations with 
local groups and received visits from tribal sheikhs and other urban merchant elites, as well 
as urban, educated Arab nationalists from Syria, Palestine, and northwestern Transjordan.62 
According to Abdullah himself, the people of Syria were extremely enthusiastic about his 
goals but the Bedouin sheikhs he met were more cautious. However, Abdullah did manage to 
secure some financial support from groups such as the Bani Sakhr.63  
The British did not seem to welcome Abdullah’s arrival. Abdullah writes that British 
posters in Amman and Karak warned people not to join the “small group arrived from the 
Hejaz to fight France in Syria, pretending to have British support. This British Government 
has no connection with this group.”64 However, behind the scenes, the British government 
was deciding whether they should incorporate Abdullah into the government in 
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Transjordan.65 The legal status of the area of Transjordan remained ambiguous. Since it was 
not created as a separate mandate at the San Remo conference, Britain declared that the area 
of Transjordan was part of the still undefined mandate for Palestine but Transjordan would 
not be affected by the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people. In February 
1921, Britain had decided that Abdullah, former contender for the throne of Iraq and 
currently building up a power base in Ma’an, was the appropriate Arab ruler for the new state 
of Transjordan.66 In March 1921, Winston Churchill, then the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, arrived in Jerusalem and met Abdullah, who was warmly welcomed by Palestinians 
on the streets of Jerusalem. Churchill and Abdullah negotiated for three days; Abdullah 
demanded to rule over Iraq and Palestine as well as Transjordan, but this idea was rejected. 
Finally, it was agreed that Abdullah would rule Transjordan for a trial period of six months 
and was promised a stipend of £5,000, in exchange for keeping Transjordan quiet and 
preventing anti-French and anti-Zionist activities.67 As a result of Churchill’s and Abdullah’s 
negotiations, the state of Transjordan came into existence. Transjordan was certainly an 
artificial creation oriented towards British interests but the process of creation was not 
completely controlled by the British government. After the experience of Ottoman rule, less 
powerful groups realized they needed protection from the state and co-operated with the 
British. On the other hand, numerous sheikhs refused to co-operate with the British-imposed 
local governments and began to assert their own rights to tribute, a practice that the Ottomans 
undermined. It was only after the failure of local governments that the British began 
considering Abdullah to rule the territory.   
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Building the State 
 After his agreement with the British government, Abdullah dissolved the local 
governments and established three administrative provinces in ‘Ajlun, Balqa’, and Karak. In 
April 1921, Abdullah created the first administration, which was composed mainly of urban 
educated Arab nationalist exiles from Syria. During the first few years of the existence of the 
emirate, the British maintained control from afar and offered financial assistance, 
administrative guidance, and military support.68 This is evident from how the British still 
maintained Ottoman institutions and did not create their own programs; for the first six years 
of the mandate, the Anglo-Hashemite government used the same methods of land registration 
and taxation as the Ottoman and Faisali governments.69 During the first half of the 1920s, the 
British really did seem to take a more advisory than an actively interventionist role.  
Abdullah continued building relations with nomadic groups, as he wanted to establish future 
rule in Syria by securing the support of such groups.70 He governed the newly created 
Department of Tribal Administration and placed powerful tribes such as the Bani Sakhr under 
his personal jurisdiction, and removed them from the government’s jurisdiction. According to 
T.E. Lawrence and Herbert Samuel, Abdullah’s relations with powerful tribes became his 
strongest political asset.71 The government was also reliant on large tribes due to the 
government’s own weakness. By entrusting sheikhs with responsibilities such as facilitating 
conflict resolution,72 the government both recognized and created clearly demarcated political 
groups under the authority of those sheikhs, thus solidifying any divisions that may have 
existed both within and between tribal groups. Since Abdullah was reliant on nomadic groups 
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as a de facto army against Wahabi raids,73 settled groups believed that Abdullah favored 
these groups, which were only lightly taxed and immune from the jurisdiction of the 
government and its nascent military, the Arab Legion.74 According to a British report in 
August 1921, the area controlled by the Bani Sakhr, for example, was pro-Abdullah but was 
extremely anti-government and the residents there refused to pay taxes and took part in illegal 
raids into Saudi Arabia.75 Any sense of loyalty from the powerful, nomadic tribes was to 
Abdullah and not to the state of Transjordan. 
Britain’s stance on indirect rule changed in August 1924 due to Abdullah’s financial 
debts. As reports from British Colonial Office described, “Amir Abdullah is financially most 
unsatisfactory and politically moderately so, he is hopelessly extravagant and declines to 
account for his expenditure; he appears to be unpopular with the people of Transjordan.”76 
According to British Representative Abramson, dissatisfaction with the government was high 
in 1921 in the southern town of Karak: “Generally speaking, nobody wants the Sherifian 
(Hashemite) Government, neither does anybody want self-government…they prefer British, 
or even Palestinians who would represent Great Britain.”77 But these sources may have relied 
too heavily on settled groups and may not have taken into account Abdullah’s relations with 
some powerful nomadic tribes, among which he was likely to be more popular. In August 
1921, the Colonial Office reported that Abdullah had already accrued a debt of £22,000. 
There was further dissatisfaction with the Syrian nationalists’ activities in Transjordan, as 
well as Abdullah’s “petty intrigues,”78 which undermined Britain’s relationship with the 
French government in Syria. According to the Colonial Office, the Transjordanian 
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government was more interested in anti-French activities than in developing Transjordan. 
Abdullah frequently released Syrian nationalists from prison, thus protecting Syrians who 
were a threat to British interests.79 By 1924, the British Colonial Office was pushed to the 
limit with Abdullah’s spending and sent Abdullah an ultimatum when he was returning from 
the Hijaz to Amman. Abdullah was told to accept the conditions in the letter or he would be 
prevented from returning to Amman by a detachment of the British Cavalry. The conditions 
were as follows: Force seven nationalists to leave the country within five days; agree to an 
extradition treaty with French-ruled Syria and Lebanon; abolish the Department of Tribal 
Administration and make ministers be responsible for the administration of Bedouin tribes, 
and immediately accept the British government’s measures of financial control.80 Abdullah 
accepted these conditions and, according to Alon, from this point onwards, the British 
government started paying attention to building institutions and establishing Transjordan’s 
borders. The British government’s presence was still weak. Nomadic groups had complete 
autonomy in the desert until 1930 and before the establishment of the Desert Patrol, state 
authority in the desert consisted almost exclusively of Abdullah’s personal influence.81 
However, the British were able to control the central government to a considerable degree; 
Alon writes, “At times Abdullah and his Arab government reduced to the role of executors of 
British policy.”82  
Establishing Borders 
One of the first major tasks was to establish Transjordan’s borders with Saudi Arabia 
and this took the form of direct negotiations between a British delegation and representatives 
of Ibn Saud. According to British records, it was a matter of British policy to exclude the 
representative from the Transjordanian government, who would be nothing more than a 
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figurehead to avoid misleading ideas about the British government’s policy.83 The British 
government aimed to balance both Transjordan’s and Saudi Arabia’s interests. The border 
was drawn entirely by the British and Ibn Saud’s representatives and both parties recognized 
cross-border raiding as an act of international aggression.84 In theory, raids were now illegal 
and were considered breaches of international law. For perhaps the first time, government 
presence asserted itself in the desert as the Trans Jordan Frontier Force and the Royal Air 
Force patrolled the Transjordan-Saudi Arabia border to prevent raids. Abdullah also tried to 
prevent raiding by using his personal influence to persuade the tribes not to illegally move 
into Saudi Arabia. He took measures to stop raids within Transjordan when he brokered a 
peace agreement between the Bani Sakhr and the Huwaitat in 1926.85 The agreement forced 
groups to stop mutual raiding, return loot from recent raids, and cease raiding into Saudi 
Arabia.86 However, although the borders had been demarcated, borders remained unclear in 
popular consciousness; even the Justice Minister in 1929 did not know whether part of the 
region called Wadi Sirhan fell within Transjordanian or Saudi sovereignty.87 Furthermore, 
cross-border raids began again in 1928 and continued into the 1930s, which partly 
contributed to the conditions of poverty among rural, nomadic groups in southern 
Transjordan. Cross-border raids presented the most significant challenge to the Anglo-
Hashemite government and Alon argues that it was during the late 1920s that British officials 
in Transjordan started conceiving of tribes more as subjects with rights to protection and less 
as a problem that required a solution.88  
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 According to Alon, borders with Palestine and Iraq were easier to manage since they 
were territories under the British administration,89 and, starting in 1939, residents in Palestine 
were required to obtain a visa to enter Transjordan.90 The new visa requirement may have 
been a security response to the Great Revolt in Palestine (1936-1939) and the substantial 
amount of arms smuggling from Transjordan to Palestine during the revolt.91 In 1937, the 
British government forbade Transjordanians from carrying arms along the Jordan River 
without a license, a regulation that had failed before due to significant opposition from the 
Transjordanian residents.92 By the end of the 1930s, tighter border control helped stop cross-
border raiding and bring nomadic tribes under the government’s control.93 The state slowly 
began gaining control of the desert and establishing its sovereignty. 
Establishing Nationality 
 Alongside establishing what Transjordan was, the Transjordanian government needed 
to establish who Transjordanians were. Transjordan’s first nationality laws were published in 
the Gazette (the official British circular) in May 1929. According to the nationality laws 
promulgated by the British government, Ottoman subjects habitually resident in Transjordan 
on or before 6 August 1924 could be considered Transjordanian nationals. However, if a 
Transjordanian national stated on or before 6 August 1926 that he preferred to have a Turkish 
nationality, he would be required to leave Transjordan within twelve months. Furthermore, 
anyone could be considered a Transjordanian national if, at the time of his or her birth, his or 
her father was a Transjordanian national by birth or naturalization. Residents in Transjordan 
could become naturalized by living in Transjordan for two years immediately preceding his 
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application for nationality, possessing good character, and knowing the Arabic language.94 
Women could acquire Transjordanian nationality by marriage; if her husband were to die or 
their marriage were to end, she would be able to declare or renounce her Transjordanian 
nationality within two years.95 Nationality was gendered in terms of being conceived as a 
patrilineal heritage and thus contingent upon men. Furthermore, the stipulation of knowledge 
of the Arabic language shows that that the government’s conceptualization of who could 
become a Transjordanian citizen was intertwined with Arab cultural and linguistic identity. 
 
The ‘Adwan Revolt of 1923 
 While the British government had almost complete control over the border and 
nationality laws, during the early years of the emirate, the British found it much more 
difficult to control the makeup of the emirate’s administration. According to Lieutenant 
Colonel Peake, the first commander of the Arab Legion, the Anglo-Hashemite government 
had difficulty finding qualified government officials from Jordan and thus, Abdullah was 
forced to recruit Syrian ministers. A problem emerged, Peake noted, when many senior 
Syrian ministers opposed Abdullah’s policy and sent raids into Syria. Their positions were 
subsequently given to “less politically minded persons.”96 Peake implies that Abdullah 
opposed raids into Syria but other sources indicate that Abdullah supported these anti-French 
raids. One of the reasons for the British government’s initial dissatisfaction with Abdullah 
was the Syrian nationalists’ anti-French activities. Abdullah’s government was made up of 
mostly Syrian nationalists and, due in part to the lack of educated Transjordanians, the first 
government cabinet had only one ‘native’ Transjordanian.97 At this point in time, ‘native’ 
meant all residents, including urban merchants of Syrian or Palestinian origin, who had been 
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residing in the area of Transjordan before the arrival of Abdullah and Syrian and Palestinian 
government administrators. 
The makeup of the first government was one of the grievances that inspired the 1923 
revolt. Abdullah’s reliance on nomadic tribes and thus his leniency towards them meant that 
some settled tribes felt they were neglected and losing influence over Abdullah. Furthermore, 
the settled tribes were under a different jurisdiction. Whereas the nomadic tribes were 
governed by Abdullah and the Department of Tribal Administration, the settled tribes were 
governed by the new administration made up of urban, educated nationalists from Damascus 
who, according to Alon, did not understand tribal customs and could not accept their goals of 
local autonomy.98 Since the establishment of Transjordan in 1921, the Balqa’ tribes (which 
include the ‘Adwan group, whose main sheikh was a primary actor in the 1923 revolt) were 
not considered Bedouin or nomadic. Shryock writes, “The term ‘Bedouin’ was a legal 
designation reserved by the British for certain camel-herding tribes of the eastern and 
southern deserts”.99 In fact, British general John Glubb ignored the fact that the Balqa’ tribes 
were migratory and considered them fellaheen or peasants because they also cultivated the 
soil.100 Colonial designations of which tribes were Bedouin reflect colonial preconceptions of 
the ‘martial race’, i.e. Bedouin, being suited for military duties. According to Glubb, the 
Bedouin tribesman’s favorite occupation was warfare.101 Glubb describes the Bedouin as 
“typical surviving examples of that purely Arab way of life, which amongst other Arab 
communities, has come to a greater or lesser degree diluted by mixture with foreign 
influences.”102 ‘Sedentary’ and ‘Bedouin’ became two very distinct categories under the 
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Anglo-Hashemite government and left no room for liminality.103 Groups such as the ‘Adwan 
did not fit the British definition of ‘Bedouin’ and were thus categorized as sedentary, despite 
the group’s pastoral nomadic practices. 
Perhaps the most important aspect of being considered Bedouin was the government’s 
leniency in terms of tax collection and this issue was the ‘Adwan tribe’s main source of 
discontent. According to Alon, tax collectors (reinforced by the military) demanded that 
villagers in the Balqa’ region to not only pay current taxes but also taxes that had remained 
uncollected taxes 1918 to 1920, while the ‘Adwan tribe’s main rivals, the nomadic Bani 
Sakhr, were exempt from taxation on their land in the eastern Balqa’.104 The catalyst for the 
revolt was an incident in August 1923 when the ‘Adwan and ‘Ajarma groups refused 
hospitality to the Bani Sakhr. Abdullah was called to intervene but when he sent military 
support to Bani Sakhr sheikh Mithqal al-Fayiz and did not meet with Sultan al-‘Adwan as 
promised, he was perceived as favoring the Bani Sakhr.105 This pushed Sultan al-‘Adwan, the 
leading sheikh of the ‘Adwan, to call on sheikhs of other tribes in the Balqa’ region and Salt 
to join him fight against Abdullah’s maladministration. According to a British translation of 
the letter from leading Circassians and sheikhs in the Balqa’ to British Resident Philby, the 
sheikhs wrote: 
We inform you of the present situation caused by the Amir Abdullah by his refusal of 
the legitimate demands of the people. Consequently some of those who have 
demanded justice have been imprisoned while others have fled, all this without any 
reason except that they asked for their rights. He is showing his friendship to Bani 
Sakhr, whose wickedness is evident and is showing hostility to those who are 
obedient to the Government. We cannot tolerate anymore to be in such a state.106 
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Sultan al-‘Adwan was probably able to gain support from notables in Salt, as well as 
support from Circassian leaders, because they had been part of the elite under Ottoman rule 
and may have also been displaced from power by the new political elite dominated by Syrian 
nationalists and nomadic groups. In September, the Arab Legion put down the ‘Adwan’s 
uprising and Sultan al-‘Adwan and his family escaped to Jebel Druze in Syria. A few months 
after the revolt, Sherif Husayn visited Amman and granted amnesty to the ‘Adwani sheikhs. 
This amnesty, along with the recognition of the sheikhs’ leadership, marked the beginning of 
the incorporation of the ‘Adwani tribes into the state.107 To this day, members of ‘Adwani 
groups continue to play leading roles in Jordanian politics and the military.108 Interestingly, 
the ‘Adwan revolt is remembered today as a revolt against British oppression and not against 
Abdullah.109 However, from the letter sent to Philby quoted above, it seems that the 
‘Adwan’s discontent was very much directed towards Abdullah and they seemed to have 
requested help from the British government. The ‘Adwan’s historical memory is an example 
of how political identities of tribal groups have become intertwined with the Hashemite 
monarchy, a theme which will be discussed in the third chapter. 
The revolt also developed from a local tax affair to a general protest against the 
government. The ‘Adwan also demanded a national representative assembly and increased 
inclusion of native Transjordanians in the government. According to Wilson, “it was the 
inclusion of these demands which led some to see Philby’s hand in the affair.”110 One of the 
main sources of disagreement between Abdullah and British Resident Philby was that Philby 
wanted to create more democratic institutions and pushed for a constitutional regime with an 
elected representative body.111 Wilson argues that the British government had been trying to 
incite indigenous opposition to the Syrian nationalists in Abdullah’s government since 1921 
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and the British advisors approved of the idea of ‘Transjordan for the Transjordanians’. By 
reinforcing a discourse of autochthony, the British hoped to undermine the appeal of Arab 
nationalism in Transjordan.112 
During the ‘Adwan revolt, some educated Transjordanians, such as urban merchants 
and new civil servants, also supported Sultan al-‘Adwan and formed a broader opposition 
movement. The merchants and professionals were left out of his newly formed political elite 
and thus banded together to form an opposition movement. Perhaps the participation of these 
educated Transjordanians informed the ‘Adwan’s demand for the expulsion of the Syrian 
nationalists from the government and their replacement with native Transjordanians.113 
Massad credits one of these educated Transjordanians, Mustafa Wahbah al-Tell (penname 
‘Arar), for coining the phrase ‘Transjordan for the Transjordanians’.114 ‘Arar conveyed his 
opposition to the Anglo-Hashemite project in his poetry and interestingly, his concept of 
‘foreigner’ includes both the British and the Hashemites. In his poems, Amman, the symbol 
for Abdullah’s rule, destroyed the natural beauty of Transjordan and imposed foreign rule 
over Transjordanians.115 Although ‘Arar seemed to question the Hashemite monarchy’s 
legitimacy, according to Anderson, the opposition movement’s use of Transjordanian 
nationalist discourse meant that they recognized the legitimacy of the state.116 There is a 
difference between one man’s poetry and a whole opposition movement’s goals but it is 
significant that ‘Arar painted the Hashemites as foreigners. This notion of the Hashemites’ 
foreignness virtually disappears as the official discourse for Jordanian national identity 
developed and the Hashemites became stand-ins for all Jordanians. 
After the ‘Adwan revolt and the subsequent British ultimatum to Abdullah, most 
Syrian nationalists were expelled from his government in 1925. Echoing Peake’s claims, the 
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new British Representative Henry Cox nevertheless believed that there was insufficient 
educated local manpower and, in 1926, Transjordan started recruiting Palestinians, many of 
whom were Christians.117 Many of these Palestinian families, such as the Rifa’i family, have 
become associated with the East Bank in Jordanian consciousness today and their Palestinian 
roots have been forgotten. Although Abdullah, from the 1930s onwards, gradually began 
incorporating Transjordanians into the administration, non-Transjordanians, mostly 
Palestinian and British officials, continued to hold the top positions in the government until 
Jordan’s independence in 1946.118 Wilson argues that Abdullah feared that bringing local 
notables in direct contact with Britain would supplant his own influence with Britain. 
Abdullah believed that his power was already limited and tenuous, and bringing 
Transjordanians, who were more rooted in local society than he was, into the state 
government could challenge his role as the intermediary between the British and local 
society.119 
Although they were excluded from the bureaucracy, local notables were able to 
participate in politics through the Legislative Council. This was established in accordance 
with the 1928 Anglo-Transjordan agreement.120 At the Legislative Council’s inception, 
fourteen members were elected from three electoral districts: ‘Ajlun, ‘Balqa, and Karak. The 
minorities were overrepresented compared to the population, with reserved seats for four 
Christians and two Circassians out of fourteen. The tribes defined as Bedouin were excluded 
from the election process and two tribal representatives, one from the north and one from the 
south, were appointed by a government commission.121 According to Wilson, Abdullah did 
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appreciate this “emerging Transjordanian elite,”122 as the Legislative Council was able to 
pass laws that supported Abdullah’s interests, rather than those of the British advisors. 
 
Politicization of Bedouin Group Identities 
Bedouin groups were already political but the politicization of Bedouin group 
identities denotes the process by which tribal group identities come to express different 
power relations between and within tribes in terms of access to the state. The separation of 
the Bedouin from the electorate is just one example of how the government treated those who 
were considered Bedouin as separate citizens. As discussed previously, Bedouin tribes fell 
under the jurisdiction of tribal or customary law, rather than civil law. Scholarship about 
British tribal law in India suggests that so-called tribal laws were really impositions of a 
colonial vision of what tribal law was, rather than a true integration of existing values.123 
Nevertheless, customary law was an important characteristic of colonial indirect rule. 
According to Mamdani, “The point was to go beyond an understanding of custom in the 
singular to unravelling its many strands, thereby to identify the authoritarian strand so as to 
sculpt it and build on it, sanctioning the product officially as customary law.”124 This was 
possible by working with a ‘culturally legitimate’ group and disseminating this elite’s 
customs to the masses.125 In Transjordan, customary law was based on the customs of 
powerful nomadic tribes. For example, the government incorporated the tribe as a basic 
administrative unit for purposes such as tax collection and distribution. The government also 
endorsed tribal practices of conflict resolution and collective responsibility to improve public 
security and lower crime rates. This was made possible by recognizing the authority of tribal 
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sheikhs and giving sheikhs the responsibility of guaranteeing security, preventing crimes, and 
arresting criminals.126 Abdullah’s personal relations with Bedouin tribes also allowed him to 
establish some semblance of control as he appealed to sheikhs to keep law and order and start 
collecting taxes. Cooperation with Abdullah also allowed sheikhs to increase their influence 
and preserve their leadership within the tribal structure.127 Although the government gave 
sheikhs new responsibilities in terms of maintaining security, the British land program (1927-
1950) also removed sheikhs’ customary responsibility in terms of land settlement.128 
One of the factors that may have incentivized co-operation with the government was 
the extreme poverty in the rural areas of Transjordan in the 1930s. Severe drought reduced 
agricultural yield and pastoral assets drastically. According to a British Royal Air Force 
intelligence summary from March 1934, the Bani Hassan tribe, which became settled in the 
Jerash area in the north, was in a “critical state of poverty”: the tribe had lost most of its cattle 
in the last four years due to the drought that afflicted Transjordan in the early 1930s. The 
Bani Hassan had not been able to raise a single crop and around 1,600 people were 
“absolutely destitute.”129 Accordingly, the Arab Legion and the Trans Jordan Frontier Force 
provided relief and found work for 400 men.130  
The intensified raids from Saudi Arabia, beginning in 1928, exacerbated the critical 
state of rural areas. Abdullah, who was still the authority on tribal affairs in 1928, attempted 
to prevent affected tribes in Transjordan from raiding the Ikhwan in retaliation and promised 
the return of the loot from Ibn Saud. However, the loot was not returned and Abdullah started 
losing control of some Transjordanian groups when they started raiding Saudi territory in 
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return.131 The British Foreign Office was more sympathetic to Ibn Saud’s claims that 
Transjordan had started the raids and embarked on a series of programs to prevent raids from 
Transjordan into Saudi Arabian territory. The first was to create the Tribal (Bedouin) Control 
Board and this was truly a mechanism that allowed British institutional control over tribal 
affairs and limited Abdullah’s use of his personal influence.132 This institution aimed to 
strengthen the state but not the ruler. However, Abdullah’s personal influence remained 
relevant when the Board also changed the social structure of the Huwaitat group. The group 
was composed of two branches, one led by Hamad bin Jazi, and the other led by ‘Awda abu 
Taya. During the 1920s, ‘Awda let his relations with Abdullah flounder while Hamad 
cultivated his relationship with Abdullah. Therefore, it is no surprise that after ‘Awda’s death, 
Abdullah declared at a Board meeting in 1930 that Hamad bin Jazi was the ‘paramount 
sheikh’ of the two branches.133 By changing and institutionalizing the balance of power 
between the two branches of the Huwaitat, Anglo-Hashemite rule made Hamad bin Jazi’s 
role as a tribal leader dependent on government recognition and thus politicized his tribal 
identity. 
In November 1930, the British wanted an even greater degree of control, at the 
expense of Abdullah’s power, over nomadic groups in the rural area and brought John Glubb 
to Transjordan. Glubb had previously served to prevent raiding in Iraq and the British 
government wanted Glubb to perform a similar task in Transjordan. According to Glubb’s 
memoirs, many Huwaitat tribesmen, whose leader Hamad bin Jazi was politically legitimized 
by Abdullah’s support, did not trust the Anglo-Hashemite government. They suffered 
severely from Ikhwani raids and Glubb stated that if the Huwaitat continued to not cooperate 
with the government, “there could be only one end to so senseless and obstinate a struggle – 
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the virtual extinction of the Huwaitat as a tribe.”134 As mentioned previously, the plight of the 
Huwaitat is an example of the larger rift developing between Abdullah and the tribes. 
According to Alon, by August 1930, the total losses of Transjordanian tribes were 3,662 
camels, 5,270 sheep, fifty killed and £1,020 worth of property. No action was taken by 
British forces to prevent Ikhwani raids. Relations between Abdullah’s government and the 
tribesmen who had suffered these losses began to deteriorate. By 1933, the combination of 
drought, locust attacks on crops, Ikhwani raids and British inaction, and the Great Depression 
caused a severe famine in Transjordan.135 
The extreme poverty made groups in rural areas more amenable to other British 
policies. Glubb spent weeks among the Huwaitat groups to convince them to stop raiding and 
start cooperating with the government to ensure their own survival. He traveled without an 
escort and thus disassociated himself from the Arab Legion, which Alon argues helped Glubb 
gain people’s trust. In order to prevent raiding, Glubb established the Desert Patrol under the 
Arab Legion. Before long, recruits from Huwaitat began enlisting.136 Glubb states that by 
March 1931, the Arab Legion had tents, trucks, uniforms, and around thirty soldiers. Raiding 
had virtually ceased.137 Glubb recruited sons of leading sheikhs to not only convey the 
prestige of the Legion but also to tie their families to the government and prevent subversion 
of government policies. Furthermore, the economic incentives were clear: a soldier’s salary 
could support several families during the famine in the 1930s.138 By the 1940s, the Arab 
Legion had expanded as a response to the Palestinian Revolt, and had become the most 
important source of government employment. Most of the soldiers were men from nomadic 
groups.139 Glubb concludes: 
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In Trans-Jordan raiding, which had been practised for centuries, was abolished in a 
few months without inflicting a single casualty on the tribes and without putting a 
single tribesman in prison…and finally these tribesmen, who had for centuries 
regarded the Government as their natural enemy, enlisted in their thousands in the 
Arab Legion, and have ever since been amongst the most loyal and patriotic of the 
citizens of Trans-Jordan.140 
Glubb also codified customary law by setting up tribal courts, which maintained sheikhs as 
judges but integrated them into the state structure.141 Alongside employment opportunities, 
Glubb distributed clothes, flour, or small sums of money to mainly women and children, 
helped implement relief projects, and introduced agricultural, health care, and educational 
initiatives in the desert.142  
By institutionalizing tribes’ and sheikhs’ relationships with the state and codifying 
(and thus changing) some tribal customs, the Anglo-Hashemite government was able to 
politicize tribal identities. These tribal identities were no longer just expressions of 
relationships between tribes as equivalent players within the territory Transjordan. Tribal 
identities solidified power differences within or between tribes and shaped how certain 
groups interacted with the state and what benefits these groups could receive from the state. 
The politicization of tribal identity became a dominant feature in Transjordanian politics and 
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Discourses of Identity: Colonial, Hashemite, and the Opposition 
 In her examination of Jordan’s history, Wilson argues that mandatory Transjordan 
was unable to develop a nationalist movement due to the lack of demographic or social 
factors, such as cities, a sizeable middle class whose interests were compromised by 
European interference, and financial resources required for a nationalist movement.144 She 
states unequivocally that there was little opposition to Abdullah’s pro-British policy in 
Transjordan and that “in the twenty years of the British mandate, no structures of independent 
political organization had emerged, nor had the demographic or economic structure of 
Transjordan changed sufficiently to allow effective nationalist politics.”145 In this section, I 
will explore colonial, Hashemite, and political opposition discourses about national identity 
to examine Wilson’s claim. As expressed in colonial and Hashemite discourses during this 
period, loyalty to the Hashemites required good relations with the British. Therefore, there 
were constraints on the emergence of a massive nationalist movement that could be both anti-
colonial and pro-Hashemite. However, there were moments of political resistance during the 
1920s when political communities denounced both Abdullah and the British by painting them 
as foreigners. Although these moments may not fit Wilson’s definition of an anti-colonial 
nationalist movement, they nevertheless indicate anti-colonial sentiment framed by a 
discourse of autochthony. 
Discourse not only reflects social realities but can shape social realities.146 In his 
memoirs about Jordan, Glubb not only describes his personal social reality but constructs his 
prescriptive vision of what Jordan should be. Glubb describes tribesmen as “amongst the 
most loyal and patriotic citizens of Trans-Jordan.”147 Note that he describes them as citizens 
and not subjects, despite the lack of strong democratic principles in this polity, which was a 
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monarchy under colonial control. Massad argues that Glubb was not a proponent of 
democracy in Transjordan;148 he believed that Arabs were more suited to traditional 
dictatorships and that if democracy were to be established in the Middle East, it would 
require centuries.149 So what was Glubb’s concept of Transjordanian citizenship if it did not 
involve democracy and why did Glubb use it? Perhaps Glubb felt that the essence of 
citizenship was individuals having a stake in the nation-state and that this would produce the 
most unshakeable sense of loyalty to the state. He wanted to inspire true love for Anglo-
Hashemite rule, rather than convey a relationship of domination and subjugation.  
Glubb also believed that loyalty to the state superseded any sentiments of Arab 
nationalism. In response to attacks from Palestine on the Arab Legion along the Palestinian-
Transjordanian border during the Palestinian Revolt in 1938, Glubb states, 
The Arab leaders in Damascus had mistaken the spirit of the people of Trans-Jordan, 
who indeed had been ardent supports of the Palestine Arabs, but who were at the same 
time extremely proud of their country and of the good order and loyalty which reigned 
in it. They were unwilling to be forced to rebel against their own Government by an 
invasion from Syria or Palestine, and indeed resented the attempt.150 
Although Glubb wrote that every man in Transjordan supported the cause of Palestinian 
Arabs against Zionist political and military groups,151 Glubb believed that Arabs were more 
individualistic than Europeans and less likely to participate in mass movements. He writes, 
“Many volunteers in Trans-Jordan forded the river and joined the rebels in Palestine fighting 
the British. Yet the attitude of Arabs of Trans-Jordan to ‘their’ Englishmen never perceptibly 
varied.”152 Glubb seems to make a distinction between Arab nationalism and Transjordanian 
patriotism, the latter of which is intertwined with support for Anglo-Hashemite rule in 
Transjordan. Similarly, Glubb’s discourse about Transjordanian patriotism can be interpreted 
more as Glubb’s prescription rather than empirical description. 
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When Abdullah first arrived in Transjordan, he had used the discourse of Arab 
nationalism to legitimize his actions. In response to the letter of the Governor of Salt, Mazhar 
Bey Raslan, asking him what his intentions were, Abdullah had written: “I am visiting 
Transjordan to occupy it, as directed by the Royal Arab Government of Syria. I am now 
acting for His Majesty King Faisal, and it is your duty to receive your orders from Maan.”153 
This statement clearly expresses the notion of a unified Arab state in which the area of 
Transjordan fell under the jurisdiction of the ‘Royal Arab Government’, despite Faisal’s loss 
of Syria and defeat and expulsion of his government. This notion of Arab nationalism rested 
on the idea that all Arabs, no matter what their current state or jurisdiction, were part of the 
Arab nation. When Abdullah left Ma’an for Amman in March 1921, he addressed the people 
who saw him off at the train station with these words: “My wish as I leave you is that you 
may cease to think of yourselves as belonging to small geographical districts; but that you 
may learn to be loyal to the great Arab brotherhood which embraces us all.”154 Previously, he 
told Syrian nationalists that “the Arabs are one body; if one member suffers the whole is 
affected… I say without hesitation that I support the monarchy and the re-establishment of 
King Faisal.”155 Abdullah clearly uses the discourse of Arab nationalism to legitimize 
Hashemite rule. What is interesting is that he urges the residents of Ma’an to abandon their 
regional identities and embrace their most important identity: that of members of the Arab 
nation. He did not call for Transjordanian nationalism because he did not intend on ruling 
Transjordan at this time; his sights were set on Syria.  
 This discourse of Arab nationalism continues through the 1940s. In 1941, Abdullah 
made a speech to the Arab Legion after they helped restore the Iraqi Hashemite king to power 
after a coup. He said:  
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Long live the brave and victorious Arab Legion, and may the Arab nation achieve her 
national ambitions through God and the love of his Prophet, and with the aid of our 
ally Great Britain. Let us stand by her as she stood by us, and let us help her in her 
difficult worldwide task.156  
At this point in time, Abdullah intertwined achieving the goal of the Arab nation with the 
help of Great Britain. This statement can be seen as an attempt to legitimize British rule in 
Transjordan using Arab nationalism. Perhaps this was a response to the anti-colonial protests 
that erupted in Amman when the Arab Legion was deployed to restore Hashemite rule in Iraq. 
Furthermore, Abdullah had a reputation of being Britain’s lackey and many young 
Transjordanians protested his continued reliance on Britain during the Palestinian Revolt, 
which undermined the unity of the Arab nation. According to Wilson, by the 1940s, Abdullah 
had few political supporters in Syria and was concerned about the activities of other Arab 
leaders who promoted their own ideas of Arab unity. This was because Abdullah did not 
command the same influence as Nuri al-Sa’id in Iraq or Nahas Pasha in Egypt, who were also 
both pro-British. They threatened Abdullah’s position as a contender for the Arab throne, 
should Britain wish to create it.157 By intertwining Arab nationalism and support for the 
British, Abdullah attempted to not only legitimize his own rule but also showcase his 
significance and loyalty to the British. In some passages from his memoirs, it is unclear if 
Abdullah was referring to Arab nationalism or Transjordanian nationalism.158 But one thing 
is clear: Abdullah always explicitly tied nationalism with loyalty and obedience to Hashemite 
rule. 
 Transjordanian anti-colonial nationalist movements did not emerge during the 
mandate period because Britain controlled the Hashemite state. How could anyone claim to 
be loyal to the state but not to the British when the Hashemites proclaimed that the Arab 
nation could only be realized with the help of the British? However, although a fully-fledged 
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nationalist movement does not seem to emerge in Transjordan, the main political opposition 
force that challenged Hashemite rule during the 1950s was established during the mandate 
period. A political movement led by young, educated, urban Transjordanians emerged 
alongside the ‘Adwan revolt in 1923 and a discourse of autochthony was utilized to frame 
their demands for greater political participation for Transjordanians.  
Similar political opposition forces were extremely visible in 1928, when Britain and 
Transjordan signed the Anglo-Transjordanian Agreement. This agreement made Transjordan 
an ‘independent emirate’, rather than a region in the Palestinian mandate, subject to British 
control over foreign affairs, defense, and finance. Britain also had the right to exploit 
Transjordan’s natural resources as it so wished and Transjordan would pay for the expenses 
of the British Resident and his staff. In return, Transjordan would receive an annual subsidy 
for its armed forces from Britain.159 The agreement also established the Organic Law, which 
recognized Abdullah as the head of state and created the Executive and Legislative Councils. 
Abdullah appointed members to the Executive Council whereas members of the Legislative 
Council were elected; non-Transjordanians were not allowed to run for election to the 
Legislative Council.160 According to Anderson, opposition forces protested the Organic Law 
because they believed it was more reflective of Anglo-Hashemite interests than those of the 
people. For example, the Legislative Council seemed to fall short of being a legislative body 
truly representative of the nation as its laws could only be implemented if Abdullah and the 
British Resident gave their approval. Various strikes and protests arose: the souq in Irbid 
closed for a week in April 1928; people refused to go to work for three days in Salt, where 
schoolboys threw onions at Abdullah; and a student demonstration in Amman pushed 
Abdullah to review final school exams himself and allowed students to pass based on their 
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political loyalty. An Amman-based newspaper, whose editor was Syrian, denounced 
Abdullah as a traitor and alienator of the freedom of his people.161 
Bu the late 1920s, this political opposition movement was no longer limited to leading 
sheikhs or urban merchants; it also involved new Syrian and Palestinian immigrants, who 
perhaps did not fit a discourse of Transjordanian autochthony but shared Transjordanian 
notables’ interests in independence and greater democracy. In July 1928, about 150 notables, 
sheikhs, and intellectuals met at a coffee house in Amman and formed the National 
Conference. Their goal was to limit Abdullah’s powers and implement a truly constitutional 
monarchy.162 From 1928 to 1929, the National Conference organized petitions from the 
residents of Karak and ‘Ajlun to send to the Secretary of the League of Nations. The 
petitioners protested the conduct of the British mandatory power in Transjordan and the 
Anglo-Transjordanian Agreement by referring to the agreement between Major Somerset and 
Transjordanian representatives in 1920: that the independent Transjordanian government 
would have an Arab amir and a House of Representatives; that the independent government 
would have no connection with the Palestine Government (the British mandatory 
government); and that Transjordan would be annexed to Syria whenever the Syrian Unity 
becomes an established fact. The petitioners argued, “His Majesty’s Government commenced 
to rob us gradually of our rights,”163 as British-imposed laws were incompatible with local 
customs and there were no native officers in the army, and they requested Transjordan to be 
an “Arab Independent State within its natural and known boundaries.”164 The last statement 
indicates that the petitioners, similar to the protesters in 1923, accepted Transjordan’s 
legitimacy in terms of its boundaries and statehood; in fact, they believe these boundaries are 
natural. No one contested British-imposed boundaries. By arguing that Transjordan’s 
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boundaries are natural, the petitioners seem to believe that Transjordan is in fact an organic 
nation and not an artificial entity created by British interests. Clearly, these Transjordanians 
could conceive of Transjordan as a nation and by extension, legitimized their own 
subjectivities as Transjordanians.  
Needless to say, the petitioners did not receive the response they wanted from the 
League of Nations as mandatory power continued until 1946. But these protests may have 
impacted the government’s policy; during the 1930s, the Anglo-Hashemite government 
began employing more Transjordanians, including those who had opposed Anglo-Hashemite 
rule, in the bureaucracy. Even the poet ‘Arar, who denounced Abdullah as a foreigner, 
became a teacher employed by the state government. According to Anderson, “in the eyes of 
many, Hashemite ‘nationalism’s task’ was not to ‘overcome the subordination of the 
colonized middle class’ but to bring more people into this national project.”165 In essence, a 
nationalist movement did not emerge because the urban, educated middle-class that was the 
proponent of anti-colonial nationalism in other nation-states was subsumed into the Anglo-
Hashemite state bureaucracy.  
However, political opposition was still present as the state educators often propagated 
Arab nationalism. Jordanian history textbooks were not published until the mid-1950s and the 
state could not observe all its teachers in their classrooms. According to Anderson, teachers 
often framed their lessons with Arab nationalism and not Transjordanian exclusivity. 
Anderson clarifies the conflict between Transjordanian and Arab identities: 
Transjordan became a reality of the students’ identity but failed to wipe out the larger 
cultural affiliation symbolized by Arab history, language, and literature. The problems 
for the students were: Which national identity holds resonance in these students’ lives? 
To which ‘community’ did they belong?166  
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Furthermore, many privileged young men were able to study at secondary schools and 
universities elsewhere in the Middle East and, according to British reports, were politicized 
further with ideas of Arab nationalism.167 After the annexation of the West Bank, the notion 
of Arab nationalism became the political opposition’s main discourse to frame their demands. 
This implies that the previous opposition discourse, the discourse of autochthony, was no 
longer viable for political opposition because Jordan’s identity as a nation-state became 
intertwined with the Hashemite monarchy. Therefore, protesters needed to use the ideals of 
the unified Arab state to undermine Jordan’s legitimacy as a nation-state and the Hashemites’ 
legitimacy as Jordan’s rulers. 
 
Amman 
 Although it lacked monumental spaces during the mandate period, Amman was an 
essential component of the Anglo-Hashemite government’s performances of legitimacy. 
Amman was the first Circassian settlement in the territory of Transjordan during the Ottoman 
period, as discussed previously in this chapter. The Circassian settlers are a fundamental part 
of Amman’s founding narrative and vice versa. Interestingly, Shami argues that Amman was 
not even the largest Circassian colony but it is the most prevalent in Jordanian Circassians’ 
narratives of settlement. The dominance of Amman in the Circassians’ narrative could be due 
to the fact that Amman is the nation’s capital. By intertwining Amman and the Circassian 
community, the Circassians have the “greatest proof of their contemporary citizenship.”168 
Amman was built by the Circassian community and therefore, the Circassians participated 
fully in building the present Hashemite state. Amman is the Circassians’ marker of belonging 
in the Arab-majority nation. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167 Anderson, 71. 
168 Seteney Shami, “The Circassians of Amman: Historical Narratives, Urban Dwelling, and the Construction of 
Identity,” in Amman: The city and its society, ed. Seteney Shami and Jean Hannoyer (Beirut: CERMOC, 1996), 
321. 
	   	    
	   51 
 Similarly, Amman also became the marker of Hashemite influence and belonging. 
According to Wilson, upon Abdullah’s arrival in Amman in March 1921, Amman was little 
more than a village with between 2,500 and 5,000 inhabitants. The Circassian settlers formed 
the core of the population and, as an ethnic minority, the Circassian community required 
government protection and thus welcomed Abdullah’s arrival.169 Wilson argues that Abdullah 
chose Amman as the capital of Transjordan for political reasons: Salt, the largest urban center 
in Transjordan at the time, was too close to Palestine and its settled inhabitants experienced a 
long history of conflict with nomadic groups, including some nomadic men in Abdullah’s 
entourage. Amman did not have such a long history of conflict and it was also strategically 
advantageous as it was located on the Hijaz Railway.170 With a core population that was 
dependent on Abdullah and a distinct lack of urban merchants and sheikhs, who could 
potentially challenge Abdullah’s power, Amman was the logical choice for the center of 
Abdullah’s rule. According to Anderson, Amman lacked infrastructure before Abdullah’s 
arrival so all physical and social development in the city symbolized the growth of Hashemite 
rule.171 
 By the late 1920s, Amman’s population grew to approximately 10,000 inhabitants, 
due to its new position as the state’s capital and the influx of immigrants from Syria after the 
failed Syrian revolt between 1925 and 1927. Infrastructure improved as streets were widened 
and new shops and houses were built. Prior to 1925, Abdullah moved around with his tents 
and entourage around the country until his new home, Ragadan Palace in what is now 
downtown Amman, was completed.172 However, according to Anderson, the majority of the 
government’s budget was spent on building the military, rather than the government, and 
Amman still suffered from a lack of physical infrastructure for its government branches. 
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Anderson argues that without physical symbols of government power, the Anglo-Hashemite 
government relied on symbolic acts to display and perpetuate government power. These 
performances included Abdullah leading a procession from his palace to the mosque every 
Friday; military drills after border raids made the regime look weak; ceremonies to award 
medals to soldiers; and the gunshot every noon from the Roman citadel, a practice which 
continued until 1930.173 The last practice is especially interesting because it connected 
contemporary Anglo-Hashemite rule with Roman rule, thus creating a narrative of continued 
centralized rule that culminates in the Hashemite dynasty. The use of ancient sites and history 




 From its conception as a state, Transjordan was inextricably linked with Hashemite 
rule. Although the state was not built from scratch and retained Ottoman institutions during 
the first few years of Anglo-Hashemite rule, the development of institutions in Transjordan 
reshaped people’s relations with the state and with each other. The state extended its control 
to an unprecedented degree in the desert: The land program removed land from the domain of 
sheikhs and placed it under the domain of the state and institutions such as the Arab Legion 
stopped cross-border raids through patrols and the recruitment of members of nomadic 
groups. A political elite made up of urban, educated Syrians and Palestinians emerged as a 
political elite and nomadic groups were officially categorized as Bedouin, which meant they 
were under separate jurisdiction from the rest of the population, and their powerful sheikhs’ 
responsibilities and authority were institutionalized. These new elites displaced the former 
urban merchants and semi-sedentary groups, which were the former intermediaries between 
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the Ottoman administration and local society, in Salt and the northern region. The former 
elites joined forces to create a political opposition movement that lasted well into the 1950s.  
Despite being a foreigner who worked with other foreign powers to support his state, 
Abdullah was able to gain the loyalty of the new residents of Transjordan and create a lasting 
dynasty. He was able to do so through institutions. Although Abdullah slowly lost personal 
control of relations with Bedouin tribes, who were initially his biggest political assets, the 
British were able to create sustainable relations between the Bedouin and the state. The 
Bedouin groups were no longer merely personally acquainted with Abdullah but had a vested 
interest in the state. The Ottomans had introduced benefits associated with state institutions 
and the Anglo-Hashemite continued providing these benefits: employment, security, 
education, health services, telecommunications systems, and roads. Anderson argues that the 
goal of the government was to consistently link prosperity with the existence of the 
Hashemite state.174 By reinforcing the relationship between benefits and the existence of the 
state, the Hashemite state gained support from nomadic groups and emerging merchants in 
the cities. Even those who had opposed Abdullah’s methods of rule in 1923 found 
employment within the state structure. Furthermore, Amman grew in people’s consciousness, 
due to its role as the center of all the state institutions that had begun to frame public life. 
As the state began to play a more active role in the public domain and in people's 
experiences of public life, the idea that Transjordan was Hashemite and the Hashemites were 
Transjordanian grew stronger. This relationship was certainly perpetrated by British officials 
who wanted to increase Transjordanian loyalty, but not anti-colonial nationalism, at the 
expense of anti-colonial Arab nationalism. Thus, the British encouraged loyalty to the 
Hashemites as the basis of Transjordanian patriotism. The Hashemites were no longer 
foreigners but thought of as Transjordanian themselves. The Hashemites’ role as a symbol of 
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the Transjordanian nation-state may explain the shift in discourse from one of autochthony to 
one of Arab nationalism among members of the political opposition. The discourses of Arab 
nationalism and pan-Jordanian identity will be explored further in the next chapter. 
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Discourses of Pan-Jordanianism: The Annexation of the West Bank, 1948-1967 
Introduction 
By the end of the mandate period, two discourses or imaginaries of the Jordanian 
nation had emerged. One was a discourse of autochthony, meaning that Transjordan 
belonged to its indigenous inhabitants, i.e. those who had lived there before the arrival of 
Abdullah and Syrian nationalist migrants during the 1920s. The other discourse was one 
of Hashemite-Arab nationalism, one that saw Transjordan a part of the Arab nation that 
could only be realized with Hashemite rule and with the help of the British. The latter 
discourse did not remain uncontested. During the 1950s, political opposition movements 
moved from deploying a discourse of autochthony to a new discourse of Arab 
nationalism that questioned the legitimacy of Hashemite rule. In the aftermath of the 
annexation of the West Bank, the 1950s were a tumultuous period during which many 
different parties questioned Jordan’s legitimacy as a nation-state. Fathi claims that 
historians often described Jordan, after its annexation of the West Bank in 1948, as “not a 
nation in any recognizable sense, but a nominal state with two substantial bodies of 
population.”1 They pointed at how the boundaries of the nation-state changed after the 
annexation of the West Bank, thus calling into question Jordan’s legitimacy. The main 
challenge for the Hashemite monarchy was to create a national identity that could be seen 
as legitimate by two different populations.  
Bhabha complicates views that nation-states are either omnipotent apparatuses or 
the natural outcome of national-popular expressions and political will. These two types of 
readings leave no room for ambiguity. He writes: 
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The ‘locality’ of national culture is neither unified nor unitary in relation to itself, 
nor must it be seen simply as ‘other’ in relation to what is outside or beyond it. 
The boundary is Janus-faced and the problem of outside/inside must always itself 
be a process of hybridity, incorporating new ‘people’ in relation to the body 
politic, generating other sites of meaning and, inevitably, in the political process, 
producing unmanned sites of political antagonism and unpredictable forces for 
political representation.2 
 
Arguably, the Jordanian government embarked on a project to hybridize the notions of 
Transjordanianness and Palestinianness by incorporating Palestinians into its body politic 
and appropriating Palestinian spaces in Jerusalem as national Jordanian spaces. In 
essence, the Jordanian government did the opposite of historical nation building by trying 
to base a national identity on the liminal and the ambiguous, rather than on clear-cut 
boundaries. Bhabha’s concept of national culture means that national identities are more 
complex than the composition of the self and the other. In Bhabha’s opinion, “The ‘other’ 
is never outside or beyond us; it emerges forcefully, within cultural discourse, when we 
think we speak most intimately and indigenously ‘between ourselves’.”3 In Jordan, the 
Palestinian ‘other’ is literally inside its borders and, during the period of annexation, so-
called ‘others’ outnumbered so-called autochthonous Transjordanians. 
There are several components of constructions of a national identity. According to 
Renan, the nation is supposed to supersede notions of race, religion, and language. The 
unifying factor that creates a nation out of composite populations is a set of discourses 
that are spiritual and sentimental. Renan argues discourses that make use of this spiritual 
principle draw on two things: “One is the possession in common of a rich legacy of 
memories; the other is present-day consent, the desire to live together, the will to 
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perpetuate the value of the heritage that one has received in an undivided form.”4 
Furthermore, discourses of nationalism and national identity can obscure minority 
discourses. The latter, as Bhabha puts it, may contest “genealogies of ‘origin’ that lead to 
claims for cultural supremacy and historical priority” and disclose “the status of national 
culture – and the people – as a contentious, performative space.”5 Those who are in the 
position of narrative control can claim ‘cultural supremacy’ and narrate themselves into 
power.6 Moreover, Brand argues national narratives are performative and can never be 
complete.7 One way to claim narrative control is to invent traditions, which Hobsbawm 
defines as a “set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and 
of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of 
behavior by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past.”8 The key 
part here is ‘continuity with the past’. The act of ritualistic traditions implies that these 
acts are a continuation of what people have done in the past. This helps create an idea of 
a national past and extends national history. Some groups have even invented history. 
Hobsbawm claims, “Plenty of political institutions, ideological movements and 
groups…were so unprecedented that even historic continuity had to be invented, for 
example by creating an ancient past beyond historical continuity.”9 In the case of Jordan, 
its colonial past and the Hashemites’ relatively recent arrival meant that the Hashemite 
monarchy needed to create or at least engage with Jordan’s pre-Hashemite past to be 	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viewed as legitimate, even natural, rulers of Jordan. In this chapter, I will explore how the 
Hashemites invented traditions of their protection of Jerusalem. Hashemite engagement 
of other aspects of history, including ancient history, will be analyzed in the fourth 
chapter.  
The annexation of the West Bank necessitated shifts in the dominant official 
discourses of Jordanian national identity. After 1948, the Jordanian government sought to 
create a pan-Jordanian national identity that incorporated Palestinians into the Jordanian 
nation. According to the Hashemite government, ‘Palestinians’ were the residents in the 
West Bank and the refugees who arrived in the East Bank after the war. 1948 was the 
arbitrary cut-off date that delineated ‘Palestinians’ and Jordanians of Palestinian origin in 
Jordanian discourses. The Hashemites tried to use the discourses of Arab nationalism and 
Islamic Hashemite legitimacy to support its control of the West Bank but there is no 
evidence that many segments of the population embraced this pan-Jordanian identity. In 
fact, contrary to the Hashemites’ goals, the annexation of the West Bank did not facilitate 
the melding of Jordanians and Palestinians into one nation but strengthened discourses of 
separate national identities for Jordanians and Palestinians in the long term.  
To examine how the Hashemite monarchy tried to create a discourse of national 
identity that was viewed as legitimate, the chapter will first address Jordan’s achievement 
of political independence in 1946 and the 1948 war with the new state of Israel. In the 
context of Jordan’s annexation of the West Bank, I will study the extent to which 
Palestinians were incorporated politically into the state. I will also chart the history of the 
political opposition movement, in the form of the Jordanian Nationalist Movement 
(JNM), during the 1950s. The JNM movement is significant to this study because 
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competing discourses of Arab nationalism emerged as ways to assert or contest the 
legitimacy of the Hashemite regime. The discursive incorporation of the West Bank will 
be examined by analyzing the Hashemite monarchy’s claims, framed by a discourse of 
Islamic legitimacy, to places such as the Temple Mount and Palestinian Archeological 
Museum in Jerusalem.  
 
Independence and War, 1943 to 1953 
 During the 1940s, there was a tremendous outpouring of anti-British sentiment in 
Amman after the Arab Legion helped the British suppress a revolt in the mandate of Iraq. 
Many Jordanians felt that the Legion betrayed a fellow Arab state. Although most 
Jordanian officers in the Arab Legion remained loyal to the Anglo-Hashemite state, one 
of the Bani Sakhr sheikhs called on all men to resign from the Legion. Cities such as 
Amman and Salt were in chaos due to demonstrations. During World War Two, 
Transjordan had officially allied with the British but, according to acclaimed writer Abd 
al-Rahman Munif’s memoirs, many Jordanians were pro-German, as were residents in 
many other British mandates and colonies. Munif attributes Germany’s popularity to 
discontent with British policies in Palestine and antagonism towards colonialism.10 After 
the coup in Iraq, security tightened throughout Amman and most travellers to Iraq were 
arrested. According to Munif, “Amman during that period was like a cauldron on the 
boil. There were many reasons for anger and resentment…When some British officers 
arrived to take up residence and rented houses…they faced a great deal of harassment.”11 
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People hardly noticed the parade of Allied troops in Amman that signaled the end of 
World War Two.12 After the war, the British Empire soon disintegrated. In early 1946, 
the British government announced that Transjordan had reached a stage of development 
that merited complete independence. In contrast to the Allied victory parade, 
Independence Day in Amman was an extravagant affair with fireworks and parades on 
the streets. Delegates from other Arab states also traveled to Amman to congratulate 
Transjordan on its independence.13  
Abdullah was aware of anti-British sentiment but he also knew that Transjordan 
was militarily and financially dependent on Britain. According to Wilson, Abdullah was 
nervous about other Arab leaders’ visions of Arab nationalism and Arab unity. He wanted 
to counter these discourses by creating his own reality of a unified Arab state under his 
rule. Before independence, he sought unity with Syria to strengthen the state of 
Transjordan but he had few Syrian supporters left, perhaps in part due to Abdullah’s 
negotiations with Zionist leaders from the late 1930s onwards were well known.14 
Transjordan’s weakness was one of the factors that led Abdullah to seriously consider the 
annexation of Palestine. Therefore, he began cultivating support among notable 
Palestinian families, chief among them the Al-Nashashibi family, which had also 
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negotiated with the Jewish Agency.15 Abdullah was also interested in annexing Palestine 
due to its natural and human resources. Furthermore, Jerusalem had tourism potential and 
symbolic value.16 In 1946, Abdullah and the Jewish Agency agreed on the partition of 
Palestine.17 Transjordan was the only Arab state that supported the partition of Palestine 
and, in Wilson’s words, Abdullah became a “political leper”18 in the eyes of the Arab 
states and also for some Transjordanians. In the lead-up to the war in 1948, Abdullah 
began negotiations with the British government to allow Transjordanian forces to occupy 
the area designated for the Arabs once the British army withdrew.19  
In 1947, the United Nations announced the partition of Palestine into an Arab and 
a Jewish state, intensifying bombs, battles, and skirmishes between Jewish and Arab-
Palestinian militias. According to Khalidi, Zionist forces’ superiority in arms was already 
evident.20 On May 14, 1948, David Ben-Gurion announced Israel’s statehood and the 
Arab states entered the war. The Arab forces eventually lost the war, partly due to the 
rivalries amont the Arab states. According to Gerges, the government in Egypt actually 
did not want to enter the war,21 but strong anti-Zionist, Arab nationalist feeling among the 
Egyptian people pushed the government to intervene. Furthermore, King Faruq in Egypt 
wanted to contain Abdullah’s territorial ambitions and legitimize himself as the leader of 
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the Arab world. Eventually, Egypt sent only a fraction of its army to Palestine.22 During 
the war, these rivalries and interests hampered the war effort, one example being Egypt 
confiscating an arms shipment from the Suez Canal to Transjordan.23 Alliances 
disintegrated as each Arab state undermined the very notion of Arab nationalism by 
prioritizing its own state interests. The Jordanian Arab Legion managed to take control of 
the Old City of Jerusalem but, in order to keep control of Jerusalem and perhaps to honor 
the deal with the Jewish Agency, the Legion withdrew from the Arab towns of Lydda and 
Ramla. This retreat left the Palestinians in these towns unprotected and forced them to 
leave their homes and move to Jordan. It also caused mass protests in Amman itself. 
Some protesters even gathered outside Abdullah’s palace in Amman until Abdullah 
approached them and slapped one of the protesters, telling them to join and fight Israel 
themselves if they protested his actions. According to Kirkbride’s memoirs, during this 
incident, Abdullah succeeded in placating the protesters and afterwards, the only shouts 
that could be heard were “Live the King!”24  
According to Katz, Abdullah’s reputation improved briefly after saving 
Jerusalem, an act that, in the eyes of some, legitimized Transjordan’s control of Palestine. 
Katz argues that saving Jerusalem still carries meaning for Jordanians today.25 But after 
Transjordan’s occupation of Palestinian territories, the Arab League considered expelling 
Transjordan. Egypt had also created an All-Palestine Government in Gaza. In response, 
Abdullah created a Palestinian National Congress that consisted of his Palestinian 
supporters such as the Nashabishi family, to counter the All-Palestine Government in 	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Egypt.26 In 1950, the Congress voted in favor of the union of the West Bank and East 
Bank and this vote passed a popular referendum. Abdullah banned the use of the word 
‘Palestine’ and the former Palestinian territories now annexed by Jordan27 became known 
as the ‘West Bank’.  
Only one year later, Abdullah was assassinated outside Al-Aqsa Mosque at the 
Temple Mount. Abdullah had made it a habit to lead prayers at Al-Aqsa Mosque, one of 
the most important holy places in Islam, every Friday. Although Abdullah spatially 
performed his legitimacy as a Hashemite,28 some Palestinians, and some Jordanians, 
clearly thought he was an illegitimate ruler. The assassin was a Palestinian youth but 
Abdullah El-Tell, a former officer in the Arab Legion who then lived in exile in Egypt, 
allegedly concocted the plot at the behest of the Egyptian government. Abdullah’s 
bodyguards killed the assassin immediately. In the East Bank, most Palestinians mourned 
in public, but in the refugee camps there was some rejoicing. In retaliation for the 
assassination, cars with Palestinian license plates were stoned in Salt and some 
Jordanians attacked a refugee camp in Amman, leaving three refugees dead and more 
wounded.29 As Munif wrote, from 1948 onwards, “Amman was full of wounds and 
bitterness.”30 After a brief reign by Abdullah’s son Talal,31 Abdullah’s young grandson 
Hussein ascended the throne at age eighteen in 1953. 
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‘Two Banks, One Family’ 
 As a result of the 1948 war, almost 360,000 refugees flooded the territory that 
would become the West Bank and 110,000 refugees entered the East Bank. Jordan’s 
population increased from 375,000 people to over one million. In 1952, Palestinians 
made up approximately 65% of the total population of Jordan (consisting of both the East 
Bank and the West Bank).32 Such a drastic change in population meant that Jordan 
needed to reimagine itself as community, i.e. construct a new national identity. According 
to Maffi, the Palestinian majority was both a hindrance to the development of a strong 
national identity and an opportunity for the Hashemite state to create a national identity 
separate from Transjordanian and Palestinian identities: a pan-Jordanian identity that 
included both Palestinians and Transjordanians.33 During a speech at the parliamentary 
session that voted for the unity of the two banks of the Jordan River, Abdullah likened 
Jordan to “a bird whose wings are its East and its West.”34 This articulation made the 
annexation seem inevitable and even a natural step towards a single, unified Arab state. A 
pro-Hashemite conference declared that the unification of Transjordan and Palestine was 
a “prelude to real Arab unity.”35  
However, Maffi argues that the Hashemite government’s discourse of pan-
Jordanianism was challenged by the strength of the Palestinian national identity and the 
Transjordanian political opposition movement that had emerged during the 1920s, as 
outlined in the previous chapter. Few people accepted the discourse of pan-Jordanian 
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identity propagated by the Hashemite monarchy;36 in fact, annexation seemed to 
strengthen notions of separate Jordanian and Palestinian national identities. This divide 
crystallized after the civil war and a sequence of events known as Black September in 
1970.37 The differences between Jordanians and Palestinians were largely socioeconomic 
but after the war, a Jordanian national identity, nascent during annexation due to 
competing discourses about Arab nationalism, became more fully formed. Kassay claims 
that the civil war was the cause of the Jordanian-Palestinian divide, not the result of 
one.38 According to Khalidi, Palestinian failures, such as the loss of Palestine during the 
1948 war, the subsequent Jordanian annexation of a large part of Palestinian territory, and 
Black September, strengthened Palestinian national identity. These losses gave 
Palestinians a universal experience of loss that cut across national lines and class 
divisions.39  
The discourse of pan-Jordanianism emerged in the 1950s, when Arab nationalism 
was becoming a more popular ideology due to the rise of Nasser. The discourse of pan-
Jordanianism was based on Arab unity and the regime may have hoped that it could 
concurrently express a Jordanian nationalism that was not opposed to Arab nationalism. 
Jordan is known for being the only Arab state that has granted Palestinian refugees 
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citizenship, which was the formal political basis for unity.40 However, it seems that 
Palestinians experienced only limited incorporation into the state structures and remained 
‘the other’. Even today, Palestinians in the East Bank define themselves as ‘Palestinian-
Jordanian’, a hyphenated identity that suggests that ‘Jordanian’ is a term reserved for 
those who lived in the East Bank before 1948 and that, in and of itself, could not include 
both Jordanians and Palestinians. Massad argues that the Hashemite state embarked on an 
intentional policy of Jordanization and de-Palestinization and that Transjordanian 
nationalism defined the newly expanded nation-state.41 However, Brand disagrees and 
suggests “the state’s goal was less to impose a Transjordanian identity than to create a 
hybrid identity for both communities.”42 Whether the state ‘Jordanized’ the West Bank 
and if so, how will be examined below.43 
Political Incorporation Into The State 
The Jordanian government began to assert its control in the West Bank by 
dissolving many of the political organizations that had been founded in Palestine before 
1948.44 In 1949, the Jordanian government changed the electoral law to allow 
Palestinians to vote in the 1950 parliamentary election. The government decreed that 
twenty representatives would be elected from the West Bank, which was the same 
number of seats as the East Bank despite the West Bank’s larger population. 
Furthermore, the Jordanian government interfered in the elections to ensure that 
candidates loyal to the government were elected. John Glubb allegedly provided his 	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soldiers with lists of candidates that had special marks next to government candidates.45 
Most of the Palestinian refugees settled in urban areas, such as Amman and the nearby 
city of Zarqa. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) estimated that by 
1978, Palestinians represented 60-80% of Amman’s population.46 Therefore, electoral 
laws, which already favored the nomadic and rural areas that are traditionally seen as 
strongholds of Hashemite support, increasingly favored rural areas through 
gerrymandering. Heavily Palestinian urban areas were and are still underrepresented. 
These electoral laws have not been reformed and are under increasing attack, with calls 
for electoral reform being one of the main issues for protesters today.47  
According to Anderson, during the annexation, the limited number of government 
posts that Palestinians obtained carried little power and Palestinians only held positions 
that were pertinent to Palestinian, rather than national, issues.48 One of these positions 
was ‘Custodian of the Holy Places’, which carried the title of minister. Abdullah created 
this position to codify Jordan’s authority over Jerusalem’s holy places and appointed 
Raghib al-Nashashibi, a member of Palestine’s bourgeoisie and one of Abdullah’s early 
supporters. However, al-Nashashibi apparently viewed this position as a demotion from 
his previous post, and according to al-Nashashibi’s nephew, Raghib al-Nashashibi 
thought he had been “reduced to a loyal personality, a player on the periphery – a 
Jordanian administrator in a dusty corner of Jerusalem.”49 Raghib al-Nashashibi died not 
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long after his appointment and by 1953 the position no longer existed and the governor of 
Jerusalem had taken over the custodianship of holy places.50 
In the East Bank, the government made efforts to incorporate Palestinians into the 
state bureaucracies and the military. Before the annexation of the West Bank, the Arab 
Legion’s soldiers were recruited mostly from southern Jordanian tribes,51 as part of 
Glubb’s policy to co-opt the Bedouin population. Glubb created the National Guard in 
1950 to prevent the Palestinians from becoming ‘half-citizens’ and to encourage them to 
fully embrace a militarized Jordanian identity. The National Guard recruited from rural 
West Bank villages and after 1950, Palestinians began to enlist in. However, much of the 
Jordanian government feared arming Palestinians and the National Guard was severely 
underequipped and their duties were limited to border control. After the dismissal of 
Glubb and the Arabization of the Arab Legion in 1956,52 the National Guard was 
integrated into the army as an attempt to desegregate men from the East Bank and the 
West Bank.53 By the late 1960s, Palestinians made up 40-45% of the military and many 
of them, being more educated than their Jordanian counterparts, were recruited for their 
technical skills.54 But officers remained Transjordanian and after Black September the 
military was drastically ‘Jordanized’ and recruitment of Palestinians decreased 
significantly. 
As for government ministries, Palestinian families loyal to Abdullah were 
rewarded with posts and appointed to the upper house of Parliament. Since systems of 
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familial networks were already the basis of political appointments and urban educated 
Palestinians were absorbed into urban social structures in East Bank cities, as Droz-
Vincent argues,55 Palestinians were able to help other family members and friends obtain 
government positions. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs became heavily Palestinian and 
the majority of Jordan’s ambassadors actually hailed from Palestinian families loyal to 
the Hashemite monarchy.56 At the same time, the ministers of the Interior, Information, 
and Defense, which deal with “sensitive” information, were usually of East Bank origin 
with an “impeccable background,”57 meaning a family history of loyalty to the monarchy. 
From 1952 to 1992, Jordan has had twenty-three prime ministers and five of them are 
considered Palestinian (this definition of ‘Palestinian’ does not include families such as 
the Rifais, who are of Palestinian origin but since they moved to the East Bank before 
1948, they are considered to be entrenched in the East Bank). Fathi argues that these five 
prime ministers all had extremely short terms of one year or less and were all appointed 
during times when King Hussein needed to show that the Jordanian government could 
represent Palestinians.58  
Since its establishment in Transjordan, the Hashemite monarchy has continually 
relied on individuals and families who have demonstrated loyalty to the king. The 
patronage system, first established to gain the loyalty of tribes, Christians, and 
Circassians, meant that different segments of the population relied on accessibility to the 
king. As Fathi sums up, “The Jordanian policy-making apparatus revolves around 
individuals more than institutions. It functions as a strategic interest group, consisting of 	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people who are bound together by their interest and stake in maintaining the system.”59 
This system of patronage was also difficult for ‘outsiders’ to penetrate and thus, even 
before the Jordanian government embarked on an intended policy of ‘de-Palestinization’ 
in the aftermath of the 1970 civil war, the majority of the Palestinian population 
established themselves in the private sector. Furthermore, as Transjordanians’ level of 
education increased due to the expansion of education in the 1950s, the government was 
no longer as dependent on Palestinians for their technical and organizational skills. As 
stated before, in 1948, the majority of the Palestinian population was more urban, 
educated, more politically aware, and more exposed to mass media than the 
Transjordanian population. According to Massad, these differences led to tension as the 
Transjordanian urban population thought that upper- and middle-class Palestinians were 
“engaging in a nation-class narrative of superiority over Transjordanians.”60 Massad 
demonstrates that class dynamics underlie the formation of discourses of Transjordanian 
and Palestinian identities. This class tension was exacerbated in the 1970s by oil 
remittances. After 1948, many Palestinian refugees, including those who became 
Jordanian citizens, migrated to the emerging Gulf states in order to work on newly 
discovered oil fields. According to Brand, Palestinians’ remittances began to flow back to 
Jordan during the oil boom in the 1970s, funding a construction boom in Amman, and 
Palestinians and Jordanians saw an obvious disparity in wealth between their two 
communities. Along with the de-Palestinization policies and increased discrimination 
towards Palestinians after Black September, Palestinian and Jordanian identities were 
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increasingly delineated and the public-private sector divide intersected with 
intercommunal divides.61 
Jordanian and Palestinian Subjectivities 
The different employment opportunities available to Palestinians and Jordanians 
may have also influenced conceptualizations of subjectivity and Jordanian identity. Brand 
argues that aside from tribal identities, an essential component of Transjordanian 
subjectivity is government employment, especially in security services or the military. 
Due to the Anglo-Hashemite government’s cooptation of tribal sheikhs, Bedouins, and 
even political dissidents into state bureaucracies, it seems that nation and state, in the 
form of the Hashemite government, are strongly intertwined.62 The Jordanian government 
also reinforces the strong relationship between the nation and the military with customs 
such as Army Day and parades. The government built the Martyrs’ Memorial as a 
dedication to the Arab Army and the Jordanian army and it also functions as a museum 
showcasing Hashemite history. The memorial will be analyzed further in the fourth 
chapter. In contrast, prominent members of Jerusalem families actively discouraged their 
children from joining the Jordanian bureaucracy.63 Thus, the tie between nation and state 
is not as strong for the majority of Palestinians. According to Brand, the contemporary 
Palestinian population in Jordan can be divided into several groups. Low-income 
Palestinian refugees who live in camps tend to be the most attached to their home village, 
town, or city since they are the least integrated into the Jordanian economic and social 
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fabric. Refugee camps are known as “strongholds of [Palestinian] nationalism,”64 as 
demonstrated by the celebrations that occurred in the camps after Abdullah’s 
assassination. Conversely, the majority of the Palestinian bourgeoisie in Jordan consists 
of West Bank families such as the al-Nashashibi family who supported Abdullah before 
annexation. The Hashemites have rewarded these families and they are a “pillar of regime 
support.”65 Brand claims that these Palestinians “tend to see no dilemma or contradiction 
in identifying themselves as both Palestinian and Jordanian”,66 and were probably among 
the few who participated in the discourse of pan-Jordanianism. Brand also argues that 
middle-class Palestinians who were economically and socially privileged were “more 
comfortable expressing some form of attachment to Jordan (if not identifying themselves 
as Jordanian), or at the very least expressing loyalty to the king.”67 Many second-
generation Palestinians, especially those who are born to marriages between Palestinians 
and Jordanians, have a much stronger sense of Jordanianness and also a stronger affinity 
with the city of Amman. Brand calls it an ‘Amman is Jordan’ identity,68 since so many 
Palestinians live in Amman. Interestingly, other scholars claim that Amman has been 
excluded from discourses of Jordanian national identity,69 and I will explore the role of 
Amman and particular public spaces in the city in narratives of national history further in 
the fourth chapter. 
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The Jordanian National Movement (JNM) and Discourses of Pan-Arabism, 1950-1957 
 The Hashemite monarchy was not only challenged by discourses of separate 
Jordanian and Palestinian identities but also by the Jordanian National Movement (JNM), 
which questioned the legitimacy of the monarchy’s discourse of Arab nationalism. The 
JNM was the primary political opposition movement during the 1950s. The movement 
was an umbrella organization, using the discourse of Arab nationalism to frame 
opposition activities of activists ranging from Palestinians to Communists. Students, who 
were increasingly politicized after studying abroad in other Arab states or studying under 
Arab nationalist teachers within Jordan itself, made up the largest group of protesters and 
urban professionals were also involved.70 The 1950s were extremely tumultuous and 
politically fraught and, according to Anderson’s interlocutors, “Everybody belonged to a 
party in the 1950s.”71 This was the golden age of pan-Arabism, with the ascendance of 
Gamal Abdul Nasser, the charismatic and polarizing military strongman of Egypt, the 
nationalization of the Suez Canal, and the short-lived union of Syria and Egypt, which 
seemed at first to be a realization of the dream of Arab unity. Due to Nasser’s influence, 
Egypt led the anti-imperialist, socialist vision of Arab nationalism, in contrast with the 
Jordanian Hashemite monarchy’s staunch pro-Western policies. Jordan’s nascent political 
opposition movement that had emerged before World War Two had already framed their 
demands in terms of Arab nationalism. According to Anderson, after the unification of 
the two banks in 1950, the Jordanian opposition movement merged with the Palestinian 
nationalist movement, due to their common vocabulary of Arab nationalism.72 This 
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discourse framed their political demands and was used to undermine Hashemite 
legitimacy. 
 The JNM’s popularity can be partly attributed to economic issues. The British-
designed land program had not only removed land from the sheikhs’ control, as 
mentioned in the first chapter, but the division of collectively-owned land, along with the 
increase in population, also led to decreased plot sizes. For example, the population of 
‘Ajluni villages increased from approximately 3,000 to approximately 5,000 from 1934 
to 1954 but they controlled the same amount of territory.73 During the 1940s, more 
landowners were in debt and they began mortgaging on their land.74 This led to increased 
urbanization, as many land tenants moved to the cities for work opportunities. 
Urbanization exacerbated problems of unemployment, estimated to be approximately 
16.5% in 1955. Palestinian refugees were disproportionately affected and in 1954, only 
10% of refugees held full-time jobs. As a result, the divide between socioeconomic 
classes widened. Only a small segment of the population benefited from the regime; the 
others, especially Palestinians who were mostly excluded from the jobs available within 
the government, were ready to fight its policies.75 According to Hacker’s survey 
conducted in 1958, most residents in Jordan lived at or below subsistence level and nine 
out of ten residents in Amman were dissatisfied with their situation of poverty.76 
Therefore, protests during the 1950s were not just about a significant event in another 
Arab state or Israel. They were also responses to inflation, food prices, and 
unemployment. According to a report about Sulayman al-Nabulsi, the leader of JNM and 	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prime minister in 1956, bread prices were always involved in protesters’ calls for Arab 
unity.77  
 Dissatisfaction with the socioeconomic situation in Jordan was framed with a 
discourse of Arab nationalism that was anti-imperialist and thus, anti-Hashemite. Many 
of those involved were avid followers of Sawt al-‘Arab (Voice of the Arabs), the popular 
radio station broadcast from Cairo. This radio station’s censure of Iraq and Jordan was 
Nasser’s main propaganda tool against the Hashemite regimes. This propaganda 
reinforced the JNM’s criticism of the Hashemite monarchy.78 Anti-imperialist sentiment 
was fueled by reports about British cooperation with Israel. According to Anderson, 
demonstrators used anti-American and anti-British slogans to urge the government to 
fight against Israel.79 Anti-imperialism also took the form of targeting John Glubb, the 
commander of the Arab Legion. Glubb and other British officers had already been targets 
of harassment and distrust before 1948. Abd al-Rahman Munif’s grandmother claimed, 
“Could anyone believe that Abu Hneik (Glubb Pasha) wants to help the Muslims?”80 This 
intensified after 1948 as Glubb was accused of betraying the Arab and Palestinian cause 
when he ordered the Arab Legion to retreat from Lydda and Ramla. Glubb was a sign 
that the British still had control over Jordan. According to Anderson, “The solution to this 
colonial interference was the unification of the Arab states as an alternative to Jordan’s 
separate existence as a state.”81 Therefore, the vision of dissolving imperially created 
borders and establishing one single Arab state was a threat to the Hashemite regime in 
Jordan. It is unclear whether political opposition parties truly wanted to overthrow the 	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Hashemite monarchy. Anderson claims that political opposition parties never discussed 
overthrowing the king in public and some even claimed to support the monarchy. But in 
private, political opposition leaders certainly discussed the end of the monarchy and 
several individuals argued that if the opposition parties had been able to overthrow the 
king, they certainly would have done so.82 Furthermore, such calls were made in 1966, 
after the Jordanian army confronted Palestinian guerrillas raiding Israeli territory. 
Jordanian military officers of Palestinian origin distributed pamphlets urging the end of 
the monarchy and establishing a republic in both banks called Palestine.83 It is interesting 
to note that these officers maintained the unity of the two banks and thus seemed to have 
bought into Abdullah’s discourse of the two banks being a natural entity. 
However, either way, few were strongly pro-Hashemite. In December 1955, after 
years of poverty, unemployment and discontent, combined with Sawt al-‘Arab broadcasts 
and rumors that Palestine would be lost due to the Baghdad Pact,84 the country erupted. 
Anderson calls these protests “the most violent demonstrations the country had ever 
seen.”85 The protesters had established networks and were organized, able to appeal to 
large segments of the population. Protesters called out the name of Sulayman al-Nabulsi 
as a potential leader for the country. These protests also occurred in the largely Jordanian 
towns of Madaba, Karak, Salt, and Ma’an. These protests were expressions of all 
Jordanians’ dissatisfaction, not just Palestinians. In 1956, the government announced that 
Jordan would not join the Baghdad Pact, marking one of the few times that protests on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 Anderson, 133-134. 
83 Massad, 204. 
84 The Baghdad Pact was founded in 1955 by the U.S. and Britain as a defensive organization against 
Soviet influence in the Middle East. However, in the context of radical pan-Arab socialism, this pact was 
commonly viewed as another means of Western imperialist control in the Middle East and thus was 
extremely unpopular.  
85 Anderson, 162. 
   
	   77 
the street actually impacted Jordan’s policy direction.86 On March 1, 1956, King Hussein 
announced that General John Glubb had been dismissed from the Arab Legion. The 
government initiated a three-day national holiday and, according to Anderson, people 
chanted pro-Hussein slogans for the first time in years and residents in the West Bank 
warmly welcomed the king for the first time.87 As the author Munif summarizes in his 
memoirs, “People’s joy at [Glubb’s] expulsion tells the story of Amman during a certain 
period.”88 In this case, the story of Amman is one of genuine anger and discontent 
directed towards the vestiges of colonial rule and even the Hashemite monarchy. 
In 1956, the JNM dominated the elections and Sulayman al-Nabulsi was 
appointed Prime Minister. But it soon became clear that King Hussein and al-Nabulsi 
could not work together due to competing visions of the future of Jordan. According to 
Anderson, the JNM envisioned a future without the monarchy, or at least a very limited 
political role for the monarchy. Conversely, King Hussein wanted to rule the country 
himself, with the Parliament being a scapegoat for unpopular policies.89 Furthermore, al-
Nabulsi favored a strong relationship with the Soviet Union; meanwhile, Hussein was in 
contact with the United States. The situation came to a head in April 1957, when al-
Nabulsi announced that he officially intended to establish diplomatic relations with the 
Soviet Union. Hussein forced al-Nabulsi to resign and, approximately one week later, the 
‘Free Officers’90 allegedly started a coup but the coup did not succeed because Bedouin 
soldiers refused to comply with the plot against the monarchy. Some politicians from the 
era claim that this coup was actually orchestrated by the king and the ‘King’s men’ as an 	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excuse to destroy the JNM. After the attempted coup, the monarchy established martial 
law, enforced censorship, and banned political parties. Demonstrations broke out in the 
West Bank and Amman; in Jerusalem, protesters swarmed al-Haram al-Sharif every 
day.91 The JNM subsequently collapsed.  
But other segments of the population maintained their loyalty to the king 
throughout the 1950s due to the patronage system by which the monarchy provided 
services in exchange for loyalty and compliance. Such groups included the majority of 
Bedouins, urban merchants, and peasants. After the coup, 200 sheikhs pledged allegiance 
to the king. Al-Nabulsi’s government did not appease the Bedouin population, which 
formed the bedrock of the military, and decreased their access to the state apparatus. As a 
result, many Bedouins thought it was in their interest to support Hussein during the coup 
and welcomed his return to full power.92 
After the JNM collapsed, King Hussein made a speech about the nationalists 
being false Arab nationalists. He stated:  
I gave them power and granted them full confidence, and made myself their hand 
in government. But they used foul play and exceeded their power, and they 
claimed credit and pretended to be nationalists, disregarding the great evils which 
the enemy and the imperialists are reserving for us to engulf the rest of the 
usurped homeland and disperse the remaining hundreds and thousands of its 
people.93  
 
In this speech, Hussein repositioned himself as the true Arab nationalist and publicly 
distanced himself from the so-called imperialists, despite having received $10 million in 
aid from the United States immediately after the coup.94 It was perhaps after the coup that 
King Hussein began taking the idea of a pan-Jordanian identity seriously and embarked 	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on spatial claims to Jerusalem in the name of Arab nationalism and Islamic legitimacy. 
Day argues that some ‘homogenization’ did take place during the period of Jordan’s 
annexation. According to Day, “The government made every effort to incorporate the 
Palestinians into the society and, to the extent that distinctions between the two groups 
remained, to balance the interests of both.”95 During the 1960s, the Jordanian government 
tried to broaden its base of support by recruiting more Palestinians into the bureaucracy, 
appointing more nationalists to the government, and expanding cultural inculcation of 
national values through education and museums. These efforts signal the emergence of a 
Hashemite discourse of a pan-Jordanian national identity that purportedly could include 
both Jordanians and Palestinians. Rather than assimilating Palestinian cultural values into 
Jordanian ones, the Jordanian government attempted to make Palestinian culture and 
Palestinian spaces more Jordanian. This discourse was perhaps most explicitly expressed 
in the form of the ‘Jordanization’ of public spaces in Jerusalem. 
 
Discourses of Legitimacy in Jerusalem 
 The phenomenon of ‘Jordanization’ in Jerusalem refers to the process by which 
the Hashemite monarchy attempted to take control of and appropriate Jerusalem’s holy 
places as Jordanian national spaces. During the period of Jordan’s annexation of the West 
Bank, the Hashemite monarchy used the vocabulary of Islamic legitimacy and the 
Hashemites’ descent from the Prophet Muhammad to frame its role as the rightful 
protector of the holy places in Jerusalem. Similarly to the Ottomans, the Hashemites 
restricted land purchases near holy places, used pictorial narratives, and emphasized their 
roles as protectors of the holy places as social and political legitimation and to assert 	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control.96 King Hussein frequently referred to Jerusalem as the spiritual capital and rarely 
called it the second capital of the kingdom. In an interview with an American journalist, 
Hussein stated, “Jerusalem is the spiritual capital of our country; it is the cradle of our 
heritage and our glory.”97 However, Jerusalem was also the focal point of constructions 
of a separate Palestinian national identity. According to Khalidi, unlike Transjordanians, 
Palestinians had a sense of their borders even before the mandate period due to 
Palestine’s recognized status as holy land. Before the mandate was established, these 
borders signified not national space but sacred space. Jerusalem was central to 
Palestinians’ belief in their land as sacred and it was the focal point in discourses of 
Palestinian national identity.98  
 Despite Hussein’s proclamations of Jerusalem’s significance, Katz argues that 
many Palestinians were offended by Jerusalem’s second-class status in Jordan. According 
to Katz, many Palestinians felt that Jerusalem was ignored in favor of Amman. 
Furthermore, some Palestinians felt that the Jordanian government only appreciated 
Jerusalem as a religious and tourist center. In their view, the Jordanian government 
ignored and downright discouraged, as indicated by the government’s dissolution of 
political parties in Jerusalem, Jerusalem’s historical role as the political, economic, and 
administrative center of Palestine.99 In some ways, this was true. Massad argues that the 
Jordanian government devoted most of its development expenditure to the East Bank. 
Some claim that, since the West Bank was more economically developed, the Jordanian 
government’s policy was to encourage investment and development in the East Bank and 	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weaken the economy of the West Bank. Only tourism flourished in the West Bank. Thus, 
many Palestinians migrated to the East Bank, especially to Amman, to find work and 
Amman flourished at the expense of Jerusalem.100 As more Palestinians moved from 
Jerusalem to Amman for work, tensions eventually eased. But according to Benvenisti, 
the sense of discrimination and injustice did not disappear; rather, these feelings were no 
longer expressed politically.101 Aid stamps, which will be discussed in more detail below, 
were initially sold in Jordan before 1948 to raise funds for Palestinians. But in May 1951, 
the Parliament decided that revenue from the sale of aid stamps would not go towards the 
Palestinian aid fund but would be used for development and construction work for the 
entire kingdom.102 Furthermore, the government did not create any public housing 
projects and carried out few development projects in Jerusalem.103 In 1954, Palestinians 
representatives in Parliament suggested making Jerusalem the capital of Jordan. In 
response, the Jordanian government said that such a move would require the agreement 
of the other Arab states. By allowing such a debate, the Jordanian government attempted 
to placate the Palestinian population by suggesting that Jerusalem was worthy of 
consideration as the capital of Jordan. This move was also an attempt for the Hashemites 
to gain legitimacy as an Arab state in the context of pan-Arabism by suggesting that 
Jerusalem belonged to all Arab states.104 However, as Katz points out, the government 
had no real intention of moving the capital to Jerusalem in fear of ‘Palestinization’ of 
Jordan and instability for Hashemite rule, as well as criticism from the international 
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community, which still favored internationalization of Jerusalem.105 Furthermore, Sa’id 
al-Tall, former minister of education in Jordan, stated that the Jordanian government 
attempted to erase Palestine and Palestinian identity through cultural appropriation of 
Jerusalem. According to al-Tall, this was a mistake as Jerusalem became one of the main 
bases of political opposition during the period of Jordan’s annexation.106 Therefore, the 
Hashemite government’s attempt to take control over Jerusalem and create a pan-
Jordanian identity that would include Palestinians only strengthened discourses of a 
separate Palestinian national identity. 
Administration of Jerusalem, 1951-1961 
One of the ways by which the Hashemite government attempted to assert its 
dominance in Jerusalem was in the realm of education. This occurred in the context of the 
expansion of education during the 1950s. The Ministry of Education began publishing 
history textbooks and, between 1951 and 1961, school enrolment increased by 113%.107 
History textbooks usually serve as narratives of national pasts. A textbook from 1959 
quotes King Hussein’s speech about the Jordanian and Arab struggle in defense of unity, 
freedom, strength and “the message of protecting our sacred things and our sacred land, 
and the message of protecting the land of the Arabs for the unity of the Arabs.”108 In 
these textbooks, Jordan’s history was Hashemite history and inextricably linked with 
Arab nationalism. Rather than being a colonial creation, Jordan was presented as a 
natural outcome of Hashemite-Arab nationalism.109 The 1964 Law of Education states 
that the goal of the education system was for the “child to develop into a good citizen 	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who believes in: God, Country and King.”110 One such example of a tradition to 
legitimize authority and to inculcate beliefs is Abd al-Rahman Munif’s account of singing 
‘Long Live the Amir’ every morning at school in Amman during the 1940s.111 These 
traditions were part of a body of practices to teach children loyalty to and belief in the 
Hashemite national narrative. This practice supports Hobsbawm’s argument that 
traditions are created to establish or symbolize social cohesion, establish or legitimize 
institutions and relations of authority, and to inculcate beliefs and behaviors.112 
In Jerusalem, where there were more missionary schools than in the East Bank, 
the Jordanian government targeted Christian schools. The 1955 education law aimed to 
restrict the influence of these Christian institutions by requiring schools to use textbooks 
and teaching methods approved by the Jordanian Ministry of Education. The law also 
limited the language of instruction to Arabic and required schools to follow national and 
Muslim holidays. Furthermore, students were limited to studying only their own 
religion.113 The Jordanian government’s restrictions on Christian missionary schools 
occurred in the larger context of the government’s battles with foreign institutions in 
general. Most foreign governments did not recognize Jordan’s annexation of the West 
Bank and still believed that Jerusalem should be internationalized.114 The Hashemite 
government also painted itself as a secular power with legitimate authority and began to 
interfere with non-Muslim communities, such as the processes of choosing the Armenian 
Orthodox patriarch.115 King Hussein proclaimed himself as the protector of Christian 
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holy places and, asserting secular authority, began renovating Christian holy places in 
1953.116 It is important to note that control of religion was not limited to Christian sites 
and practices. The Hashemite monarchy also undermined the authority of the Higher 
Muslim Council, which was formerly headed by Abdullah’s rival Hajj Amin al-Husayni, 
and moved the Palestinian waqf from Jerusalem to Amman.117 The monarchy’s assertion 
of control over Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem will be discussed in the section below. 
Holy Places in Jerusalem, 1954-1964 
 Despite seventeen years of official annexation and an additional twenty-one years 
of administrative ties, there are few signs of Jordan’s past control of the West Bank 
today. However, it was not for lack of trying, at least in the spheres of religious and 
national sites with tourist potential. Abdullah himself ‘invented’ traditions and performed 
a particular identity and authority by attending prayers at the Al-Aqsa mosque every 
Friday in Jerusalem, thus symbolically and spatially reinforcing the relationship between 
the Hashemites and Islam and presenting himself as the utmost authority in Jerusalem. 
But ultimately, actions spoke louder than words and the Jordanian government’s 
discrimination against Palestinians undermined any sort of Hashemite claims of support 
for the Palestinian cause or Islamic legitimacy in monarchical discourse.118 Jordan’s 
annexation of the West Bank was not legally recognized and Jordan had therefore no 
legal authority to administer the holy sites in Jerusalem. In fact, Hussein’s government 
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did not focus on religious sites at first. Although Abdullah treated the city like a second 
capital and decreed that Friday prayers would be held in Jerusalem, Sofer argues that 
Hussein’s attitude to Jerusalem was quite different. After Abdullah’s assassination, the 
Jordanian government “treated the city with utmost severity,”119 harshly stopping riots 
and reacting to violence with violence. Hussein himself did not pray at the Al-Aqsa 
mosque until 1960.120 It was Palestinian representatives themselves who, soon after 
Jordan failed to make Jerusalem the capital, called for Jerusalem to be treated as a 
spiritual center. At this time in the mid-1950s, the Jordanian government took no action. 
According to Sofer, the Jordanian government only began using the slogans of Jerusalem 
being the second capital and the spiritual capital of Jordan in 1960,121 as a response to 
domestic turmoil and the pressures of Arab nationalism. In 1963, Hussein established a 
Hashemite palace in Jerusalem,122 thus creating a tangible symbol of Hashemite control. 
But Sofer points out that the Jordanian government wanted to limit Jerusalem’s political 
rule to prevent the city from becoming a symbol of Palestinian separatism and opposition. 
Therefore, the Hashemites emphasized the religious importance of Jerusalem through 
written and performative discourse.123  
The Hashemite monarchy framed its control over the Islamic holy sites in 
Jerusalem in terms of a discourse of Islamic legitimacy, citing the Hashemites’ descent 
from the Prophet Muhammad and their historical role as the guardians of the holy cities 
of Mecca and Medina. The Jordanian government asserted its control over the holy sites 	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when it began to conduct renovations at the Dome of the Rock in the late 1950s. By 
conducting renovations, the Hashemite monarchy could signal the significance of the 
holy sites to the government and also tangibly claim sovereignty over the physical space 
of the sites.124 For example, Hashemite banners were placed around the entrances of the 
Dome of the Rock during celebrations and festivals.125 These performances and claims of 
sovereignty follow from practices during the mandate period: Arab leaders exacerbated 
clashes by claiming that the Jewish population wanted to capture the Dome of the Rock 
and Abdullah himself frequently made pilgrimages to Sherif Husayn’s grave.126  
According to Katz, other Arab states did not criticize Jordan on religious grounds 
when the Hashemite government asserted its authority over the religious sites, indicating 
that other Arab states at least de facto accepted the Hashemites’ discourse of Islamic 
legitimacy. Furthermore, over time, the Arab states gave de facto recognition of Jordan’s 
annexation of Jerusalem by accepting and even celebrating the renovations. Katz claims 
that some Arab states provided funds and vocally supported the renovations and many 
representatives from the Arab states, as well as Muslim states, participated in the 1964 
ceremony to celebrate the completed renovations.127 These Arab states also considered 
themselves protectors of Jerusalem;128 therefore, they could also participate in a discourse 
of Islamic legitimacy by contributing to renovations and setting up charities in Jerusalem. 
 According to Katz, Jordanian government officials were very aware of the 
symbolic significance of the 1964 celebration ceremony of the completed renovations. 
The committee set up to supervise the ceremony spent most of its time and effort 	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discussing symbols, images, and rituals that would make the celebration ‘Jordanian’.129 
The Jordanian Tourism Department was extremely involved in the ceremony: Images of 
Jordan were displayed during the celebrations to ensure that foreign representatives 
would see them. In addition, the department decided that guests would also visit the tomb 
of Sherif Husayn, Abdullah’s father and the former king of the Hijaz, in Jerusalem.130 
The inclusion of Sherif Husayn in Jerusalem’s historical and spatial fabric is an example 
of an invented tradition. Katz writes that Hashemite narratives of Jordanian history 
indicate that Sherif Husayn wanted to include Jerusalem in his Arab state during 
negotiations with the British, indicating that the Hashemites had always cared for 
Jerusalem and its Islamic sites but colonial powers impeded their project of Arab and 
Islamic unity.131 Despite having never lived there and having limited activities in the city, 
Sherif Husayn was buried in Jerusalem. Katz argues that Sherif Husayn’s grave became 
part of the ‘Hashemite legacy’ that the Hashemite monarchy created and drew upon as an 
Islamic discourse of legitimation for its annexation of Jerusalem. By inventing a past, the 
Hashemites could control the official narrative of the present.132  
 During the ceremony, King Hussein spoke ‘in the name of the one united 
Jordanian family’ and he spoke of how Jordan was blessed with holy places, from Mecca 
and Medina to the holy sites in Jerusalem.133 These sites were all under Hashemite 
control or guardianship, implying that Jordan was, above all, a Hashemite state. Jordan 
was in no way associated with Mecca and Medina aside from all places having 
Hashemite rulers. Thus, Jordan was blessed because of the Hashemite guardians 	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protecting these Islamic sites. Aside from Islamic discourse, these celebrations also gave 
the Jordanian opportunities to participate in the discourse of Arab nationalism. After the 
1964 celebration, the Filastin newspaper printed a photo of King Hussein and Gamal 
Abdul Nasser standing on either side of the newly renovated Dome of the Rock.134 This 
image was a signal that Hussein and Nasser, who were on the opposite sides of the battle 
regarding what kind of Arab nationalism should be promoted, had reconciled due to their 
common bond of Islam. The Hashemites sought to legitimize Jordan’s place in the Arab 
world with its control of Islamic holy sites. During speeches at al-Haram al-Sharif, 
Hussein called Jordan the defender of the Arab world due to its proximity to Israel but 
also due to the Hashemites’ history of ‘defending the land and the nation’ and their 
allegiance to Islam. Hussein cited Sherif Husayn’s burial in Jerusalem as a sign of the 
Hashemites’ struggle for the Arab cause.135  
This discourse of Islamic legitimacy did not just serve to strengthen the 
Hashemite regime’s place in the Arab world. One of the reasons that Abdullah wanted to 
gain Palestinian territory was the touristic value of Jerusalem. The Hashemite 
government appropriated the holy places in Jerusalem as representative of Jordan in order 
for Jordan to conceivably market itself as the Holy Land. The Tourism Department was 
already heavily involved in the 1964 ceremony to celebrate the newly renovated Dome of 
the Rock. According to Katz, Jordan’s identification as the Holy Land “not only accorded 
the kingdom regional legitimacy but also added a global responsibility to care for and 
protect the world’s religious heritage.”136 Before Jordan’s appropriation of the term for 
tourism purposes in the 1950s, ‘Holy Land’ had only appeared in religious discourse. But 	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once ‘Holy Land’ became a powerful term in touristic discourse, Israel soon began 
competing with Jordan for the title. ‘Holy Land’ became a slogan for Christian and 
Muslim audiences and this term transformed Jerusalem’s holy places into national 
spaces.137 Furthermore, by cultural appropriation, the Jordanian government gave no 
thought to the actual usability of these spaces. According to travellers, women and 
children frequently played in the courtyard of Al-Haram Al-Sharif;138 Jerusalem as a 
whole was one of the centers of clashes with the government. But the Hashemite 
government glossed over these aspects of Jerusalem’s spaces and presented Jerusalem as 
a timeless city dominated by its religious significance. 
The Jordanian tourism industry received aid and guidance from the United States 
and thus, part of the Holy Land image that Jordan portrayed conformed to Western, 
romanticized visions of the Holy Land as ancient and exotic.139 In response, the Jordan 
Tourism Department broadcast the 1955 Christmas celebrations in Jerusalem to Western 
audiences and produced two films about Jordan as the Holy Land.140 According to Katz, 
American representatives had advised the Jordanian tourism department to “blend the 
ancient and modern,”141 in keeping with the custom of inventing traditions and an ancient 
past to blot out the Hashemite state’s short political history. The tourism department 
published articles around Christmas and Easter citing pilgrimages during the Roman 
period and praising pilgrims during the modern period.142 Jordan also participated in 
world fairs and international expositions around the world to display reproductions of its 
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holy places to Western audiences. One of the objects displayed at the 1964-1965 New 
York World’s Fair was one of the Dead Sea scrolls, which, according to the Jerusalem 
Times, “symbolized the Jordanian religious tradition.”143  
Pope Paul VI’s visit to the Holy Land in 1964 was highly promoted. King 
Hussein positioned himself as a Muslim mediator when the Pope met with the patriarch 
of the Orthodox Church. During speeches addressed to the Pope and global Christian 
communities, Hussein reinforced Jordan’s status as the Holy Land and the Hashemites’ 
constructed long history of toleration. He stated, “For centuries…we have been 
welcoming pilgrims to the holy places in this country, the Holy Land” and he pledged to 
defend Christian holy places forever.144 The Pope’s visit also prompted a new stamp 
series that showed the Pope represented Christian sites and King Hussein representing 
Muslim sites, thus indicating an equal relationship between the Pope and Hussein and 
positioning the latter as both a national ruler of the holy places and the leader of the 
Islamic world.145 In doing so, the Hashemite government removed “the link between the 
sites and Palestinian historical memory” and created a “Jordanian historical and 
contemporary view of Jerusalem’s holy places.”146 The display of the relationship 
between Hussein and the Pope may have also been an effort to unite Palestinian Muslims 
and Christians against the Israeli Jewish population, a discourse that had begun in 
1948.147 These tourism initiatives seemed to work: tourism in Jordan increased by nearly 
30% in 1965.148 But despite the regime’s efforts, some newspapers questioned the 
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Jordanian government’s nation-building efforts. One article spoke of how the region was 
split into Israel and Palestine and addressed the holy sites and the Pope’s visit without 
mentioning Jordan at all.149 By extending Jordanian traditions back in history, King 
Hussein himself promoted Jordan as old-yet-new, in order to increase its tourism value 
but also to show that Jordan was more than an artificial creation but was a legitimate 
nation-state with an ancient history determined by great rulers. The Hashemites were the 
latest in the territory’s history of great rulers, and they hoped to be the last. But Sofer 
argues that the government’s actions had no effect on relations between the Jordanian 
government and the Palestinians because the government did not wholeheartedly believe 
in enhancing Jerusalem’s importance.150 Contrary to the goals of the Jordanian 
government, Jerusalem actually became a center of opposition activity and a strong 
symbol of a separate Palestinian national identity. 
Nationalization of the Palestine Archeological Museum (PAM), 1966 
 The Jordanian government did not limit itself to claiming and appropriating holy 
places. One of its targets was the Palestine Archeological Museum (PAM). The museum 
was built with the funding of American philanthropist John D. Rockefeller Jr., who 
decreed that the Palestine government should be responsible for building and 
administering the museum.151 In the lead-up to the termination of the British mandate in 
Palestine, the British decided to transfer ownership and management to an international 
board of trustees, which included representatives from the Jordanian government, the 
British government in Jordan, and the Hebrew University in Jerusalem.152  
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In 1966, the Jordanian government took over the museum. Sir Alec Kirkbride, a 
founding member of the board of trustees, seems to attribute the nationalization of the 
museum to the board of trustees. In his memoirs, he writes: 
On the excuse that the annual revenue from the endowment and from fees charged 
for admission, was insufficient for the proper maintenance of the Museum, the 
trustees made over the place and its contents to the Jordanian Government. I am 
sure that it might have been possible to raise the funds needed to preserve its 
independence as an international institution.153 
 
However, reports from Kathleen Kenyon, an archeologist and another member of the 
board, and the British Foreign Office tell a different story. It is important to remember 
that by the time the museum was nationalized, Kirkbride had resigned and left Jordan for 
Libya, and heard about the story from afar. Perhaps his memoirs are an indication of how 
the Jordanian government told the story, as Kathleen Kenyon’s letter indicated that news 
articles painted the board of trustees as incompetent.154 Kathleen Kenyon believed that 
Jordan should ultimately control the museum but, in 1966, the Jordanian Department of 
Antiquities was, in her opinion, incapable of administering the museum. According to her 
reports, Dr. Awni Dajani, the director of the Jordanian Department of Antiquities, met 
with the board and claimed that the department was competent and provided a list of 
qualified university graduates to prove it. Dajani stated that the museum would be a point 
of national pride and that Jordan was a stable, well-advanced country now and was 
entirely capable of running the museum.155 The board had no choice but to acquiesce and 
on September 1, 1966, the Jordanian flag was hoisted above the museum for the first 
time.156 The story of the museum shows the importance of museums and visual and 
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spatial narratives in creating national space and national history. In fact, after Israel 
annexed the West Bank, the Israeli government renamed the museum the ‘Rockefeller 
Museum’,157 thus erasing the museum’s Palestinian roots. 
 
Conclusion 
 In 1967, Israel went to war with Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, and consequently 
invaded and annexed the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula, much of the Golan Heights, and 
the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. After its retreat, Jordan lost the West Bank but 
still maintained administrative ties, including Jordanian citizenship for the West Bank 
residents. But Jordan had lost the holy places in Jerusalem. Subsequently, the Jordanian 
government shifted and began promoting non-religious places in the East Bank for 
tourism purposes, especially in the aftermath of the civil war. Day argues that the true 
challenge for the Jordanian government’s plans for a pan-Jordanian identity came with 
the establishment of the PLO in 1964, which he claims “gave new life to the idea of a 
separate Palestinian national identity.”158 But discourses of a Palestinian national identity 
were already strong before the establishment of the PLO and pan-Jordanianism seemed to 
be a much weaker force than pan-Arabism. 
 One of the questions raised in this chapter was to what extent the Jordanian 
government ‘Jordanized’ the West Bank and the Palestinian population? During the 
period of annexation, popular discourses of Jordanian national identity were, as analyzed 
above, only emerging and Jordanians themselves were divided between those loyal and 
those opposed to the monarchy. The government’s discourse of national identity focused 	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on pan-Jordanianism, a discourse that the government used to appropriate Jerusalem and 
co-opt Palestinians, rather than impose any sense of Jordanianness. What is clear is that 
the Jordanian government’s vocal support for the Palestinian cause of return to their 
homeland did not translate into action. Furthermore, the Jordanian-Palestinian divide 
became truly salient in terms of national identity after the civil war in 1970, which will be 
discussed in the third chapter. The Jordanian government’s project of developing a pan-
Jordanian identity seemed to fail once policies of Jordanization and de-Palestinization 
were implemented after 1970. However, Jordan remains the legal protector and 
administrator of the Muslim holy places in Jerusalem, as outlined in the peace treaty 
between Israel and Jordan in 1994. Clearly, the Jordanian government still sees value in 
controlling Muslim sites as part of a discourse of Islamic legitimacy. Since Israel began 
its occupation of the West Bank, one of the only ties between the Hashemite monarchy 
and Jerusalem has been the administration of the Muslim holy sites. This remains a 
source of legitimacy that the monarchy draws upon to increase its authority as the ruler of 
Jordan and as a leader of the Arab and Islamic worlds. 
   
	   95 
Discourses of a Tribalized National Identity, 1967 to 1990 
Introduction 
Discourses engaging tribal identities and tribalized national identities have been 
and remain salient in Jordan today. In this thesis, the concept of tribalism does not refer 
to a particular pre-state or sub-state social or political organization but a discursive use of 
references to such organization in the past for political purposes in the present. As Jungen 
also argues, with this meaning, tribalism is not merely a vestige of past pre-modern days 
but has been actively constructed by the Hashemites during the state building process.1 
Some Jordanians’ criticisms of tribalism can be read as responses to assertions of a 
tribalized Jordanian national identity that began to emerge after Black September. This 
section explores how Palestinians came to be excluded from discourses of national 
identity and how narratives of tribal autochthony developed in order to create a discourse 
of tribalized national identity. 
The 1967 war between Israel and the Arab states can be considered a turning 
point in Jordan’s history. Not only did the Jordanian state lose approximately 38% of its 
GDP and approximately half of its population, it lost the credibility required for its claim 
to represent Palestinians. How could the Hashemite government still claim a legitimate 
discourse of pan-Jordanian identity without Jerusalem and the West Bank? The flailing 
pan-Jordanian identity was dealt a decisive blow in 1970, when the Jordanian 
government drove Palestinian militias out of Jordanian territory in the conflict known as 
‘Black September’. In academic literature, 1970 is seen as the decisive split between 
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Jordanians and Palestinians that led to the exclusion of Palestinians from Jordanian 
national identity.  
Since the discourse of pan-Jordanianism was no longer feasible, during the 1970s 
and 1980s, the Jordanian government embarked on a new discourse of Jordanian national 
identity and actively promoted a ‘tribalized’ national identity. Tribal customs and 
traditions were presented as uniquely and, more importantly, authentically Jordanian. 
During the mandate period, tribal identities were politicized in that tribal identities were 
no longer limited to constructions of the rights and duties of kinship and concrete social 
relations expressed in that idiom but began to be used to access benefits and services 
from the state and to establish differential power relations within and between tribes. 
Increasingly, different groups evoked notions of tribal solidarity and identity for political 
use in relation to the state and applied the category of ‘tribe’ to people who did not 
necessarily have strong social relations with each other. As Droz-Vincent argues, family 
networks and the power relations implied with such kinship relations were not hegemonic 
but reinvented in certain circumstances, such as elections.2 This category of tribe was 
also claimed by people who had not historically organized as tribes, such as the 
Circassians. As state power grew, the tribal network became less essential and less 
powerful but the tribal identity remained salient in this restructured form. The 
government’s discourse of tribalized national identity was supported by individuals from 	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tribes who began writing ‘tribal histories’ in the 1990s as ways to show that their ‘tribe’, 
a group of individuals who theoretically had concrete social relations with each other 
based on kinship, was autochthonous. However, as Shryock points out, these narratives of 
tribal histories could potentially undermine the state’s discourse of national identity 
because these narratives emphasized heterogenous groups rather than homogenous 
groups. These narratives emphasized the differences between tribes, between Bedouin 
and settled populations, and between Jordanians and Palestinians. This discourse of 
autochthonous Jordanian identity had a dialectic relationship with the Jordanian 
government’s discourse of a tribalized Jordanian national identity. 
At the same time, the Hashemite monarchy began promoting Jordanian unity 
based on values of pan-Islam and Arab-Muslim unity. The Hashemite monarchy reshaped 
a discourse of Islamic legitimacy that was not based on its protection of Jerusalem but on 
creating Jordan’s own visual Islamic identity in the context of Islamism during the 1970s 
and 1980s. Fathi argues that before 1970 the Hashemite monarchy delineated a Jordanian 
national identity by emphasizing who was not Jordanian. After 1970, the state attempted 
to base its discourse of national identity on common respect for institutions and common 
loyalty to the state. The state was creating the nation by emphasizing ‘unity in diversity’.3 
In order to examine changes in the Jordanian government’s discourse of Jordanian 
national identity after the 1967 war and Black September, I will analyze the context of 
Black September and the discourse that focused on Jordanian national identity in 
opposition to the Palestinian population. I will chart the emergence of a discourse of a 
tribalized national identity by examining its historical roots and analyzing recent 
discourses that denationalized or excluded Palestinians in order to make claims of tribal 	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autochthony. I will then examine two different Hashemite narratives of Jordanian 
national identity: one based on tribalism and the other a discourse of Islamic legitimacy 
in the form of mosque-building in Amman. The discourses of tribalism and Islamic 
legitimacy as expressed in public spaces will be examined in further detail in the fourth 
chapter, along with discourses drawing on ancient history and neoliberalism that emerged 
in the 1990s. 
 
War and Loss, 1967-1972 
 During the 1960s, the Jordanian government made several attempts at Palestinian 
incorporation and integration. Wasfi al-Tall, prime minister of Jordan from 1962 to 1963 
and again from 1965 to 1967, wanted to broaden the monarchy’s bases of support and he 
targeted the young and the educated, many of them Palestinians. In order to gain the 
loyalty of this class, al-Tall worked to increase personal freedom, released 159 prisoners 
with amnesty, and cut down on military and security checkpoints.4 In short, Jordan 
operated less like a police state. However, the 1967 war impeded any political and 
cultural integration that occurred. During the 1950s and early 1960s, Jordan was 
politically isolated and desperately needed to boost its position in the eyes of Arab 
nationalists. But King Hussein was not willing to give up his power and Western support 
in favor of Nasser’s version of radical, anti-imperialist Arab nationalism.5 Despite such 
tensions, relations between Jordan and Egypt thawed with the 1967 war with Israel. Both 
Nasser and Hussein needed to be seen as legitimate in the context of Arab nationalism so 
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Hussein travelled to Cairo to sign a mutual defense pact with Nasser in May 1967. But 
the war led to humiliating defeat for the Arab states. In just six days, the Israeli air force 
managed to destroy Egypt’s air force and the Jordanian army was driven out of Jerusalem 
and the West Bank. Israel began its occupation of the West Bank, Gaza, the Sinai, and 
parts of the Golan Heights. Many people all over the Arab world were crushed that after 
nineteen years of Arab nationalists’ promises of Arab victory against Israel, victory never 
came. The discourse of pan-Arabism became much weaker after 1967, which helped 
facilitate the rise of state nationalisms, especially for Palestinians, who increasingly 
believed that none of the Arab states could help them return to Palestine. Thus, militias 
became more popular as a means of trying to reclaim Palestinian territory.6  
 One such militia was the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which became 
a threat to the Hashemite monarchy’s legitimacy and security. In order to improve 
relations with Egypt, Jordan accepted the creation of the PLO at the Cairo Summit in 
1964. The PLO initially stated that it would cooperate with the Jordanian government and 
King Hussein claimed that the PLO would not harm the “unity of our one Jordanian 
family…rather, on the contrary, it will strengthen and deepen this unity and double its 
abilities to grow and take off.”7 But Palestinian militias’ raids into Israel increased 
substantially in the late 1960s, jeopardizing Jordan’s uneasy ceasefire with Israel. As Day 
argues, Jordan was caught in a double-bind: “Efforts to turn back the guerrilla operations 
were regarded as anti-Palestinian. When the raids were not prevented and the Israeli 
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retaliation came, the Jordanian army was criticized...”8 Furthermore, the PLO claimed 
that the East Bank had been torn from Palestine in 1919 and thus should be returned to 
the motherland of Palestine. King Hussein responded that the PLO and other Palestinian 
militias threatened Arab unity,9 but public sympathy for the Palestinian militias endured.  
In 1970, the Jordanian government decided to take military action against the 
guerrillas due to their ‘provocations’, several of which according to Massad, were 
actually started by Jordanian agents in order to provide excuses for the Jordanian Army to 
take military action during events known as ‘Black September’.10 After approximately a 
year of violence and conflicts, which allegedly killed at least 1,000 people, the Jordanian 
government succeeded in driving Palestinian militias out of Jordan and the leaders of the 
PLO fled to exile in Lebanon. This conflict between the Jordanian government and the 
various Palestinian militias has been described in historiography as a ‘civil war’. But it is 
important to note that the conflict did not strictly fall along lines of national origin. 
Transjordanians who opposed the monarchy were involved in the Palestinian militias and, 
according to Massad, 5,000 members of the Jordan Army defected to the militias during 
and after the war.11 As for Palestinians with Jordanian citizenship, the majority stayed out 
of the conflict and many Palestinian members of the Jordanian Army chose to remain in 
the military, rather than defect to the militias.12  
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‘East Bank First’: Government De-Palestinization and De-Palestinized Discourse 
Black September strengthened a discourse of Jordanian national identity that was formed 
in opposition to the Palestinian other. This discourse emerged in parallel to the Jordanian 
government’s policy of ‘de-Palestinization’. Many Palestinians in the government and the 
military were removed from their posts and the government ceased to actively recruit 
Palestinians for employment. Thus, Palestinian-Jordanians established themselves further 
in the private sector.13 Furthermore, an ‘East Banker first’ discourse emerged: more 
Transjordanians began articulating the idea that Transjordanians should be favored. This 
discourse may have been largely based on competition for resources as the state 
increasingly modeled itself as a welfare state.14 Jordan suffered rising inflation and 
increasing costs of living during the 1970s. In 1979, various Bedouin groups staged a 
protest in Amman.15 This shows that the Bedouins did not always support the Jordanian 
government and the erosion of their economic bases and political power can be 
considered factors that contributed to the emergence of tribal narratives and assertions of 
tribal identities in the 1980s and 1990s. Since access to the state was structured by a neo-
patronage system based on politicized tribal identities (as discussed in the first chapter), 
members of tribes needed to emphasize their tribal identities and claims of autochthony 
to claim the right of access to the Hashemite state. Furthermore, during the 1980s, Jordan 
experienced a decrease in remittances sent from mostly Palestinian-Jordanian workers in 
the Gulf and a decrease in aid from the Gulf states, which reduced both public and private 
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incomes.16 Unemployment increased, which was exacerbated by Palestinian migrants’ 
return to Jordan after the Gulf War, allowing for the argument that Palestinians created a 
strain on state services. These economic factors increased competition for state resources 
and thus could be the source of tensions that were framed as national or inter-tribal 
differences between Jordanians and Palestinians and between different tribes at a moment 
that discourse of exclusion of Palestinians emerges. By the 1990s, more Transjordanians 
felt that they were participants in a zero-sum game: If Palestinians gained more resources 
and power, Transjordanians would lose both political and economic power. ‘Abd al-Hadi 
al-Majali, a member of Parliament and leader of the ‘Ahd political party,17 stated in a 
newspaper article, “The Palestinian who lives among us and wishes to maintain…his 
Palestinian political identity, has the right to live without discrimination…[but] he does 
not have the right to work in Jordan political institutions.”18 This discourse of a Jordanian 
national identity is exclusively Transjordanian (meaning East Bank and excludes 
Palestinians) and undercuts the Jordanian government’s efforts to create a discursive 
national identity that was applicable to all Jordanian citizens. Furthermore, the Israeli 
government’s repeated slogans of ‘Jordan is Palestine’ during the 1980s, an attempt to 
legitimize its own deportation of Palestinians by claiming that Jordan could be a 
homeland for the Palestinians, seemed to align with the Hashemite government’s 
previous discourse of a pan-Jordanian identity, thus exacerbating its unpopularity.19 
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 During the 1970s, the Jordanian government began articulating a more exclusive 
East Bank Jordanian identity by promoting non-religious sites on the East Bank for 
tourism purposes. Government tourism campaigns featured ancient ruins and castles and, 
beginning in the 1990s, Jordan also began promoting itself as a ‘Holy Land’ with the 
promotion of an alleged baptism site on the East Bank.20 Despite the emergence of 
Islamist movements from the 1970s onwards, the Jordanian government was still very 
willing to capitalize on its Christian history and heritage in order to compete in the 
tourism industry. But despite such tourism initiatives on the East Bank, the Hashemite 
monarchy clearly still valued the religious and symbolic power of Jerusalem. According 
to Katz, images of Jerusalem’s holy places still appear on stamps and banknotes. Despite 
Israel’s occupation and Jordan’s official disengagement from the West Bank in 1988,21 
the Jordanian government’s discourse of Jordanian national identity has continued to 
include the symbol of Jerusalem until today.22 
Accents and Clothing: A Discourse of Difference 
The ‘East Banker first’ discourse is an aspect of popular discourses of difference 
that emerged in the 1970s. Cultural markers such as accents and clothing also indicate a 
change in discourse of Jordan national identity that excluded Palestinians and privileged 
Transjordanianness. This Transjordanianness was distinctly based on so-called ‘tribal’ 
culture. Formerly urban and rural accents became imbued with national meaning and 
became known as ‘Palestinian’ and ‘Transjordanian’ accents, respectively, despite the 
fact that urban Transjordanians used to speak with so-called Palestinian accents and rural 
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Palestinians spoke with ‘Transjordanian’ accents. Furthermore, these accents took on a 
gendered dimension as the formerly urban, now Palestinian accent became encouraged 
for women and the rural ‘Transjordanian’ accent was designated for men. After 1970, 
most urban Transjordanian men picked up the rural accent and urban Palestinian-
Jordanian men felt pressure to do the same.23 The changes in who could speak with what 
accent not only marked separate national identities but also feminized Palestinians. 
Massad argues that Bedouins had the advantage of controlling the narratives on 
masculine and feminine accents because many Bedouins believed that urban accents were 
feminine. Thus, the dominant discourses on gender and national origin reflect the state’s 
success in incorporating Bedouins and ‘Bedouinizing’ Jordanians.24  
 Clothing such as the keffiyeh also took on a new meaning as it turned into a visual 
marker of difference between Transjordanians and Palestinians. During the 1970s, it 
became increasingly popular for Transjordanian young men to wear red and white 
keffiyehs, a type of scarf that was supposedly originally worn by Bedouins and has come 
to symbolize Transjordanian national pride. Palestinian youths began wearing black and 
white keffiyehs, which became a symbol of Palestinian national identity. These color 
schemes did not originally evoke ideas of national identity. Previously, both 
Transjordanians and Palestinian Bedouins wore white or black and white headcloths. The 
red and white keffiyehs were in fact General John Glubb’s invention. Black September 
intensified a discourse of autochthony and this is reflected in performances of identity 
such as adopting the right accent and wearing the right keffiyeh to mark ‘true’ 
Jordanianness. This discourse was reinforced by the monarchy; King Hussein himself 	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began wearing the red and white keffiyeh during state visits and when he met with tribal 
leaders and soldiers much more frequently after the war.25 This performance of tribalized 
legitimacy continued with the reign of King Abdullah II, the son of Hussein. In the 2002 
banknote series, all the Hashemite kings from Sherif Husayn to Abdullah II appear on the 
notes with keffiyehs rather than Western dress.26 Images of the Hashemite leaders in most 
offices, shops, and restaurants in Amman also show the leaders in both Western suits and 
white thubs (robes) and red and white keffiyehs. The Hashemites have appropriated this 
colonial invention of tribal fashion as a symbol of Jordanian national identity and 
Transjordanians and Palestinians have also adopted these performances of national 
identity. By doing so, they propagate the idea that Transjordanians and Palestinians 
constitute two separate nations and rural and tribal customs become evidence of 
Transjordanian autochthony. 
Colonial Roots of Tribalized National Culture 
 Markers such as accents, food, and clothing have come to represent 
Transjordanian national identity and were based on supposedly tribal culture. One of the 
roots of this discourse of tribalized national identity, which is deployed at both the 
government and at the popular level, was the colonial production of tribal culture. In his 
book Colonial Effects, Massad claims that the so-called tribal or Bedouin customs and 
traditions that are performed in Jordan today as representations of Jordanian national 
culture, such as drinking tea or eating the national dish mansaf, are actually, if not at least 
invented by colonial figures such as John Glubb, then reinvented in the context of 
colonial indirect rule. The state-sponsored and widely accepted representations of a 	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tribalized Jordanian national culture and identity, which is usually presented as timeless 
and ancient, were actually reshaped during colonial rule in the 1930s. 
 Glubb was a military man and displayed paternalistic Orientalist tendencies when 
discussing his relationship with his Bedouin soldiers. As mentioned in the first chapter, 
he led the Desert Patrol, a branch of the Arab Legion, as a means of incorporating 
Bedouin tribesmen into the state. He had a very keen eye for detail and he knew exactly 
what he wanted his soldiers to look like. According to Massad: 
Glubb was a voyeuristic aesthete with equal commitment to colorful 
exhibitionism, albeit an exhibitionism projected onto his Bedouin subjects qua 
spectacle. He was meticulous in his plans for the production of a new species of 
Bedouins, nay, a new species of Arabs, albeit a species that came to be known as 
Jordanian. He knew exactly what the new Arab soldier should look like…what he 
should view as traditional and culture, what he should accept as suitable 
modernity…In that, Glubb’s project entailed molding the Bedouin’s body and 
mind into something new.27 
 
Glubb himself believed that “In [Bedouins] also we find the most typical surviving 
examples of that purely Arab way of life, which amongst other Arab communities, has 
come to a greater or lesser degree diluted by mixture with foreign influences.”28 His 
discourse of Arab purity and the Bedouins being a martial race is typical of British 
colonists’ tendencies to ascribe different epistemologies to constructed categories of 
‘races’.  
His memoirs provide a detailed description of the soldiers’ uniform: Long 
‘traditional’ Bedouin robes but now reinvented in khaki, a red sash, a belt and bandolier 
for ammunition, and a silver dagger. The Bedouin soldiers’ uniform also included a 
newly invented red and white keffiyeh, which was discussed previously as a symbol of 
Transjordanian national identity in opposition to a Palestinian national identity 	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symbolized by the black and white keffiyeh. The red and white keffiyeh has a short history 
as Glubb invented the keffiyeh in the 1930s. Other Jordanians usually wore pure white or 
black and white keffiyehs and other Arab Legion soldiers wore helmets.29 Glubb proudly 
claims, “The effect was impressive. Soon the tribesmen were complaining that the 
prettiest girls would accept none but our soldiers for their lovers.”30 Glubb’s statement 
ascribes the Bedouin soldiers with more masculinity in relation to other Jordanian men. 
Yet the Bedouin soldiers cannot be viewed as more masculine and more capable than 
Glubb himself in colonial Orientalist discourse. Therefore, Glubb also devotes parts of 
his memoirs to stories of the Bedouins’ gentleness and learning how to read under 
Glubb’s tutorship.31 Using this discourse, Glubb elevated the Bedouin soldiers as ‘pure 
Arabs’ and more masculine than (and thus superior to) sedentary and urban Jordanians 
but ultimately inferior to the hyper-masculinized Glubb himself. Glubb used his own 
vision of what Bedouin culture should look like and redefined Bedouin customs and 
recoded them as traditional.32 
Aside from uniforms and fashion, colonial rule also influence Bedouins’ eating 
and drinking habits. Jordan was opened up to other British territories for trade and 
Bedouin soldiers were introduced to military rations. According to Massad, Bedouin 
tribespeople usually relied on camel meat but, once Jordan’s trade relations were 
established, camel meat became much less common. Furthermore, the prices of tea and 
rice lowered and thus they became more popular. Formerly coffee drinkers, the Bedouins, 
in Glubb’s words, “learned to drink tea” and contemporary Jordanian academic and 
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government discourses also claim that tea is the most common beverage in Jordan, all the 
while obscuring tea’s colonial history in Jordan.33 But the dish that perhaps is displayed 
as the most popular symbol of Bedouin and Jordanian national culture is mansaf. Various 
tourism brochures include sections about mansaf being Jordan’s national dish and list 
restaurants for tourists to specifically try mansaf. Jordanians themselves also speak of 
mansaf as the national dish in popular discourse and Jeffrey Goldberg, author of the 
March 2013 article about King Abdullah II in The Atlantic, made sure to point out the 
king’s lunch with tribal leaders in Karak where they ate mansaf “in the Bedouin 
tradition.”34 Mansaf is now made with white rice and lamb cooked in jamid, a yogurt 
sauce made from goat milk. But until the early twentieth century when the prices of rice 
fell due to increased trade with other colonial territories, Bedouins only used rice on 
festive occasions and thus usually cooked mansaf with bread.35 But mansaf with rice, 
with its colonial roots, has now been recoded as traditional. Massad states that Glubb 
“repressed and erased much in the Bedouins’ way of life that conflicted with imperial 
interests” but he also “produced much that was new and combined it with what was 
‘inoffensive’ and ‘beneficial’ in their ‘tradition’ in a new amalgam of what was packaged 
as real Bedouin culture.”36 These colonial inventions of ‘traditions’ are considered in 
popular discourse today to be authentic and Glubb’s productions of culture is one of the 
roots of the tribal culture that became representative of national culture in official 
discourses of national identity.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Massad, 158-159. 
34 Jeffrey Goldberg, “The Modern King in the Arab Spring,” The Atlantic, March 18, 2013. 
35	  Massad, 158-159. 
36 Ibid., 159. 
   
	   109 
Bedouins’ Historical Support for the Monarchy 
Another root of the discourse of tribalized national identity is the fact that 
Bedouins have historically supported the monarchy, which is leveraged discursively to 
portray Bedouins as the ideal Jordanian citizen. Due to their means of incorporation into 
the Hashemite state, Bedouins are usually associated with the military. Employment by 
the military itself is an important component of East Bank Transjordanians’ 
subjectivities,37 as discussed in the second chapter. The significance of the military in 
Transjordanian subjectivity could be partly attributed to the military’s dramatic increase 
in political and cultural power after Black September as King Hussein decided to tighten 
security around the country. While the civil government was undergoing ‘de-
Palestinization’, King Hussein began spending more time with the military and involving 
high-ranking officers in palace politics. In Massad’s words, the increased political power 
of the military led to more “tribalist Bedouin chauvinism” and different tribes competed 
for power, to the extent that the king needed to intervene in conflicts between tribes.38 
The Jordanian government also started producing television programs about the military: 
In 1970 alone, there were sixteen special television programs about the Jordanian Army. 
Patriotic army songs began playing on television and King Hussein displayed himself 
more in military uniform with other soldiers. According to Massad, these displays of 
military culture continue in Jordan today.39 One spatial tribute to the military is the 
Martyrs’ Memorial, which will be discussed in the fourth chapter. Due to deployment of 
colonial productions of culture and historical association with the Bedouin population, 
the government has managed to create a discourse of national identity that emphasizes 	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what is presented as tribal traditions and customs, as well as military culture, as the ideal 
representations of national culture. Both the general public and people who identified as 
tribesmen have adapted this discourse. The section below explores how the disintegration 
of tribal structures laid the foundation for the emergence of tribal narratives that 
denationalize Palestinians and claim autochthony for the tribes. 
 
Non-Government Discourses of a Tribalized National Identity 
Although tribal identities remained salient, tribal structures and systems became 
less relevant as the Hashemite state grew stronger and took over more duties and 
responsibilities that had previously belonged to tribal sheikhs. In the first chapter, I 
discussed the politicization of tribal identities, meaning that tribal identities did not just 
connote communal identities of people having concrete social relations but became 
political identities that could be leveraged by certain groups and group leaders and the 
state. As Fathi noted, although political power rested to an extent with tribal elites at 
Transjordan’s inception in 1921, political power shifted more towards a bureaucratic elite 
as the state grew.40 With economic development came increased sedentarization and 
urbanization, meaning that Jordan now has very few truly nomadic tribes. According to 
Day, by the late 1970s, only 3% of Jordan’s population was nomadic compared to the 
1922 population in which nearly half of Jordan’s population was nomadic.41 Kamel Abu 
Jaber argues that by the 1980s, social structures such as tribes and extended families had 
become replaced by nuclear families, interest groups, professional associations, and 
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bureaucrats.42 Economic growth has led to the breakdown of the tribal system as power 
became more concentrated with individuals. Due to education as a leveler, individuals 
from politically weaker tribes have been able to join the bureaucracy and gain political 
power. The rise of the individual and the parallel rise of the middle class have weakened 
social divisions between the urban class, the Bedouin, and fellahin. One of the reasons 
why such a contentious debate about the role of tribalism emerged in the 1980s was that 
the new middle class began advocating for emphasis on merit, rather than tribal identity, 
in social and political life. For the new middle class, tribalism meant nepotism.43 
Despite the breakdowns in tribal structures, tribalism and tribal identities as 
political forces remained strong, to the extent that groups which lacked tribal histories 
began asserting themselves as tribes. One such group is the Circassians, a group of non-
Arabs from Central Asia that established themselves in Jordan at the end of the 
nineteenth century but remains an ethnic minority. In 1979, some Circassians and 
Chechens established the Circassian-Chechen Tribal Council in order to increase access 
to state resources and transcend its minority status by using a discourse of tribal identity 
to participate effectively in the institutionalized patronage system.44 By doing so, the 
Council has imagined itself as a community in a radically new way. This development 
suggests that the Circassian-Chechen Council believed that in order to be taken seriously 
as legitimate Jordanians, they needed to form tribes rather than rely on their Jordanian 
citizenship alone. Although Jordan is a welfare state that aims to provide services such as 
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education and health care to all,45 its political system is still highly personalized and 
discussions about using networks, which may not necessarily be kinship networks, to find 
jobs and resources remain highly contentious in popular discourses. With the loss of their 
political power, tribes needed to narrate themselves into significance. This occurred with 
the emergence of a tribal discourse of a tribalized national identity, which denationalized 
Palestinians and made claims of autochthony. By doing so, these tribesmen and narrators 
could claim a special relationship with the state that granted them political power, 
elevated their social standing, and gave them access to resources. These tribes’ discourse 
of tribalized national identity emerged at a particular historical moment to as a way to 
make up for particular communities’ increasing lack of political power. 
Denationalization of Palestinians and Claims of Autochthony 
Non-government discourses of tribalized national identity emerged in the 1980s 
when educated urban Jordanians of Bedouin origin began writing about tribal histories in 
order to nationalize them. By nationalizing their claims of genealogical origin and tribal 
heritage, these Bedouin scholars could reinforce their claims of autochthony and claim a 
special relationship with the Hashemite state. For example, they may choose to obscure 
resistance to Hashemite rule. Out of seventeen ‘Adwanis interviewed by Shryock, only 
five were willing to discuss the ‘Adwan revolt of 1923.46 Tribal historians used the state’s 
discursive mechanisms, such as written rather than oral history, to create a discourse of a 
tribalized national identity in which the tribes themselves are the true, rightfully dominant 
Jordanians. However, at the same time, tribal histories reveal the hegemony of tribes and 
thus may actually undermine the state-sponsored narrative of a homogenizing national 	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identity. As Layne argues, there is a dialogical relationship between tribal and national 
identity, meaning that there is a “constant interaction between meanings, all of which 
have the potential of conditioning other.”47 Discourses of tribal identity and national 
identity interact and give meaning to each other and the ambiguities of such interactions 
will be discussed below. 
Such claims of autochthony required the denationalization of Palestinians. 
Perhaps the most radical marker of Palestinian otherness consisted of tribes members’ 
references to Palestinians as ‘Belgians’ beginning in the 1980s. The origin of this epithet 
is unclear,48 but according to Massad, calling a Palestinian-Jordanian Baljikiyyih or 
Belgian is still used as a ‘national’ insult today.49 In his anthropological study of the 
Abbadi and Adwani tribes in the Balqa during the 1990s, Shryock writes that tribesmen 
commonly referred to Palestinians as Belgians as a way to claim tribal land and space 
from current Palestinian inhabitants.50 This epithet renders Palestinians foreign, despite 
their Jordanian citizenship, and removes even their Arab linguistic and cultural heritage. 
Thus, denationalizing and de-Arabizing Palestinians in this way undermined notions of 
Arab nationalism and Arab unity and the Jordanian government’s efforts to create a 
unified Jordanian national identity. 
By painting Palestinians as foreign, Jordanians presenting themselves as members 
of tribes claimed autochthony for themselves. According to Shryock, a common 
statement among Bedouins in the Balqa region was “we are the people of the land (ahl al-
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balad). The tribes. The original Jordanians (al-urduniyyin al-asaliyyin). We have lived in 
Jordan for ages, and the land is ours to this day.”51 This emphasis on land is a reflection 
of the problematic relationship between notions of tribal identity and land. Although 
Bedouin tribesmen did not legally own the land of the Balqa, they claimed autochthony 
by referring to historical claims of land ownership. Shyrock notes that the majority of 
Bedouins in the Balqa are now sedentary, with jobs in the cities of Amman and Zarqa. In 
fact, the majority of inhabitants in the Balqa region are Palestinians who came to the East 
Bank in 1948 and in 1967 and there is also a large Palestinian refugee camp in the Balqa 
region.52 There are tensions between those who claim to be Bedouin and the Palestinian 
residents. When a Palestinian man interviewed by Shryock claimed to have a connection 
with the ‘Adwan tribe, an ‘Adwani tribesman told Shryock, “Don’t believe him. He’s a 
liar. What does he know about Bedouin? Nothing. He’s a Palestinian, not even from the 
tribes…They have no important history and they will only mislead you (Shryock) and 
waste your time.”53 Palestinians’ supposed wealth, influence in government, and role in 
the civil war are emphasized in tribal discourses. One example of someone describing 
Palestinians from the position of an ‘authentic tribesman’ reveals an unsettling violent 
attitude: “They tried to kill our King. They wanted to rule over us, but we slaughtered 
them. Praise be to God.”54 This discourse represents Palestinian militias as all 
Palestinians and by attempting to overthrow the Hashemite monarchy during the civil 
war, all Palestinians relinquished their right to consider themselves Jordanian. For the 
Bedouins in the Balqa in the 1990s, to be Jordanian was to be loyal to the Hashemites. 
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Another expression of denationalization of Palestinians that was required to make 
a claim of autochthony in tribal discourse is a tribal history written by Dr. Ahmad al-
‘Uwaydi al-‘Abbadi, a well-known Jordanian historian and politician who was elected to 
Parliament in 1989. His election could be interpreted as evidence of his discourse’s 
popularity. Al-‘Abbadi hails from the Sikarna clan within the ‘Abbadi tribe and this 
aspect of his identity became salient during the election. According to Shyrock, al-
‘Abbadi used his tribal identity to attack his opponents, also ‘Abbadi but from a different 
clan, and their sheikhly histories and historical dominance. But al-‘Abbadi does not seem 
to reject the very values that constitute tribalism.55 Instead, al-‘Abbadi continued to buy 
into the discourse of tribal identity by constructing a genealogical history that narrates the 
Sikarna clan into significance and power. In order for the Sikarna to be viewed as 
legitimately Jordanian, al-‘Abbadi needed to ensure that the Sikarna clan was viewed as 
autochthonous. Thus, despite oral histories of the Sikarna clan that indicate that they are 
originally a Palestinian clan from the West Bank, al-‘Abbadi argued in his various 
writings that the Sikarna are originally from the Hijaz and that they are descendants of 
the Prophet Muhammad.56  
The case of al-‘Abbadi indicates two important points. Firstly, the categories of 
‘tribe’ and ‘clan’ are not static or hegemonic. Although nominally from the same tribe, 
al-‘Abbadi attacked his ‘Abbadi opponents’ origins. Clearly, al-‘Abbadi and his 
opponents have imbued the notion of ‘tribe’ with different meanings in order to gain 
political power and resources. Secondly, al-‘Abbadi wrote a history that differs from the 
oral history espoused by other members of his tribe. Not only was al-‘Abbadi one of the 	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first in his clan to fix oral genealogical histories in written forms, but he presented a new 
discourse about Sikarna history. Although the Sikarna and other tribal oral histories were 
also undoubtedly political, in that they obscure past sheikhs’ collaborations with the 
Ottomans, al-‘Abbadi’s discourse of Palestinian exclusion and tribal autochthony seems 
to be especially reflective of recent political developments with the Palestinians. By 
claiming that his clan was from the Hijaz and descendants of the Prophet, al-‘Abbadi 
used Hashemite discourses of legitimacy in order to increase his and his clan’s standing 
in a political system that is controlled by the Hashemites. This shows the Hashemite 
monarchy’s success in portraying themselves as authentically Jordanian, to the extent that 
others deploy Hashemite discourses of legitimacy to portray themselves as 
autochthonous. By doing so, groups asserting identities as tribes can assert a special 
relationship with the state that frames their privileged access to government resources. It 
is truly an amazing phenomenon that the Hashemites from the Hijaz created a discourse 
of autochthony that is seen by some as legitimate and is used to exclude the majority of 
Jordan’s modern-day population and to obscure the Palestinian origin of many 
Transjordanians.  
Al-‘Abbadi not only painted himself and his clan as Hijazi rather than Palestinian, 
he also envisioned Jordan as an essentially ‘tribal nation’ without any Palestinian links. 
His discourse of Jordanian national identity is based on constructed genealogical links 
with the Hijaz and the noticeable lack of Palestinian ties. According to al-‘Abbadi’s 
views, only those Jordanians with long genealogical histories in the territory of Jordan or 
the Hijaz, i.e. the Bedouin tribes that were historically dominant in the south, could be 
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labeled authentically Jordanian.57 The notion of autochthony or nativeness is crucial to al-
‘Abbadi’s construction of a Jordanian national identity. 
In the 1990s, Palestinians responded to such prejudice with a discourse of 
belonging that intersects with notions of modernity.58 In an interview with Shryock, a 
Palestinian businessman living in the Balqa stated, “They are not important people, these 
Bedouin…We are the ones who built this country. When we came there, there was no 
civilization…[Bedouins] are still very close to savages.”59 This is an extremely different 
conceptualization of what it means to belong to Jordan. This identity is based on moving 
the country on an imaginary linear trajectory from being traditional, represented by rural 
Bedouins, to being modern, represented by urban Palestinians. In his statement of 
Palestinian belonging and subjectivity, the Palestinian businessman made no claims of 
genealogical ties to the land of Jordan but emphasized Palestinians’ modernizing 
accomplishments. According to him, one does not need to be autochthonous but one must 
be able to contribute to the state in order to be considered Jordanian.  
Dialectic Narratives of National Identity 
 According to Shryock, it seems that the emergence of non-government discourses 
of a tribalized national identity was a response to Hashemite-controlled discourses of 
national identity. Educated members of tribes used the Hashemites’ discursive methods 
such as writing textual histories in order to write narratives about their own tribes and, by 
extension, their own histories. Furthermore, oral histories indicate changing meanings of 
sheikhly authority. For example, Sheikh Khalaf in the ‘Abbadi tribe, despite referring to 
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himself as sheikh and as a reconciler of his fellow tribesmen, stated, “There are no 
sheikhs today.”60 This was a common statement among the sheikhs and tribesmen 
interviewed by Shryock because the Hashemite era is viewed as an age of law and order 
and state power at the expense of sheikhly power. By saying that modern-day sheikhs are 
not ‘true sheikhs’, the tribesmen that Shryock interviewed were referring to a ‘golden 
age’ of sheikhly power, when true sheikhs governed the land. For Haj ‘Arif, a sheikh in 
the Amamsha group interviewed by Shryock, a sheikh is someone who “slays whomever 
he desires to slay…He can lop off heads and the government will not interfere…But 
today they are all barnyard hens.”61 Precisely because the government would probably 
interfere in affairs between tribes, sheikhs have no role in Jordan today. 
 Yet many of the individuals who claim the disappearance of sheikhs still call 
themselves sheikhs. Clearly, there is power in discourses of sheikhly authority, which 
remained salient because the discourses framed an assertion of a special relationship with 
the state and state benefits. Sheikhs gained prestige by obtaining access to political circles 
of power controlled by the Hashemites and this prestige could be spread to the members 
of their tribes, thus reshaping the ideal sheikh in the Hashemite era.62 As Shryock 
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summarizes, by claiming a special relationship with the Hashemite state, Bedouin writers 
“force themselves and their fellow Bedouin into novel relationships with political 
identities that remain, in many respects, premodern, fragmentary, and ‘state-
renouncing’.”63 In order to assert a relationship with the state, the writer can narrate his 
tribe into significance by recalling his tribe’s significance during the ‘age of sheikhs’ and 
writing history against past or present political insignificance. This can be read as a way 
of constructing tribal memory as national memory. Dr. al-‘Abbadi’s discourse of 
autochthony and denationalization of Palestinians was discussed previously as an 
example of such an assertion of significance. Glorifying and perhaps exaggerating the 
sheikhs’ past power, such as being able to behead people at will, is also part of this 
discourse. For example, according to Shryock, members of the ‘Adwani tribe do not 
usually mention the fact that some ‘Adwani sheikhs found it more beneficial to cooperate 
with the Ottoman authorities after 1869 and some sheikhs even became government 
officials.64 The age before Hashemite rule is not represented as an era of cooperation 
with, but resistance against the Ottoman Empire. Violent resistance against Ottoman 
officials and pashas are glorified.65 This trend in the Balqa is similar to Jungen’s findings 
in Karak. According to Jungen, the Ottoman Empire is only mentioned in oral accounts 
of the Ottoman period in order to show how the Ottoman authorities tried to take political 
power away from the tribes in Karak and how the tribes, especially the Majali tribe, 
resisted Ottoman rule. Majali sheikhs’ participation in the Ottoman government as tax 
collectors has been obscured.66 For example, the 1910 Karak revolt is an important 
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component of popular memory in Karak and “today serves to distinguish between a 
Keraki and someone who could not lay claim to such an identity – particularly the 
Palestinian population which has settled in Kerak.”67 Thus, a discourse of political 
resistance has become imbued with meanings of autochthony and glory in order to 
elevate sheikhs’ social standing. 
As a state authority, the Hashemite monarchy is not completely immune to being 
a target of this discourse of resistance. Sheikh Rfefan al-Majali’s early indifference 
towards Abdullah is also remembered with pride.68 Haj ‘Arif, the ‘Adwani sheikh who 
called current sheikhs ‘barnyard hens’, tells the story of the ‘Adwan revolt in a way that 
places Abdullah in a position of submission. His tale ends when Sherif Husayn 
admonishes Abdullah for exiling Ibn ‘Adwan, the ‘sheikh of sheikhs’ of the ‘Adwan 
tribe. According to Haj ‘Arif, Sharif Husayn said, “Those ‘Adwan were here before you. 
You came here yesterday.”69 This statement highlights the ‘Adwan tribe’s resistance and 
legitimizes their resistance because the ‘Adwan are supposedly more autochthonous than 
Abdullah. Jordanian autochthony is a source of legitimacy in this discourse. Furthermore, 
Shryock argues that the phenomenon of writing tribal histories can undermine the 
Hashemite government’s discourses of national identity. These narratives of tribal 
identity do not aim to unify Jordanians but showcase the differences between Jordanians. 
Tribal historians actively resist a single narrative that applies to all Jordanians.70 While 
the Hashemite government promotes a unified Jordan that obscures distinctions between 
Jordanians and Palestinians and between different tribes with slogans such as “We are all 
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Jordanians,”71 different tribal histories promote an exclusive Transjordanian nationalism 
in which only certain Jordanians could be considered autochthonous Jordanians. But a 
narrative of a unified national identity would make members of tribes equal members of a 
national community. As Shryock summarizes, “State-sponsored nationalism serves to 
homogenize a social landscape that for the Balga tribes, is rich in essential contrasts.”72 
But the Hashemites and tribal historians share discursive practices. Shryock argues that 
different discourses of Jordanian national identity have all been imbued with values of 
genealogical communities: The Hashemites claim legitimacy based on their descent from 
the Prophet Muhammad and some tribesmen assert that the belonging to the Jordanian 
nation is restricted to descendants of East Bank Bedouins.73  
However, as Jungen points out, tribal narratives do not necessarily undermine the 
state. Tribal discourses reflect both opposition to and support of government narratives. 
Since tribes refer to mythical or glorified pasts in their narratives, tribes can and do 
acknowledge the social reality of Hashemite political power. In fact, tribal leaders frame 
their work to access state benefits in terms of tribal pasts.74 A resident of Karak 
interviewed by Jungen stated, “The truth is that the tribes around here knew that they 
would never agree with each other…The solution, therefore, was the Hashemites – they 
came from the outside, so everybody is happy.”75 This man’s statement indicates that he 
has accepted the Hashemites as mediators between tribes and as legitimate leaders 
because they prevented tribal conflicts over leadership. Ironically, it seems that the 
Hashemites’ foreignness is the source of their legitimacy in this discourse. Another 	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tribesman interviewed, Muhammad Hamdan of the ‘Adwan tribe, seems to also accept 
Hashemite legitimacy and interestingly, he uses the Hashemites’ discourse of national 
identity and claims that Jordan is one big family:  
First we dominated the other tribes completely. A relation of strong to weak. Then 
we became like parts of a single body, with ‘Adwan at the head. Then dominance 
was taken by the government, and we all become, as they say, one family. King 
Hussein is the father of that big family.76  
 
Hashemite Discourse of Tribalized National Identity 
There is a dialectic relationship between government and non-government 
discourses of tribalized national identity and it is unclear which discourse emerged first. 
But it is clear that discourses of tribalism provided the government with a framework by 
which to delineate Transjordanians from Palestinians. The need to create a uniquely 
Jordanian identity after Black September increased further with the emergence of Ariel 
Sharon’s ‘Jordan is Palestine’ discourse. Sharon became the Israeli Minister of Defense 
in 1981 and he claimed throughout the 1980s that all Palestinians in Israel could be 
transferred to Jordan because Jordan was just an Arab state repository for their fellow 
Arab Palestinians. In order for Jordan not be completely reimagined as a Palestinian state, 
which threatened the Hashemite monarchy, the Jordanian government to emphasize its 
uniqueness vis-à-vis the Palestinians.77 The government had previously invented or 
reinvented traditions in order to reinforce its discourse of a pan-Jordanian identity, as 
discussed in the second chapter. After the war, the Hashemite government embarked on a 
policy to reshape and perform supposedly Bedouin traditions as symbols of a common 
national heritage. As Fathi argues, discourses of tribal identity did not necessarily 	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contradict official discourses of national identity: “By emphasizing the collectivity of 
tribes and integrating individual tribal identities into a broad category of tribal 
heritage…tribalism may serve as a source of shared history and a national symbol.”78 It is 
important to note that the Jordanian government still included ‘Palestinian traditions’ in 
its performances of a unified Jordanian national identity. For example, the government 
began promoting ‘folk cultures’ in order to showcase a long history for Jordan and such 
promotions included a display of Jordanian folk fashion from both the East and the West 
Bank in 1971.79 Nonetheless, discourses of Bedouin culture and tribalism became much 
more prevalent in public cultural spheres after Black September.  
Programs about ‘Bedouin life’ were produced on television and radio and 
Bedouin songs also became much more popular, even outside Jordan, as representative of 
‘Jordanian folk songs’. The Jordanian government also began promoting an image of the 
timeless Bedouin for tourist consumption. For example, according to Layne, Bedouins 
were the only Jordanians to appear in both government-produced and privately-produced 
tourism brochures during the 1980s. The brochures promoted ancient sites in places such 
as Petra, Wadi Rum, Jerash, Madaba, and Amman and the Desert Patrol in full ‘Bedouin’ 
regalia featured prominently. Furthermore, Jordanians dressed as Bedouins ‘stage 
authenticity’ in places for tourists such as hotels and prepare coffee and provide 
traditional dances for tourists.80 Other performances of tradition include the Jerash 
Festival, which showcased ‘traditional’ and ‘folkloric’ costumes and dances. Queen 
Noor, the fourth wife of King Hussein, usually attended wearing a gown that combined 
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traditional embroidery patterns of different regions,81 which showed that Queen Noor was 
not only tribal but supra-tribal, a unifier of different tribes.  
Exhibitions and displays of tribal artifacts also became more popular and 
according to Layne, exhibitions became a standard part of Jordanian life in the 1970s.82 
The exhibition of tribal artifacts that Layne attended provided no contextual information 
for objects such as dishes of spices and jars of drained yogurt. Instead, these objects were 
presented as completely ordinary but, at the same time, worthy of display in an 
exhibition.83 These artifacts provide evidence that a national heritage existed and still 
exists; by displaying not one tribe but multiple tribes, tribal artifacts provide a display of 
a broad tribal identity and a shared source of pride. Layne calls Jordanian representations 
of national culture ‘mix-and-match’ because the Jordanian state has appropriated tribal, 
Circassian, and Palestinian symbols and customs to present a unifying Jordanian national 
heritage.84  
Furthermore, the Hashemite monarchy presented itself as mediators between 
‘traditional’ tribalism and ‘modern’ urbanism, while identifying with the tribes as well. 
The Royal Court or diwan has a special department called the Tribes Council, which is 
responsible for maintaining relations between the Hashemites and different Bedouin 
tribes and still exists today. According to Fathi, “this Council emphasizes the King’s 
image as a patron-ruler and continues the tradition that Abdullah had established in 
dealing with the tribes in his function of a ‘supra-tribal’ leader.”85 In other words, the 
Hashemite kings used the discourse of tribal values and customs to frame their 	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relationship of patronage with different tribal leaders. By doing so, the Hashemites were 
better able to integrate themselves into Jordanian society and to reframe their foreign 
origins by announcing themselves as the legitimate leading sheikhs of sheikhs. King 
Hussein also used a discourse of kinship when discussing Jordan. In his memoirs, he 
writes, “When I think of my family, I think with pride of everyone in Jordan…When I 
think of the tribe to which I belong, I look upon the whole Arab nation.”86 This quote 
shows that the Hashemites created a new discourse of legitimacy, one based on tribal 
identity and kinship with Jordanians. Therefore, it seems that the Hashemites too believed 
that only a tribal identity could be associated with true Jordanian autochthony. By 
reinforcing such a discourse of autochthony, the Hashemite monarchy endorsed a new 
Jordanian identity based on “east-Jordanian tribal and Islamic values, loyalty to the royal 
family and to the king’s army, and more pertinently, cleansed of Palestinian, pan-Arab 
and progressive ideologies.”87 The only sense of pan-Arabism allowed in this discourse 
was framed by the Hashemite monarchy. 
Many Jordanians supported this new emphasis on a ‘revival’ of tribal values. One 
such supporter was newspaper columnist Musa Keilani. He approved of displays and 
performances of Bedouin traditions for tourists and he believed that many Jordanians 
living in Amman were proud of their Bedouin origins. According to him, the Bedouin 
lifestyle should be emulated as a “noble moral code.”88 Other Jordanian and Western 
scholars lamented the disappearance of Bedouin values from everyday life.89 But others 
opposed the vestiges of tribalism in political life. During the 1980s, debates emerged in 
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Jordan about the roles of tribal values and tribal networks. One prominent opponent of 
tribalism was Marwan Muasher, a columnist who wrote for the English-language 
newspaper Jordan Times. In one article, he wrote that the government should not support 
tribal practices. He stated in an article, “I wish to see people proud because they are part 
of a professional organization, not because they are members of a big tribe…I wish to see 
people proud because they are Jordanians, not only because of their surnames.”90 In 
Muasher’s view, the prevalence of tribal identities hindered the development of a 
Jordanian national identity. In early 1985, the Parliament held a debate about the 
abolition of tribal law and Senator Rifa’i claimed that tribal laws were no longer 
compatible with the modern Jordanian state.91 But the Hashemite monarchy was not 
swayed. After the debate, King Hussein published a letter denouncing the ‘attacks’ on 
tribalism. He wrote, 
I would like to repeat to you what I have told a meeting of tribal heads recently 
that “I am Al-Hussein from Hashem and Quraish the noblest Arab tribe of Mecca 
which was honoured by God and into which was born the Arab Prophet 
Mohammad.” Therefore, whatever harms our tribes in Jordan is considered 
harmful to us.92 
 
The Hashemite monarchy called upon its own tribal heritage to legitimize discourses of 
tribalism and the patronage system which politicizes tribal identities. Hussein pledged to 
defend tribalism and the tribes of Jordan because historically, the Hashemite monarchy 
has relied on Bedouin tribes as a political pillar of support. There is a close association 
between the Hashemites and the Bedouins: the Hashemites are frequently mistaken for 
Bedouin (they are descended from a tribe but Abdullah and Hussein both grew up in 
urban areas) and even a notable scholar such as Day called the Hashemites Bedouin. 	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Therefore, to rid Jordan of tribalism would mean dismantling the patronage system and 
undermining the Hashemites’ power. However, the Hashemite monarchy has recently 
shown signs of moving away from this discourse of a tribalized national identity due to 
the emergence of heterogeneous tribal narratives and histories, which as discussed 
previously, could potentially undermine a discourse of unified Jordanian identity. 
 
Discourse of Islamic Legitimacy: Mosque-Building in Amman in the 1980s 
 Parallel to a discourse of tribalized national identity, the Hashemites also 
deployed a discourse of Islamic legitimacy. After 1967, the Jordanian government no 
longer had direct access to the holy sites in Jerusalem so the Hashemites needed a new 
Islamic discourse of legitimacy. Unlike the Hashemites’ discourse of Islamic legitimacy 
based on protection of Jerusalem in the 1960s, this discourse of Islamic legitimacy 
emerged in the 1970s with the rise of Islamism. According to Fathi, Islamist political 
candidates and organizations were very appealing to Palestinians and the Islamists won 
many seats in the 1989 elections,93 thus prompting the Hashemite regime to change the 
electoral law in 1991. Increasing Islamization was manifest in residents’ interest in 
building more mosques.94  Day argues, “What engages the attention and evokes the 
concern of Jordanians today is the appearance of an amorphous but very real movement 
back to Islam by many people from all levels of society.”95 This was perhaps Jordanians’ 
response to increasing Islamization around the Middle East and the Islamic world, 
ranging from the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran to increased popularity in wearing the 
hijab in Egypt. By investing in an Islamic heritage, the government could control the 	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narrative of Islamic legitimacy and undermine the growing Islamist opposition. 
According to Day, the Jordanian government has promoted Islam through different 
means. During the 1960s, the Islamist-headed Ministry of Education created a religious 
program for schools. The Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Holy Places allegedly 
subsidized women to wear religious dress.96 For the government, creating a narrative of 
Islamic heritage was a matter of domestic policy. Jordan lost vast sources of revenue in 
the West Bank and one of the government’s main sources of income was foreign grants 
and subsidies. Rogan claims, “As such subsidies flow largely from the Baghdad Pact 
pledges of Arab League states, it is in Jordan’s interests to reaffirm both its Arab and 
Islamic form.”97 
This discourse of Islamic legitimacy was also expressed visually through 
mosques. In the context of Islamism, Amman was increasingly criticized for lacking an 
organic identity. Due to the drastic increases in inhabitants, the municipality of Amman 
expanded westwards and demolished old souqs to decongest the historic downtown 
area.98 But reliance on Western urban planning methods meant that Amman’s distinct 
Circassian architecture became more obscure and its medieval Islamic sites, already in 
poor condition, were forgotten.99 In the face of increasing Islamization in the Arab and 
Muslim worlds, the Jordanian government decided to commit to a discourse of pan-
Islamism and create an ‘Islamic’ architectural style for Amman. One way to do so was to 
increase the number of mosques in the city. In 1984, the government created a committee 
that was charged with providing guidelines for modern buildings to comply with Arab 
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and Islamic architectural styles.100 The committee had three aims: raise awareness of 
architectural heritage, develop a school of Islamic architecture in Jordan, and bring both 
public and private architectural projects under government control and evaluation. But 
defining what Islamic architecture should be was more difficult than anticipated.101 
Nonetheless, the government created discussion and, according to Rogan, “there is no 
indication that the government intends to ease its commitment to the goal of impressing 
on Amman a more regional and Islamic form.”102 While the government struggled to 
make the city more aesthetically Islamic, private organizations and individuals also 
funded a mosque-building boom. As of 1986, sixty-three of the ninety-eight dated 
mosques in Amman were built during the 1970s and early 1980s.103 Rogan argues that 
the combination of the mosque-building boom with the government initiatives “reflects a 
general will to make Amman more representative of its inhabitants’ religious and/or 
cultural heritage.”104 Note that the Islamization of Amman was not only initiated by the 
government but was also funded by private organizations and individuals. In fact, the 
majority of mosques in Amman was built by philanthropists and residents’ 
associations.105 Therefore, some Jordanians themselves had an interest in creating a 
unified Jordanian-Muslim identity that affirmed Jordan’s Islamic legitimacy. In the 
context of political Islamism personified by figures such as Ayatollah Khomeini, the 
Jordanian government and Jordanian individuals wanted to enhance Jordan’s position in 
the Arab and Muslim worlds through visual discourses of Islamic identity. 
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Conclusion 
 After the loss of Jerusalem and the civil war, the Hashemite monarchy’s discourse 
of a pan-Jordanian identity and its discourse of legitimacy based on protection of 
Jerusalem were no longer feasible. During the 1970s, the Jordanian government 
embarked on a project to promote Jordan’s tribal identity and the Hashemite monarchy 
appropriated the vocabulary of tribalism and kinship to express its relationship with the 
Jordanian people. Individuals identifying as members of tribes themselves reframed 
discourses of tribal identity in a way that made their own tribe distinct, autochthonous, 
and politically significant. But by narrating themselves into significance, these 
individuals highlighted the fractures of Jordanian society. As Jungen summarizes, the 
tribe can be a “conceptual framework, manipulated at leisure to offer an image of social 
organization traced from a mythic past but which, because of the demands of modernity, 
it can only imitate very imperfectly.”106 Jordanian discourses of tribalism oscillate 
between the past and the present as proponents of tribalism refer back to the mythical or 
embellished past to enhance their political power in the present. Tribal identities can 
reflect genuine social relations and sentiments but they are also used as discourses to 
create social relations or engage sentiments of solidarity for political purposes. 
The regime’s attempt to navigate the ambiguities of the discourse of a tribalized 
national identity will be discussed further in the fourth chapter, especially in the context 
of narratives of national identity in public space. The Hashemite monarchy is aware of 
the discursive power of tribalism and tribal identities and also of the potential for such 
claims of autochthony to delegitimize and denationalize the Hashemites. Therefore, the 
Hashemite monarchy actively appropriated a discourse of tribal identity in a way that 	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represented the Hashemite monarchy as not only a tribe but a unifying force and a 
mediator between tribes. At the same time, as one of Shryock’s interlocutors pointed out, 
the Hashemite monarchy does not want tribal affairs to be emphasized in public spaces 
such as schools because it wants people to learn the history of the Hashemites: “They 
came from the Hijaz. They have a history of their own; they have ancestors and origins of 
their own, and that’s the history they want students to know about and admire.”107 After 
the Jordanian government officially severed all administrative ties with the West Bank in 
1988, the government chose to focus more on Arab-Muslim unity and loyalty to King 
Hussein as the bases of a Jordanian national identity.108 The Hashemite monarchy also 
began showcasing both Jordan’s ancient history and its modernity as an attempt to create 
an image of hypermodernity in a context of neoliberal policies. Tribalism and tribal 
identities have been represented in some Jordanian and Western discourses as obstacles 
to this form of modernity but clearly, these discourses are politically and socially salient 
in a present that is emphatically modern or even hypermodern. 
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Museums, Monuments, and Downtown Amman: Spatial Discourses of National 
Identity 
 
(Map of Amman showing the four places to be studied in this chapter. The King Hussein 
Mosque refers to the King Hussein Park, Al Hussein Youth City refers to the Martyrs’ 
Memorial, and the Roman Theater refers to downtown Amman. Source: Google Maps, 




 In the previous three chapters, I discussed several discourses the Hashemite 
monarchy deployed to make claims about a Jordanian national identity and the legitimacy 
of the Hashemite regime to rule Jordan. The official discourses were based on notions of 
Arab nationalism, pan-Jordanianism, Islamic legitimacy, and tribalism. How and when 
the Jordanian government deployed these discourses was shaped by political and social 
contexts. These contexts include the annexation of the West Bank from 1948 to 1967, 
Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser’s attempts to undermine the Hashemite 
monarchy due to its pro-Western political stance during the 1950s and 1960s, Black 
September and the government’s policy of ‘de-Palestinization’ in the 1970s, and the 
growth of political Islamist movements beginning in the 1970s. It is also important to 
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note that ideologies of tribalism, Arab nationalism, and Islamic legitimacy were not static 
or monolithic or only given political power by the Jordanian government. Various 
interest groups framed their political agendas in different terms for a range of political 
and ideological purposes. This can be seen with the competition between Hussein and 
Nasser over who could be seen as the most legitimate Arab nationalist leader and the 
Jordanian Nationalist Movement’s adoption of Nasser’s Arab nationalist vocabulary to 
frame their opposition to the Jordanian government. The Hashemite monarchy itself 
shifted its discourse of Islamic legitimacy from one based on its lineage, previous status 
as protectors of Mecca, and its protection of Jerusalem’s holy spaces to one based on a 
visual Islamic identity and heritage in Amman. 
This chapter will examine how these discourses were expressed in public space in 
Amman. Before engaging in this analysis, I will review conceptualizations of ‘space’ that 
have been at the heart of recent scholarship in history and the social sciences. According 
to Lefebvre, a space in which social interactions take place is just as analytically 
important as the social relations themselves. Lefebvre asks rhetorically, “Can space be 
nothing more than the passive locus of social relations...The answer must be no.”1 Rather, 
a space contains ideology and meaning in and of itself. In fact, Lefebvre argues, ideology 
requires space in that ideology refers to places. Therefore, in Lefebvre’s words, 
“Ideology per se might well be said to consist primarily in a discourse upon social 
space.”2 As such, a space can shape social relations, just as a discourse not only reflects 
but shapes social relations. Soja adopts Lefebvre’s concept of space and argues that 
spatiality cannot be understood in isolation and apart from society and social 	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relationships. Spatiality is a social product, i.e. space is shaped by social relations,3 which 
is slightly different from Lefebvre’s idea that space shapes social relations. This chapter 
will focus not just on the relationship between space and social relations but how power 
relations shape experiences of spaces. 
Another important concept raised in this recent scholarship is the idea of ‘place’. 
Amireh defines a place as “a space with a meaning, [which] is comprised of a core and a 
physical context and…features which are enveloped with meanings, vocabularies and 
cues.”4 These meanings, vocabularies, and cues encourage users to adapt to the dominant 
ideology of the space or place, thus shaping behavior and social relations.5 The spaces 
examined in this chapter are all places. Furthermore, these places can be considered 
public spaces. A public space can refer to any place that is supposedly accessible to all - 
such as roads or parks - and are associated with places in which people gather. A public 
space’s potential for gathering usually has political connotations in popular 
conceptualizations of public spaces. For our study, it is useful to note Kilian’s argument 
that public and private are not characteristics of space but are expressions of power 
relations within spaces. Public spaces are not necessarily accessible to all. According to 
Kilian, who can access and who occupies public spaces is often determined by issues of 
physical security, cultural identity, and social/geographical community.6 Lastly, there is 
contention between various groups of Jordanians about what kinds of experiences public 
spaces in Amman should provide. These conflicting ideas about public spaces are 	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reflective of competing discourses about Jordanian national identity. An important aspect 
of this analysis is the consideration of public spaces as monumental spaces. An essential 
characteristic of monumental spaces, according to Lefebvre, is that a monumental space 
“offers each member of society an image of [his or her] membership, an image of his or 
her social visage.”7 In this context, a ‘social visage’ can also be thought of as a discourse 
of national identity present in monumental spaces. 
Since the beginning of its rule in Jordan, the Hashemite monarchy has articulated 
various discourses of national identity. Due to changing political situations from the 
1920s through to the 1980s, the Hashemite monarchy has shifted between discourses of 
Arab nationalism, pan-Jordanianism, Islamic legitimacy, and a tribalized national 
identity. These discourses were not mutually exclusive and they have been expressed in 
the same public spaces. In order to understand space as something more than an empty 
container or a blank page with just a message or dominant discourse written on it, we 
must understand the context of the space and, ideally, how the space is used.8 In this 
study, I will analyze the Hashemite monarchy’s spatial discourses of identity referred to 
in the Jordan Museum, the Martyrs’ Memorial, the King Hussein Park, and downtown 
Amman. I chose these places partly because of the wide range of time periods they 
represent: the Martyrs’ Memorial was inaugurated in 1977; the King Hussein Park 
opened in 2006; the Jordan Museum opened in 2013; and downtown Amman presents a 
range of spaces relating to the period from 1921 onwards. Furthermore, the Jordanian 
government sponsored all these places so they allow us to track shifts in official spatial 
discourses of national identity over time. In the 1920s, the Hashemite monarchy used 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Lefebvre, 220. 
8 Ibid., 94; Ibid., 142-143. 
   
	   136 
parades and spectacles as performances of legitimacy in downtown Amman. As 
discussed in the second chapter, during the early 1960s, the Jordanian government also 
used renovations and celebrations at the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem as claims to 
Islamic legitimacy and pan-Jordanian national identity. After the 1967 war, the Jordanian 
government retreated from the West Bank and in 1970, Jordan became embroiled in civil 
war. The first time the government began to build monumental spaces in Amman was 
after Black September. The places discussed in this chapter can be read as the Hashemite 
monarchy’s efforts to express various sources of legitimacy in Amman to strengthen its 
rule. The monarchy also attempted to create a visual and spatial identity for Amman, 
which has been criticized for lacking an identity.9 By creating such an identity for the 
city, the Jordanian government has made physical, long-lasting claims of authority and 
has presented Amman, the stronghold of Hashemite power, as the rightful capital of 
Jordan. Another interesting aspect of the places under study, especially in the cases of the 
King Hussein Park and downtown Amman, is that the Jordanian government has 
propagated ideas about how the space should be used that are in tension with how the 
spaces are actually used. This suggests that the government’s vision of modern Jordanian 
public spaces and by extension, the government discourse of modernity are, if not 
contested, then viewed as incompatible with the majority of the residents in Amman.10 
This chapter is organized by the analysis of the four places in turn and as much as 
possible, the chapter follows the chronological order of the historical periods on which 
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the spatial discourses of national identity draw.11 I will first analyze the Jordan Museum 
(opened in 2013), then the Martyrs’ Memorial (1977) and the King Hussein Park (2006) 
as monumental spaces, and finally, downtown Amman as a site of competing discourses 
of modernity. The Jordan Museum, the Martyrs’ Memorial, and the King Hussein Park 
all feature references to the past as part of a discourse of national identity. The Jordan 
Museum was not fully opened at the time of my visit so the analysis of the museum 
focuses on its exhibits of ancient history and the appropriation of ancient history as 
Hashemite history. At the Martyrs’ Memorial, the focus is on the period from the Arab 
Revolt in 1917 onwards and the museum timeline stops before 1967. These events are 
highlighted as expressions of discourses of Arab nationalism and Islamic legitimacy but a 
newer discourse of Jordanian national identity based on ancient sites such as Petra can 
also be seen at the Memorial. The King Hussein Park presents the Jordanian 
government’s first attempt to represent the whole history of the territory of Jordan from 
the Paleolithic period to the modern-day as one coherent narrative. Therefore, the 
Hashemite monarchy draws on all sources of legitimacy and discourses of national 
identity previously discussed to assert its authority in this space. The Hashemite Court 
and Hashemite Plaza in downtown Amman differ from the other places analyzed in this 
chapter because they showcase the Jordanian government’s hyper-modernist discourse 
about the future of Jordan, rather than the government’s visions of Jordan’s past. 
Although the Jordan Museum and the King Hussein Park do not make explicit references 
to this discourse of hyper-modernity, they are both located in spaces in which this 
discourse of modernity is expressed and contested. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 The chapter is not in perfect chronological order as there are various referrals to multiple historical 
periods at each place and not all the public spaces express narratives about the same period. 
   
	   138 
The Jordan Museum 
The Jordan Museum opened in 2013 after a decades-long planning process. The 
museum combines representations of the ancient past, tribal life, and modern Jordan to 
create a coherent narrative of Jordan’s long and glorious history with Hashemite rule as 
its pinnacle. Placed in the context of museum-building in Jordan, the museum can be 
viewed as the culmination of the government’s efforts to create an imagined national 
community. This was done by moving from a folkloric approach to museum displays in 
older museums to a showcase of ‘national’ history at the Jordan Museum.  
In her study of the participation of women in Jordanian museums, Malt asked 
several of her Jordanian interlocutors, many of whom were female curators or involved in 
the profession, what they thought museums were. According to Malt’s respondents, 
museums in Jordan were synonymous with antiquity. Most respondents thought of 
museums as collections of ‘old things’. Others noted the potential of museums to 
“recover a sense of belonging to local history and traditions,”12 and found that they “give 
you nostalgia for the past” and “what they want to present of themselves.”13 The latter 
statement is especially interesting because it touches on the discursive practices of 
museums. By making claims of ownership of the past, museums appropriate artifacts into 
a narrative of national history and national identity. To use Lefebvre’s insight, museums 
present to members of society an image of their membership by creating a narrative of a 
continuous national history. The Jordanian government has placed some importance on 
museums as a way to disseminate the values and narratives of national history. Most 
museums are free to Jordanian students (and some are free to all Jordanians). Museum 	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visits are also a core component of the Jordanian school curriculum,14 indicating that the 
Jordanian government actively encourages and expects students to visit museums. 
The ‘Folkloric’ Approach to Museums 
Most of the museums in Jordan were established in the 1970s or later. According 
to Maffi, a ‘folkloric’ approach dominated the way objects were displayed in Jordanian 
museums. This approach, as Maffi argues, involved creating a sense of unity through the 
erasure of local differences.15 Museums outside of Amman in cities such as Salt or Ma’an 
were rarely built to showcase local history; instead, the exhibits and displays at these 
museums were usually about Hashemite history. For example, at the time of Maffi’s visit 
in the early 2000s, the only exhibit at the museum in Ma’an that applied specifically to 
Ma’an was one about the Hijaz Railway, which had a stop at Ma’an. There was no 
discussion of life in Ma’an before or during the Ottoman period.16  
During the early 1970s, the ‘folkloric’ approach to museum planning included 
examples of Palestinian folk culture, such as embroidery, as mentioned in the third 
chapter. For example, the Museum of Popular Traditions was established in 1971, only 
one year after Black September. According to the Jordan Tourism Board, the museum’s 
aims are to “collect Jordanian and Palestinian folk heritage from all over Jordan, to 
protect and conserve this heritage and to present it for future generations. The museum is 
also concerned with introducing our popular heritage to the world.”17 The museum 
contains ‘traditional’ costumes from the East Bank and the West Bank, terms that are still 
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used in the touristic description of the museum today,18 as well as a collection of 
Byzantine mosaics from Jerash and Madaba. According to Maffi, the museum was 
founded to promote reconciliation between Palestinians and Jordanians by focusing on 
common rural customs and erasing representations of urban cultures of both banks from 
the museum.19 This phenomenon of erasing urban culture from discourses of national 
identity is not limited to museums but has developed alongside discourses of a tribalized 
national identity. Since urban areas in Jordan are often places where Palestinians form the 
majority of the population and are usually sites of civil disobedience, rural areas have 
become symbols of national identity in official discourse.20 As Maffi summarizes, 
“The Bedouin culture is regarded as the core of Jordanian identity and at the same time 
the Palestinian component, which is represented as mainly rural, is integrated into 
Transjordanian national traditions.”21 Along with the flattening of local differences, 
folkloric museums’ privileging of rural culture implied that only Bedouin culture was 
worth displaying and including in historical narratives. But this Bedouinization or 
tribalization of discourses of national identity shifted again in 1988. Jordan officially 
disengaged from the West Bank and the Hashemite monarchy began establishing 
museums of modern history focused on Hashemite history, rather than on local 
traditions.22  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Jordan Tourism Board, Museums. 
19 Maffi, “The Creation of Jordanian National Identity,” 152-154. 
20 Furthermore, most residents of urban areas are migrants or descendants of migrants. Thus, the idea of 
‘being from Amman’ is considered strange or even rejected in popular and official discourses (Kassay, 260; 
Kassay, 265-67). 
21 Maffi, “The Creation of Jordanian National Identity,” 154. 
22 Ibid., 154. 
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The ‘National’ Approach to Museums 
 The Jordan Museum is the first museum that combines ancient artifacts and 
modern history to present a unified narrative of national history. During the late 1970s, 
Jordanian government officials recognized the need for a museum to display Jordanian 
national history and culture. But the museum languished in the development and planning 
stages for over twenty years, as officials debated the location and the contents of the 
museum.23 Finally, the government decided to build the museum in Ras al-‘Ain, a 
neighborhood located between the downtown area and Abdali, which the Jordanian 
government hopes to remodel as the new downtown area. Ras al-‘Ain is part of a 
phenomenon of urban restructuring according to the government’s vision of modernity. 
The Jordan Tourism Board website describes Ras al-‘Ain as the “dynamic new 
downtown area.”24 According to Malt, the aim of building the museum in Ras al-‘Ain 
was to connect the museum to the downtown area and to “retain the special character of 
the cityscape.”25 These statements show that the government is attempting to negotiate 
the existing ‘special character’ of the cityscape, as represented by the old downtown, with 
a new type of urban space that is based on this version of modernity, or hyper-modernity.  
By building the museum close to downtown, the museum serves as a bridge 
between discourses of tradition and modernity. The whole area of Ras al-‘Ain includes 
the museum, City Hall, and the Al-Hussein Cultural Center, all of which were built in the 
late 1990s or later. Ras al-‘Ain is a new site of performances and spatial discourses of 
national identity developed by King Abdullah II, which will be discussed further in the 
contexts of the King Hussein Park and downtown Amman. Despite the government’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Malt, xxix-xxx. 
24 Jordan Tourism Board, Museums. 
25 Malt, xxxi. 
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image of the dynamism of Ras al-‘Ain, the neighborhood does not seem to be bustling; it 
seemed rather empty during my visit to the museum, City Hall, and the cultural center.26 
Like Martyrs’ Memorial, these places occupy large open spaces, which are rare in 
Amman and increase the sense of monumentality of these places (Figure 1).27 But I did 
not see casual users of these open spaces because these spaces do not seem to be 
transitory. In this context, transitory means that there were not any people wandering 
around or using the spaces as gathering places, perhaps due to the lack of shops and 
restaurants. Rather, users are likely to travel to Ras al-‘Ain with a specific purpose and/or 
destination in mind.  
 
(Figure 1. Exterior of the Jordan Museum. Source: By Freedom's Falcon (Arabic 
Wikipedia) [Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons) 
 
 
 In this context, many of the visitors I saw during my visit were Western tourists, 
rather than Jordanians, perhaps because the museum just began its partial opening in 
2013 with very limited hours so not many Jordanians were aware of the museum’s 
opening. Unlike other museums in Amman, the Jordan Museum seemed modern, clean, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 A potential reason for the lack of bustle is that I visited on a Saturday so City Hall would be largely 
empty. However, I assume that museums receive more visitors on weekends than on weekdays. 
27 Unless otherwise noted, all photographs are property of the author. 
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and well-lit. The museum made use of technology and had informative plaques, which 
are lacking in most museums in Amman. The museum is rated the third best attraction in 
Amman on Trip Advisor and reviews are generally very positive, citing the museum’s 
wealth of information and interactive activities. One resident in Amman described how, 
considering the quality of other museums in Amman and the rest of Jordan, the museum 
was a surprise to her: It was spacious, clean, well-lit, informative, and interactive.28 Only 
the first floor was open at the time of my visit and I was able to visit exhibits about Petra, 
the Dead Sea Scrolls, and the ‘ancient’ period. One of the rooms on display was also a 
‘traditional’ Bedouin space. The sign for the second floor indicated that exhibits would 
include information about the Islamic periods, ‘traditional’ heritage, and modern Jordan. 
  Similarly to the King Hussein Park that will be discussed below, the museum 
reinforces a discourse of national history that is based on an unbroken timeline from the 
Neolithic period to the present. One of the educational graphics on display was a map 
showing Jordan’s trade relations from 3500 to 1200 BCE (Figure 2). This map shows 
ancient civilizations in Mesopotamia, Anatolia, and Egypt without borders. But the 
modern borders of Jordan are drawn on the map with the title ‘Jordan’. Rather than use 
the names of the civilizations present in the territory of Jordan during the Bronze Period, 
the museum imposed the anachronistic name and territorial borders of modern Jordan on 
a representation of ancient history. By visually connecting ancient history and the modern 
Hashemite state of Jordan, the Hashemite monarchy claims ownership of that ancient 
history. The museum thus appropriated ancient artifacts and history found in the territory 
of modern Jordan into a Hashemite-dominated narrative of Jordanian history. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Trip Advisor, The Jordan Museum, http://www.tripadvisor.com/Attraction_Review-g293986-d3973096-
Reviews-The_Jordan_Museum-Amman_Amman_Governorate.html#REVIEWS. 
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(Figure 2. Map showing Jordan’s trade relations during Bronze Ages.) 
 
 
The Jordan Museum serves to appropriate ancient civilizations for a discourse of national 
identity and history and disseminates this discourse through such maps, graphics, and 
plaques of information. Other symbols of ancient history appropriated are Petra and the 
Dead Sea Scrolls. One of the plaques at the museum claims that the Petra exhibit “aims to 
link young Jordanians with their national heritage.” The Dead Sea Scrolls are also given a 
prominent position within the museum even though the scrolls were found in the West 
Bank. During the period of Jordan’s annexation of the West Bank, the scrolls were also 
highlighted in Jordan’s exhibits at world fairs. The inclusion of the scrolls in the museum 
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indicates that the Jordanian government is still willing to claim Palestinian artifacts and 
display a visual discourse of pan-Jordanian national identity for the purposes of tourism. 
 
(Figure 3. Bedouin Exhibit.) 
 
 
 One of the most interesting displays at the museum is the ‘traditional’ Bedouin 
space (Figure 3). Set against a backdrop of an unidentified desert, the exhibit features 
rugs, cushions, cooking utensils, and instruments representative of Bedouin life. By 
putting representations of Bedouin life on display, the museum placed this type of life 
firmly in the past. At the same time, this exhibit was the only one at the time that 
presented lifestyles of any group of local Jordanians. Therefore, it seems that, according 
to the museum, the Bedouins are the only Jordanians worth representing as historically 
relevant and making representative of all Jordanians. The Jordan Museum negotiates two 
discourses that seem contradictory: a discourse of tribal autochthony and a discourse of 
modernity that paints tribalism as anti-modern. Similarly, the Jordanian government 
draws on a set of potentially conflicting discourses of national identity. The Hashemite 
monarchy still uses a discourse of kinship and tribalized identity to describe the Jordanian 
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nation, calling Jordan one big tribe or family, but at the same time has embarked on a 
project of neoliberalism that imagines Jordan, particularly Amman, as a locus of global 
modernity. Perhaps the most fascinating thing about the Hashemite monarchy is that it is 
able to project these different discourses at the same time in the same places. 
 
The Martyrs’ Memorial 
 Inaugurated in 1977, the Martyrs’ Memorial is one of the first Hashemite-
sponsored monumental spaces not only in Amman but in Jordan. The memorial does not 
gesture towards the ancient past but creates a spatial timeline focusing on the Arab Revolt 
(1916-1918) and military victories over Israel in the 1960s. By creating such a timeline, 
the Jordanian government expresses discourses of national identity framed in terms of 
Arab nationalism and Islamic legitimacy in order to portray the Hashemite monarchs as 
legitimate rulers of Jordan. The Arab Revolt, according to Layne, constitutes one of the 
main aspects of Jordan’s official discourse of collective memory and national history.29 
The annexation of the West Bank is also represented as ‘protection’ of Palestinians in the 
name of Arab nationalism. What is interesting is what is not emphasized at the memorial: 
mandatory rule, the 1967 war, and Black September. These periods and events could 
threaten the monarchy’s narrative of the Hashemites being the legitimate and natural 
rulers of Jordan. A reference to ancient history in the form of images of the Hashemite 
kings superimposed on an image of Petra indicates an emerging narrative of ancient 
history appropriated as Hashemite history. This narrative is also seen at the Jordan 
Museum and the King Hussein Park. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Linda Layne, Home and Homeland (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 103. 
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The memorial is located at the top of a hill in the Sports City complex in the 
affluent Shmeisani district in northwestern part of Amman. The Martyrs’ Memorial is an 
imposing sight. It is a white stone cube with a black frieze of Qur’anic inscription 
running around the memorial (Figure 4). The austere cuboid structure of the memorial 
resembles the ka’aba, the cuboid that is the most sacred site in Islam and is located in 
Mecca, the destination of the holy pilgrimage. Therefore, the physical architecture of the 
Martyrs’ Memorial can be read as a visual part of the Hashemites’ discourse of Islamic 
legitimacy, which will be discussed further below. In order to enter the memorial, you 
must cross a stone courtyard, where military tanks are on display and you must walk up a 
flight of stone steps surrounded by Jordanian flags. Vast, empty, open spaces such as the 
courtyard of the memorial are rarities in Amman, which is characterized by busy streets 
and roads, rather than any open spaces. Big outdoor places such as Sports City and the 
King Hussein Park are mostly located in western Amman, which is more affluent than the 
eastern side of Amman.  
 
(Figure 4. Exterior of Martyrs’ Memorial. Source: Preston Quinn) 
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The interior of the building is a large, dark space with twenty-four large flags 
hanging in the lobby, creating an atmosphere of majestic solemnity. The structure of the 
memorial is such that visitors must literally walk through a timeline of Jordan’s history at 
the museum before visiting the memorial itself. The monarchy’s and military’s versions 
of history are physically manifest in this timeline. This version of Jordanian history 
begins with the Arab Revolt led by the Hashemites and its kings are literally this history’s 
markers: Individual exhibition cases with the kings’ pictures mark the eras of their reigns. 
Cases are devoted to the kings’ belongings such as walking sticks, uniforms, and books, 
rather than representing the contested parts of Jordan’s history such as the 1967 War or 
Black September. This speaks to the image that the monarchy was trying to portray: The 
kings are paternal figures who led a stable country without internal divisions. The 
presence of the kings’ belongings almost create an atmosphere of worship, implying that 
even the kings’ belongings are important to the country. Each image of the king is 
accompanied by his copy of the Holy Qur’an, a reminder that the kings were not only 
pious but had religious legitimacy as descendants of the Prophet. Apart from the kings, 
very few individuals are named.30  As the author of this narrative, the Hashemite 
monarchy can erase political opposition to the monarchy from its narratives of national 
history and identity. This flattening of history further propagates the discourse that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 This is a trend in other Jordanian museums as well. According to Maffi, the Museum of Political Life in 
Amman, which is devoted to King Abdullah, “ensures that the monarchy is the political and ideological 
center which alone can organize the past in order to guarantee [the monarchy’s] own existence. In light of 
such principles, other actors in history must play a secondary role” (New Museographic Trends, 213). 
However, there is a place in the museum for those who participated in the Arab Revolt and were not 
Transjordanian by descent but later moved to Transjordan under Abdullah’s rule. Maffi argues that 
emphasis on this originally foreign group is an “allegorical personification of the situation of the majority 
of the Jordanian citizens and of the royal dynasty itself” (213). As discussed in the third chapter, some 
tribal discourses of autochthony that emerged in the late 1980s defined autochthony as being from the Hijaz 
and not as Palestinian origins. By painting Jordanian citizens of non-Transjordanian origin as role models, 
the Jordanian government propagates a model citizen who is similar to the Hashemite monarchy, thus 
ironically creating a discourse of national identity based on foreignness. 
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Hashemite history is Jordanian history and Hashemites can legitimately represent 
Jordanians. Here, what Anderson said about official discourses of national identity rings 
true: “The Hashemites are Jordan; Jordan is the Hashemite family.”31 According to this 
spatial discourse of national identity, Jordanian history is represented as Hashemite 
history and any reference that threatens the Hashemites’ ‘natural’ right to rule Jordan, 
such as British colonial officials and Palestinian-majority opposition forces, are 
noticeably absent.  
The memorial itself is devoted to fallen Jordanian soldiers. Somehow, this process 
of devotion serves to further the glorification of the Hashemite monarchy by dramatizing 
the Hashemites’ role in the 1916-1918 Arab Revolt.32 At the memorial, there is a whole 
section dedicated to the Arab Revolt with windows displaying military paraphernalia 
from the revolt and photos of emirs Faisal and Abdullah with Arab soldiers. The Arab 
Revolt occurred in World War I and predates the modern state of Jordan. But the revolt 
was constructed as a part of Jordanian history at the memorial because the revolt can be 
read as a way of legitimizing the Hashemites’ role as Arab nationalist leaders and thus 
legitimate rulers of Jordan. 
What is emphasized at the Martyrs’ Memorial is the Hashemites’ dedication to 
Arab nationalism, evoked here through their leadership of the Arab Revolt and the 
monarchy’s protection of Palestinians from Israel in 1948. Labeling this discourse pan-
Jordanian may be incorrect because there are few references to Palestinians being a 
natural part of the Jordanian state. But this discourse differs significantly from the 
discourse of national identity based on notions of East Bank tribalism discussed in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Betty Anderson, Nationalist Voices in Jordan (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2005), 1. 
32 Malt, 35-36. 
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third chapter. The Jordanian government could not afford to give up on the ideology of 
Arab nationalism completely during the late 1970s. Inflation was high and in 1979, 
Bedouin groups, usually thought of as the most loyal to the Hashemite monarchy, 
marched on the capital.33 In a context of trade relations and aid from other Arab states, it 
was in the Jordanian government’s interest to construct a large monument devoted to the 
Hashemites’ and Jordanians’ sacrifices for Arab causes. Furthermore, notions of Arab 
and Muslim unity were less politically controversial to other Arab states than the 
discourse of pan-Jordanianism. 
Another important discourse of Hashemite legitimacy present in the Martyrs’ 
Memorial is based on Islamic legitimacy. Exhibition cases with the Hashemite kings’ 
images literally mark the spatial timeline so that Jordanian history is read in terms of the 
kings’ reigns. Each of these windows contains the king’s personal copy of the Qur’an.34 
Along with the memorial’s ka’aba-like structure and the references to the Hashemites’ 
connections with the Holy Land, the Martyrs’ Memorial reminds visitors that the 
Hashemites were once protectors of Mecca and Jerusalem. According to this discourse, 
the Hashemite monarchy’s religious credentials make them suitable and legitimate rulers 
of Jordan.  
These discourses of legitimacy require the erasure of political groups who 
threaten the Hashemite narrative of authority. These groups are the British mandatory 
government that created the state of Transjordan and Palestinians, despite most 
Palestinians’ lack of involvement in Black September. Only in the context of the Arab 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Schirin Fathi, Jordan – An Invented Nation? (Hamburg: Deutsches Orient-Institut, 1994), 188-189. 
34 The display of the Hashemite kings’ personal items seems to be a trend in Jordanian museums. The 
Islamic Museum, located at the King Abdullah mosque complex in Amman, showcases King Abdullah’s 
personal items alongside ancient artifacts (Malt 35), thus reinforcing this sense of a continuous Jordanian 
history running from ancient civilizations to the modern Hashemite monarchy. 
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Revolt are the British mentioned for their support of the Hashemite military actions 
against the Ottoman Empire. Military officers (including Arab and Jordanian officers) 
remain unnamed, keeping the main attention on the monarchy. The mandate period is 
similarly underemphasized. John Glubb is only named once, despite his important role in 
recruiting Bedouin tribesmen into the Desert Patrol,35 as discussed in the first chapter. 
However, the tribes’ loyalty to Glubb came at the expense of then-emir Abdullah’s 
control of them.36 In the spatial context of a dedication to the military, it is especially 
significant that Glubb, the former Commander of the Arab Legion, is absent. At the 
Martyrs’ Memorial, the only political power associated with the military is the Hashemite 
monarchy. In fact, Britain is not mentioned outside of giving the Hashemites weapons.  
Thus Britain’s power over Abdullah and Jordan’s colonial past is downplayed. The lack 
of information about Britain’s role in the creation of Transjordan and its relationship with 
Abdullah at the memorial serves to prevent any counter-narrative to the monarchy’s 
discourse of national history. The history of Jordan presented at the memorial implies that 
Jordan has ‘natural’ boundaries and its history ‘naturally’ culminated in Hashemite rule.  
Parts of Jordan’s history that are also absent at the Martyrs’ Memorial are 
moments of resistance against the Hashemite monarchy, especially by Palestinians. 
According to the plaques at the museum, the military performed their duty to protect 
Palestine during the 1948 War. There are no hints of Abdullah’s secret talks with Israel 
and the Arab Legion’s suspicious conduct during the war, such as retreating from some 
areas in Palestine that would not become Jordanian territory, as discussed in the second 
chapter. Throughout the whole museum, ‘Palestinians’ are portrayed as victims of Israel 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 John Glubb established the Desert Patrol in 1931. Part of the Arab Legion, the Patrol’s main duties were 
to protect Transjordan’s borders. 
36 Yoav Alon, The Making of Jordan (London; New York: I.B. Tauris, 2007), 106. 
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who needed Jordan’s protection (Figure 5). In the exhibits for this time period, Israel is 
referred to vaguely in the informational plaques as ‘the enemy’ that threatened the whole 
Arab world, an implicit justification of Jordan’s annexation of the West Bank. There is no 
mention of the conflicts with Palestinian nationalists and later on militias who were 
forced out of Jordanian territory in Black September. Apart from Palestine’s status as the 
Holy Land, Palestinian territory and particularly Palestinians are notably absent from this 
version of Jordan’s history and national identity in the period of 1948 to 1970.  
 
(Figure 5. Display of Karameh Battle of 1968, during which Palestinian militias and 
Jordanian military units inflicted heavy losses on the Israeli military. This display is one 
of the few mentions of Palestinians at the memorial and reinforces Jordanian heroism. 
Source: Preston Quinn) 
 
 
The Palestinian who assassinated King Abdullah is represented but remains 
unnamed; he is not even identified as Palestinian. The only reference to Abdullah’s death 
reads, “The great man fell in the Holy City.” Even an event that is clear evidence of 
Palestinian opposition to Jordanian annexation is represented in such a way to strengthen 
the link between Jordan and the Holy Land, in order to strengthen Hashemite legitimacy. 
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The failure of Jordan to ‘protect’ the West Bank from Israel’s occupation after the 1967 
War is also omitted. For this failure is a challenge to the legitimacy of the Jordanian state. 
The Hashemite monarchy had claimed to be the protector of Palestinians so if Jordan 
could not protect or represent Palestinians, then what was Jordan’s role in the Arab 
world? This dilemma also helps explain the absence of Black September at the memorial. 
By supporting Palestinian militias as opposed to the Jordanian government and engaging 
in violence against the Jordanian state, some Palestinians and Jordanians themselves 
questioned Jordan as the legitimate representative of Palestinians. Although the memorial 
is dedicated to the military, which has been ‘de-Palestinized’ as discussed in the second 
chapter, the official discourses present at the memorial actually seem to be based on 
notions of Arab nationalism rather than that of an exclusive Transjordanian one. 
However, in this space, the government undoubtedly silences Palestinian voices.37  
Finally, there is another visual discourse of Hashemite legitimacy present at the 
memorial that does not seem to be based on pan-Islamic legitimacy but on Jordan’s own 
cultural heritage. In the lobby, there is a large poster composed of photos of the five 
Hashemite leaders from Sherif Husayn to King Abdullah II superimposed on images of 
Petra and the King Abdullah Mosque (the current national mosque). This poster was 
added after the memorial was built and indicates a shift from a pan-Islamic discourse of 
legitimacy to an emphasis on national, secular sites. There is focus on national territory, 
as national homeland is mentioned a few times in the Arabic brochure and the martyrs are 
referred to as ‘sons of Jordan’. In order to construct this national homeland, the Jordanian 
government emphasized Petra as a symbol of Jordan’s ancient history. By visually 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Palestinian voices were already silenced when the Hashemite monarchy appropriated Jerusalem’s holy 
places to form a discourse of pan-Jordanian identity based on ideas of Islamic legitimacy. 
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connecting the Hashemite monarchy and Petra, the poster implies that the monarchy has 
inherited Jordan’s great and ancient history. The memorial presents shifts in official 
discourses of national identity and Hashemite legitimacy over time. When the memorial 
was built, the Hashemite monarchy wanted to emphasize the Hashemites’ legitimacy as 
leaders of the Arab Revolt, protectors of Palestinians, and descendants of the Prophet. 
But after King Abdullah II ascended the throne, the discursive meaning of the space 
changed with a visual narrative of Jordanian history intertwined with the Hashemite 
monarchy, rather than relying on discourses of Arab nationalism or pan-Islamic 
legitimacy as a way to justify Hashemite rule. 
 
The King Hussein Park 
 Located near the eighth circle,38 which was formerly the westernmost part of 
Amman, the King Hussein Park opened in 2006, although construction continued 
throughout 2007.39 The park is notable for its combination of ancient history with modern 
Hashemite rule to create a unified historical narrative. By referring to the great 
civilizations of Jordan’s past, the park creates a new discourse of legitimacy for the 
Hashemite monarchy, in that the Hashemite kings can be read as descendants of these 
civilizations. The Historical Passageway, which is a spatial timeline of Jordan’s history, 
expresses almost all the sources of legitimacy that the monarchy draws upon, from 
ancient history to Arab nationalism to Jerusalem to Islamic legitimacy. I will analyze 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 One of the main throughways in Amman is Zahran Road, which runs east to west from First Circle (near 
the historical downtown) to the newer Eighth Circle. These circles have become landmarks in Amman and 
are spatial markers of different districts. 
39 Naseem Tarawnah, The King Hussein Park & Mosque, http://black-iris.com/2007/01/15/the-king-
hussein-park-mosque/. 
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displays and objects in chronological order of the periods they refer to but this order does 
not necessarily correspond to the order by which visitors can experience the park. 
The park can be considered an example of how King Abdullah II, the son of 
Hussein who ascended to the throne in 1999 following his father’s death, has sought to 
create the eighth circle, as opposed to the historical downtown, as one of the centers of 
his discourse of national identity. The park’s location by the eighth circle evokes 
neoliberal values. The park is surrounded by the King Hussein Business Park, Mega 
Mall, City Mall, and other manifestations of the neoliberal economic program. Neoliberal 
economic policies, which are based on the notion of competition, have led to intensified 
privatization and the development of luxury projects as a way to create an appropriate 
image of hypermodernity to attract foreign investors.40 The eighth circle has become a 
new site of performances of national identity and the King Hussein Park is instrumental 
to the current Hashemite king’s discourse of hypermodernity that is circulated as a vision 
of Jordan’s future.41 The relationship between discourses of modernity and national 
identity will be discussed in this section. 
The park is difficult to reach, especially for residents in the less affluent eastern 
Amman, because the eighth circle is near the city’s western limits, far west of downtown. 
Thus, although the park should be accessible to all, invisible barriers to access based on 
class dimensions are present at the park. As Figure 6 demonstrates, the distance from 
King Hussein Mosque at the park to the Roman Theater in downtown is approximately 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 See Rami Daher, “Discourses of Neoliberalism and Disparities in the City Landscape <Cranes, Caters, 
and an Exclusive Urbanity>”, in Cities, Urban Practices and Nation Building in Jordan, ed. Myriam 
Ababsa and Rami Daher (Beirut: Presses de l’Ifpo, 2011), 273-295.	  
41 Hypermodernity usually refers to an intensified modernity. In the case of Jordan, I use hypermodernity to 
mean a modernity that evokes neoliberal values, i.e. greater role of the private sector in the economy and in 
public life and an increase in spaces of consumption.  
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sixteen kilometers, which is considered a long distance in a city such as Amman. 
Therefore, users would likely need to drive or take a taxi to the park, thus limiting who 
would be able to access the park in terms of socioeconomic class. The dotted line on the 
left in Figure 6 shows the city limits. 
 
(Figure 6. Map of Amman showing route from King Hussein Mosque to Roman Theater. 
Source: Google Maps, accessed February 28, 2014) 
 
 
The park itself is a vast space at 700,000 square meters,42 and is considered one of the 
only green spaces in Amman or ‘Amman’s favorite green space’ in tourist parlance.43 
Aside from open space, the park also encompasses the King Hussein Mosque, which was 
inaugurated in 2006 as the new national mosque, the Royal Automobile Museum, the 
Children’s Museum, representations of the Hijaz Railway, a Levantine townhouse, a 
Roman amphitheater, and the Historical Passageway. However, these sites can be 
difficult to find due to the lack of signage in the park and the multitude of winding paths. 
Many areas of the park were also surrounded by fences, which limited movement. For 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Greater Amman Municipality, King Hussein Park – Kids Zone, 
http://www.ammancity100.jo/en/content/event-venue/king-hussein-park-kids-zone. 
43 Rough Guides, King Hussein Park, http://www.roughguides.com/destinations/middle-
east/jordan/amman/west-amman/king-hussein-park/. 
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example, the Historical Passageway, a 488-metre wall and promenade,44 is fenced off on 
both ends of the promenade (Figure 7).  
 
(Figure 7. The fences around the Historical Passageway.) 
 
 
When I visited the mosque, I saw mostly women with their children, as well as 
young couples making use of secluded spaces. A notable Jordanian blogger described 
similar users when he visited the park in 2007, although he noted that the park was 
supposed to be full of families during the summer.45 From my observations, users mostly 
took advantage of the open spaces to sit and chat. I did not see anyone else engaging with 
the Historical Pathway. It is unclear if the Jordanian government wanted to target a 
certain segment of the population but it is clear that the users of the park do not represent 
the diversity of Jordan’s population. It is also unclear whether visitors normally stroll 
towards the passageway and engage with it casually. According to the website Jeeran, 
which allows residents to review places in their cities, the King Hussein Park scored four 
out of five stars from 154 reviews. Reviewers generally praised the park’s beauty, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Elena Corbett, “Hashemite Antiquity and Modernity: Iconography in Neoliberal Jordan,” Studies in 
Ethnicity and Nationalism 11 no. 2 (2011): 163. 
45 Tarawneh, King Hussein Park & Mosque. 
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cleanliness, and open spaces. But some users criticized the lack of organization, the 
distance from the city, and the shabab (youths) hanging around the park; for one user, 
these youths infringed on a family space.46 It seems that most users were more interested 
in using the park’s open public spaces than to learn more about Jordan’s ancient history. 
During my walk through the park, I passed by representations of the Hijaz 
Railway, a ‘typical’ townhouse in the Levantine style, and a Roman-style amphitheater 
(Figure 8). These displays also lacked signs, indicating that these displays are spatial 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Jeeran, King Hussein Park, http://jo.jeeran.com/en/p/king-hussein-park-amman/. 
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The amphitheater evokes Amman’s Roman past. Perhaps the Hashemite monarchy is 
attempting to present itself as like the Roman rulers before it, basing monuments (such as 
the King Hussein Park) on the Roman amphitheater that can be found in downtown 
Amman. The townhouse is an interesting example because it belongs to an urban space 
that Jordan was lacking before the early twentieth century. Homes in early twentieth-
century Amman did not resemble these town houses. According to Rogan, when 
Circassian settlers arrived in Amman in the late nineteenth century, they dismantled 
Islamic architectural structures in order to use the stone to build their homes. The 
Circassian architectural style was visually distinct from the Levantine style: “Unlike the 
courtyard home typical to much of the Arab world, the Circassian home is an outward-
looking design with large windows and porches, surrounded by gardens fenced in by a 
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peripheral wall.”47 Thus, Amman has been criticized for lacking an ‘identity’ by not 
conforming to the model Islamic city, a problematic model developed by Orientalists 
from cities such as Damascus, Cairo, and Fez. By creating a representation of Islamic 
architecture that did not exist in Amman, the Jordanian government imported a visual 
heritage of middle-class life in the Levant. From her study of museums in Jordan and the 
shaping of Jordanian national culture, Malt argues, “Jordan attempts to perpetuate its 
image as part of the exotic Middle East – continuing to market and identify itself visually 
with an Orientalist past”.48 This is done through constructing Orientalist images of a 
place and emphasizing the ‘noble Bedouin’ population. Furthermore, similarly to 
Solidere’s reconstruction of downtown Beirut, the Jordanian government’s construction 
of places which have no historical reality in Amman creates mere spectacles, rather than 
reconstructions.49 By presenting the Levantine townhouse as a part of Jordanian national 
history, the government displays a discourse of national identity that evokes belonging to 
the rest of the Arab world; more specifically, a middle-class, Orientalized Arab world.  
The government also spatially reinforces the connection between Jordan and the 
modernizing efforts of the Ottoman Empire through a display of a segment of the Hijaz 
Railway. The railway expresses a discourse of Jordan’s modernity that belongs strictly to 
the early twentieth century. The Hijaz Railway was built during the Ottoman Empire’s 
modernization period and the stop at Amman gave the city a newfound significance in the 
empire. By referring to Amman in the Ottoman modernizing past, the Hashemite 
monarchy can spatially link past modernization with contemporary discourses of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Eugene Rogan, “Physical Islamization in Amman,” The Muslim World 76 no. 1 (1986): 27. 
48 Malt, 34. 
49 See Saree Makdisi, “Laying Claim to Beirut: Urban Narrative and Spatial Identity in the Age of 
Solidere,” Critical Inquiry 23 no. 3 (1997): 660-705. 
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modernity. Furthermore, the Hijaz Railway can be read as a reference to the Arab Revolt, 
due to the Hashemite-led attack on the railway in the Allied offensive against the 
Ottoman Empire. This reminds visitors of the Hashemites’ role as leaders of an Arab 
nationalist movement in the early twentieth century and is part of a Hashemite discourse 
of legitimacy. 
The area between the Cultural Village and the Historical Passageway was fenced 
so that visitors at the time of my visit would have needed to explore more of the park 
before reaching the chronological beginning of the Historical Passageway. The 
passageway displays archeological artifacts representative of time periods from the 
Paleolithic period to the modern day in chronological order in space. Each Hashemite 
king also receives his own mosaic (Figure 9) and the passageway culminates with a 
mosaic display of the Hashemite family tree, which visually outlines their descent from 
Prophet Muhammad (Figure 10).  
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(Figure 9. Sherif Husayn, King Abdullah I, King Talal, King Hussein, King Abdullah II.) 
 
 
According to Corbett, the passageway is the first attempt to use artifacts representative of 
ancient history to create a unified history of Jordan. Furthermore, aside from the 
Hashemite family tree and a depiction of Jerusalem’s holy places, the passageway is 
mostly secular. Corbett argues that the passageway presents a discourse of Hashemite 
historical legitimacy, not religious legitimacy. In Corbett’s words, the passageway is a 
“demonstration of things having happened just as they should have. From the dust of the 
ancients the modern Hashemite kingdom-nation was destined to be.”50 By asserting 
Jordan’s ancient history, the Hashemite monarchy asserts that Jordan is a natural nation, 
and not an artificially-created state, and that the Hashemites are destined to rule Jordan as 
a modern nation.  
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The passageway also represents the shift that occurred in the 1990s in official 
discourse of national identity from one based on Arab nationalism, with references to the 
Arab Revolt, to one based on Jordanian nationalism and history specific to the territory of 
Jordan. Corbett argues that until recently, “The [discursive] mental map of the watan 
(homeland) was not necessarily the Jordanian nation-state, but the Arab nation, with 
special prominence afforded to the Hashemites.”51 But as Jordan’s physical and 
imaginary borders changed, especially after Black September and the disengagement 
from the West Bank in 1988, so too did discourses of national identity. The contemporary 
discourse of ‘Hashemite-centric, Jordanian Arab inclusivity’ required representations of 
antiquity and Jordanian ancient history, in order to emphasize Jordan and not the wider 
Arab nation or Islamic umma. By doing so, the official discourse of national identity 
crossed religious and ethnic boundaries and included minority groups such as Christians 
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and Circassians. At the same time, this discourse excluded groups and ideologies that 
could undermine Hashemite legitimacy, namely Palestinians, Ba’athism, and 
Nasserism.52 However, the Jordanian government has not forgotten Jerusalem and 
continues to reinforce discourses of Islamic legitimacy. In the passageway, one panel is 
devoted to showing Hashemite renovations and administration of the Dome of the Rock 
(Figure 11), thus reinforcing the Hashemites’ emphasis on its role as the legitimate 
protectors of the holy sites in Jerusalem.  
 
 
(Figure 11. Displays of a map of the Dome of the Rock and a plaque discussing 
Hashemite renovations of the mosque.) 
 
 
This spatial discourse of Jordanian-centric national identity began to expressed at 
a specific moment in time in the 2000s and can be considered part of King Abdullah II’s 
attempt to control readings of modernity. Narratives of ancient history and Jordan-
centered national identity are expressions of an emerging discourse of hypermodernity 	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that are visible in spaces right now. Since his ascent to the throne in 1999, Abdullah II 
has embarked on neoliberal policies consisting of privatization and cooperation with 
international real estate companies to build luxury real estate and tourism facilities. 
Corbett argues that due to privatization, the Hashemite monarchy no longer has such a 
strong control of economic resources in Jordan. Abdullah II has represented himself as a 
mediator between tradition and modernity. By doing so, Abdullah II is sending the 
message that he can modernize Jordan and advance Jordan’s economy according to 
global standards but also preserve ‘traditional’ values. This message is disseminated in 
the context of intensified rivalries and divisions between different segments of the 
population and a sense that Abdullah II can no longer control the economy.53 According 
to Corbett, the King Hussein Park is a way for the Hashemite monarchy to take control of 
discourses of modernity and nationhood. 
It is intended to help stem the tide of disbelief by demonstrating that the history of 
Jordan, with the Hashemites at the helm, has unfolded exactly as it should have. 
The wall is a conversation between modernity and tradition; it is a new reading on 




The Downtown Amman(s) and Discourses of Modernity 
 The area considered downtown Amman is one of the oldest public spaces in 
Amman. Some of the city’s most famous restaurants, cafes, bookstores, and markets are 
located in downtown Amman and Jordan’s first national mosque, the Al-Husseini 
Mosque, is also located here. This is where the Anglo-Hashemite government hosted 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 According to a discussion with Corbett, this fear that the Hashemite monarchy was not in control of 
Jordan intensified in March 2013, when The Atlantic published an article about Abdullah II as a modern 
monarch. Corbett posited that many Jordanians were scared because the article portrayed the king as 
lacking control over the direction of the country’s development. 
54 Corbett, 165. 
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parades as performances of legitimacy during the 1920s. Perhaps the most famous site in 
downtown Amman is the Roman Amphitheater, which is still highly publicized in 
Jordan’s tourism literature today. This section analyzes the Jordanian government’s 
efforts to revamp the downtown area, primarily through the construction of the 
Hashemite Court and the Hashemite Plaza. These places were constructed in the context 
of a new discourse of hypermodernity that the Hashemite monarchy circulates as the 
trajectory of Jordan’s development and as a source of legitimacy for the monarchy. This 
discourse of modernity is contested through references to another discourse of modernity 
that is evoked by the ‘old downtown’. 
 The Hashemite Court is a large open space located in front of the Roman 
Amphitheater near the heart of what is considered downtown Amman (Figure 12). 
Hoping to build a vibrant public space downtown, the Jordanian government built the 
white stone space in front of the theater in 1986. However, the court is noticeably 
underused as a spontaneous space or a meeting place and public participation has not 
been at the level the government anticipated. Therefore, the government has needed to 
plan activities such as musical parades in order to attract people to the place.55 
Furthermore, the Jordanian government built a colonnade between the amphitheater and 
the rest of downtown to try to facilitate movement towards the court but this was 
transformed into a strictly controlled shopping area, where vendors are permitted to sell 
only touristic products.56 There are also seats around the trees to facilitate group activities 
but they are mostly occupied by single individuals. Furthermore, the court seems to 
present different uses according to gender. According to Amireh, unlike men, women are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Amireh, 154. 
56 Ibid., 155. 
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rarely seen lying down on benches or chatting in social groups. Women are 
‘circumstantial users’ and tend to use the place as a transient space: They pass through, 
tend to walk by the edges of the court rather than through the middle, or stop to buy a 
snack. Women’s participation in this space is actually decreasing.57 Additionally, there 
were spaces designated as children’s play areas but these did not attract parents or their 
children. An interesting aspect of the Hashemite Court is that there was a Bedouin tent, 
which Amireh argues did not succeed in engaging with users for two reasons. Local 
residents recognized that the tent was a mere adaptation or representation of ‘traditional’ 
life used to attract tourists. Meanwhile, tourists did not know how to engage with the tent 
outside of the tent’s usual context, i.e. in the desert.58 For locals and tourists, the tent took 
on a different meaning in an urban space. This meaning differed from the government’s 
intention and thus, the tent was not successful in attracting users. According to Amireh’s 
concept of spaces and vocabularies, this place did not attract the expected variety of users 
and has not shaped the expected adaptation of users to the cues and meanings of the 
space. Most people actually avoid the Hashemite Court and it has become a space for 
unlawful vendors.59 
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58 Ibid., 157. 
59 Ibid., 160. 
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(Figure 12. The Hashemite Court in front of the Roman Amphitheater.) 
 
 
 Recently, the government embarked on a project called the ‘Hashemite Plaza’ 
next to the Hashemite Court. The plaza consists of (or will consist of) sleek metal 
covered walkways, benches, and open spaces. The renovations appear to be completed as 
of May 2013 but access to the open spaces are blocked, although users can access the 
walkways and benches. The images of the designs on billboards around the plaza suggest 
that the designer intends for the plaza to be an extremely social space teeming with 
various groups of people (Figure 13). It is unclear how the space will be used but if it is 
similar to the Hashemite Court, then the designer is likely to be disappointed. So far, old 
men have used the benches as transient resting places, rather than socializing spaces, and 
it may even be a space for homeless individuals. 
   








 The Hashemite Court and the Hashemite Plaza are both government initiatives to 
create public gathering spaces in the downtown area. These developments can be 
considered part of an effort to move away from the historical public spaces of Faisal 
Square, just a few blocks away from the Roman Amphitheater. In the 1920s and 1930s, 
Faisal Square was the political and intellectual hub of Amman. The government has 
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actually recognized Faisal Square’s importance to Amman with a sign in the downtown 
area that describes how Faisal Square/Plaza was the meeting place between the 
Hashemite monarchy and the residents of Amman and how Faisal Square “represents 
geographically and spatially the heart of the city of Amman.” The Anglo-Hashemite 
government used to perform rituals of legitimacy in the space of Faisal Square through 
spectacles and parades.60 The sign also describes Faisal Square as “the hearth of an active 
public sphere” (Figure 14) due to the hotels, bookshops, and cafes that allowed 
journalists, politicians, and writers to meet and form a public sphere. Faisal Square was 
compared to Martyrs’ Square in Beirut and Sahet al Marje in Damascus and Amman as a 
whole was considered one of the active cities within the Levant, along with Damascus, 
Jerusalem, and Beirut. The sign provides a map highlighting key hotels, bookshops, and 
cafes. 
 
(Figure 14. Faisal Square as a public space.) 
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and Rami Daher (Beirut: Presses l’Ifpo, 2011), 70. 
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Daher reinforces the sign’s description and he claims that the intellectual activities in 
Faisal Square connected Amman with other urban centers, playing a similar role as 
Martyrs’ Square in Beirut. Amman was not famous for early grand, monumental public 
spaces but it had public spaces in the forms of cafes and corner shops.61 He describes 
how many of these sites are representative of Amman’s ‘urban heritage of modernity’ 
because the intellectual activity showed signs of a city moving into modernity. But many 
of them have since been demolished in the name of another kind of modernity, one that 
gestures towards neoliberal principles.62 
 Despite the Jordanian government’s acknowledgement of the significance of 
Faisal Square as a public space, the government has cooperated with private development 
companies to create a new downtown. These new ‘public’ spaces are built in the image of 
a new kind of modernity in the context of neoliberal economic policies. After King 
Abdullah II succeeded his father King Hussein, he embarked on a neoliberal economic 
program based on privatization and foreign investment. The state-owned property 
development company MAWARED has been developing high-rise office buildings in 
neighborhoods such as Abdali to try to create a new downtown in the image of 
neoliberalism. According to Daher, the new downtown will have an IT park, upscale 
offices and residential spaces, and a large plaza connecting the new downtown to the 
Parliament buildings and national mosque in Abdali.63 This image of hypermodernism is 
based on an ‘urban culture’ of Western cosmopolitanism, a competitive business climate, 
and first-class tourism and leisure facilities. This is the image required to attract 	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62 Ibid., 77. 
63 Rami Daher, “Discourses of Neoliberalism and Disparities in the City Landscape <Cranes, Caters, and an 
Exclusive Urbanity>”, in Cities, Urban Practices and Nation Building in Jordan, ed. Myriam Ababsa and 
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investors.64 The new Western-educated, technocratic political elite, which emerged with 
King Abdullah II, has controlled most of this neoliberal economic development and they 
have used Solidere in Beirut and Dubai as models. Similarly to Dubai, MAWARED and 
other property development companies have built ‘gated communities’ or private spaces 
disguised as public spaces, such as luxury malls and hotels. These are spaces of 
consumption and access to these spaces is controlled by a discourse of respectability that 
is determined by socioeconomic class. Daher argues that these neoliberal policies and 
gated communities will only perpetuate the urban geographies of Amman,65 which is 
already split between east and west. But this discourse of hypermodernity with aspects of 
neoliberalism is the kind of modernity that King Abdullah II claims to bring forward as a 
culmination of Jordan’s ancient, noble past.  
 Among the general public, there appears to be a level of resistance or, at least, a 
lack of interest in the Hashemite monarchy’s newly sponsored ‘public spaces’. There is 
an emerging interest in Amman’s ‘urban heritage of modernity’ through the initiatives of 
the Amman Municipality and residents’ associations. The Amman Municipality has 
embarked on gentrification projects in downtown and to improve pedestrianization.66 One 
example is Rainbow Street, located at the first circle and close to downtown, which is 
now a space with coffee shops, art galleries and shops, and restaurants. Unlike most 
places in Amman, visitors can walk down Rainbow Street and sit on various benches. 
Residents’ associations such as the Jebel Amman Residents’ Association have started flea 
markets in order to raise awareness of older areas such as Jebel Amman and create 
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Yasser Elsheshtawy (London; New York: Routledge, 2008), 47. 
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interest in an alternative form of shopping to malls.67 An interesting form of resistance to 
neoliberalism is one raised by the National Committee of Military Veterans. In 2010, the 
committee (made up of both Transjordanian and Jordanian-Palestinian elites) published a 
public criticism of the policies of King Abdullah II and the appointments of Palestinians 
to important positions in the government, for which the committee blames Abdullah’s 
wife Queen Rania, who is of Palestinian origin. In their view, the monarchy’s neoliberal 
development program has privileged some elites and not others.68 Despite the presence of 
some Palestinian elites among the protesters, this criticism can be read as a protest by the 
old elite of the neoliberal development program - and the diminishing power of the 
committee members as opposed to the ascendance of Abdullah’s technocratic elite - 
framed in terms of national identity. The committee presents the neoliberal economic 
policies as an attack by Palestinians on Jordanians. But perhaps the true concern is 
Abdullah’s vision of a modern Jordan, which excludes the old political elite, as 
represented by the committee, and privileges a new, younger group of both Jordanians 
and Palestinians close to the king. In this way, ideas about modernity and anxiety about 
control of resources impact discourses of national identity. 
 
Conclusion 
 The spaces and places analyzed in this chapter indicate shifts in official discourses 
of national identity over time. Beginning with a discourse of Arab nationalism showcased 
at the Martyrs’ Memorial, the Hashemite monarchy has created narratives of a unified, 
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teleological Jordanian history that implies that the Hashemite monarchs have inherited 
Jordan from the great rulers and civilizations of Jordan’s ancient past. As an image of 
Jordanian membership, to use Lefebvre’s words, the monumental spaces promote loyalty 
to the monarchy as a prerequisite for loyal citizenship and present spatial discourses of 
Jordanian national identity based on the notions of Arab nationalism, Islamic legitimacy, 
and a continuous Jordanian history culminating in Hashemite rule and its successive 
kings. More recently, under the reign of King Abdullah II, the Jordanian government has 
embarked on a somewhat controversial neoliberal economic program and many of the 
spatial discourses of national identity are circulated in spaces that have been constructed 
as part of the neoliberal project (King Hussein Park, Jordan Museum, and Hashemite 
Plaza). Similarly to how the Jordanian government embarked on creating a visual Islamic 
identity for the city of Amman in the 1980s, it is currently creating a visual and spatial 
identity of hypermodernity with echoes of neoliberalism. Several communities have 
created alternative public spaces such as outdoor markets to counter the increasing 
number of luxury malls in Amman. But many users also appreciate places such as the 
King Hussein Park, which in itself does not express a vision of modernity but it is located 
in a space in which values of hypermodernity and neoliberalism are circulated. 
It is important to remember that each ‘public’ space constrains who can use the 
space and users themselves limit access to the space from others deemed ‘inappropriate’. 
Spaces controlled by the political elite and state-designated public spaces have not been 
popular so far due to conflicting experiences of modernity. The Jordanian government 
has torn down many of the ‘public spaces’ at Faisal Square from the 1920s and 1930s and 
has embarked on projects to create vast parks and plazas and a new downtown in 
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neoliberal spaces. The government seeks to control which spaces are public. But for 
many Jordanians, spaces such as cafes and restaurants, which Daher described as 
Amman’s urban heritage of modernity, remain popular sites of socialization. There is a 
discrepancy between the vocabulary and meanings of the government’s spaces and the 
way users understand the spaces. Thus, this impacts how the spaces are used. 
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Conclusion 
 Since the establishment of Transjordan in 1921, the Hashemite monarchy has 
continuously drawn on a range of historical narratives and discourses of national identity 
to legitimize its rule. The monarchy chose to favor certain discourses at specific moments 
due to political and social contexts. Despite the dominance of certain discourses of 
national identity, communities excluded from these discourses had opportunities to 
articulate their own visions of the nation and belonging to the nation. These different 
discourses of national identity, especially as expressed in public spaces, indicate that 
constructing a nation is not a one-time event but requires continuous discursive 
interventions and performances of nationhood and national identity. Despite the 
Hashemite monarchy’s rhetoric, Jordan was not a ‘natural’ outcome of an organic 
historical process but a political project undertaken by many different actors. This 
process includes the active, contested, and ongoing processes of constructing ever-
changing narratives of national identity in the context of a changing set of power 
relations. 
 This thesis explores how and why different actors, especially the Hashemite 
monarchy, constructed different discourses of national identity at various moments in 
time from the mandate period to the present. During the mandate period, Abdullah, 
whose ambitions to gain more territory for the Hashemite state never wavered, 
continuously emphasized the ideals of Arab nationalism. The discourse of Arab 
nationalism not only expressed the idea that a unified Arab state was more legitimate than 
separate nation-states but was also a source of legitimacy for the Hashemites due to their 
role in the Arab Revolt and their status as sherifs and former protectors of Mecca. The 
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Arab nation that Abdullah envisioned was rightfully ruled by the Hashemites. Thus, the 
message to Transjordanians was that they should be loyal to the Hashemites in order to 
be patriotic members of the Arab nation. During the same period, former political elites 
from the Ottoman period framed their demands and criticism of the Anglo-Hashemite 
government in terms of autochthony. The opposition movement painted the British, the 
Hashemites, the Syrians, and the Palestinians who dominated the Transjordanian 
government as foreign. By doing so, the movement articulated a notion of autochthony 
and Transjordanian uniqueness that was in conflict with Abdullah’s vision of Transjordan 
as the core part of the Arab nation. 
 However, after Jordan annexed the West Bank in 1948, both the Hashemite 
monarchy and the opposition movement developed different discourses of national 
identity. Following the annexation, the Jordanian government needed to reframe 
Jordanian national identity to include the Palestinian population. The political opposition 
movement adopted Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser’s brand of anti-imperialist, 
socialist Arab nationalism and this challenged the monarchy’s discourse of Arab 
nationalism. Thus, the monarchy began to promote a dominant discourse of pan-
Jordanianism, rather than Arab nationalism, to try to paint the Hashemites as legitimate 
rulers of both Jordanians and Palestinians. This discourse was based on notions of Islamic 
legitimacy, drawing on the Hashemites’ status as descendants of the Prophet Muhammad 
and as former rulers of Mecca, as well as, beginning in 1948, rulers of the holy sites in 
Jerusalem. By conducting renovations and performing ceremonies at the holy sites in 
Jerusalem, the Hashemite monarchy asserted ownership of Jerusalem as a way to 
legitimize annexation. 
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 Dominant discourses of national identity shifted again after the Six Day War in 
1967 and after Black September in 1970. The loss of the West Bank combined with the 
expulsion of Palestinian militias from Jordanian territory led to the emergence of an ‘East 
Bank first’ discourse. This discourse was an articulation of Transjordanian nationalism, 
as opposed to a pan-Jordanian national identity, now no longer considered legitimate or 
feasible. The government framed its version of Transjordanian nationalism in terms of a 
tribalized national identity, which emphasized so-called tribal customs and traditions as 
representations of a national culture. Popular discourses of Jordanian national identity 
also privileged Bedouin accents, clothing, and food as symbols of the Jordanian nation. 
Alongside official and popular discourses of a tribalized national identity, communities 
that identified as tribes also began expressing notions of a tribalized national identity. 
They did so by denationalizing Palestinian-Jordanians and rendering them foreign in 
order to narrate themselves in their oral and written histories into a position of 
autochthony and significance. These narratives of tribal history potentially conflicted 
with the Hashemite monarchy’s discourses of national identity because these narratives 
privileged tribal communities and did not articulate a unified national identity that could 
truly include all communities in Jordan. Furthermore, these narratives of autochthony 
threatened the Hashemites because they would not be considered autochthonous 
according to this definition. 
 All of the discourses discussed above are expressed in public spaces in Amman. 
The Hashemite monarchy has drawn on a set of discourses of national identity and 
referrals to various historical periods or events ranging from Nabataean times to 
Hashemite rule of Jerusalem and has expressed these in different places in order to 
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legitimize its authority. The analysis of the public spaces illustrated the monarchy’s 
construction of new narratives of Jordanian history and expressions of Jordanian national 
identity. During the 2000s, the Hashemite monarchy built places that combined histories 
of ancient civilizations with modern achievements and aspirations of Hashemite rule. By 
doing so, the monarchy portrayed itself as the glorious culmination of an organically 
evolving Jordanian history. Alongside referrals to the past, the Jordanian government has 
also articulated a vision of Jordan’s future that is hypermodern with gestures towards 
neoliberal principles. The various reactions to Jordan’s neoliberal economic policies of 
the last ten years indicate competing ideas about imaginaries of modernity, national 
identity, and the trajectory of Jordan as nation-state.  
The analysis presented in this thesis contributes to an understanding of how in the 
context of Jordan’s ‘artificial creation’, the monarchy and other groups of Jordanians 
have created a national identity or national identities that could be viewed as legitimate. 
This thesis has not been able to address to what extent communities in Jordan have 
considered or consider these discourses of national identity legitimate. However, by 
tracing constructions of national identity from the mandate period onwards and by 
analyzing the spatial expressions of discourses of national identity, this study has shown 
how the Hashemite monarchy’s efforts to legitimize itself through changing 
representations of the nation is an ongoing process. How and why various groups in 
Jordan have influenced or resisted these official discourses of national identity is an area 
that will require new sources and further research. However, by documenting and 
analyzing changes in the Hashemite monarchy’s discourses of national identity over time, 
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this thesis has contributed to an understanding of how discursive and spatial constructions 
in nation-building gain significance and can become dominant. 
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